

The FORUM

Discussing International Affairs and Economics



MIGRATION

Character and Scope

Economic Potential

Regional Perspectives

Interviews, Essays, Editorials

- | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------|--|-----------------|
| Scott Blinder | Joseph Chamie | Gloria Moreno
Fontes Chammartin | Justin Gest | Delio Gianturco |
| Pavla Hradecna | Graeme Hugo | Maria Koinova | Khalid Koser | Mark Krikorian |
| Marek Kupiszewski | Loren Landau | Phillip Martin | Marco Martiniello | Tamlyn Monson |
| Tobias Pfutze | David Phillips | Rafael Reuveny | Peter Schaeffer | Ronald Skeldon |
| Yaw Nyarko | Ilya Somin | Madeline Sumption | Arno Tanner | Dean Yang |
| Catherine Withol
de Wenden | L. Alan Winters | Ayman Zohry | Student Award Winners
Raluca Beslieu Sam Hansen | |

contents

fall 2010

18 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: CHARACTER, SCOPE, AND BARRIERS

20 **International Migration and World Population**, Dr. Joseph Chamie

25 **International Migration: A Long Term Perspective**, Dr. Peter Schaeffer

28 **International Migration Between Political Propaganda and the Economy**, Dr. Ayman Zohry

31 **Making the Case for the Global Governance of International Migration**, Dr. Khalid Koser

34 **Loading the Lottery of Birth: Forced Migration and the International State System**, Tamlyn Monson

38 **Immigration and Political Freedom**, Dr. Ilya Somin

44 **Migration Effects Due to Climate Change**, Prof. Rafael Reuveny

49 **The Future Dilemmas of International Migration: Ongoing Brain Drain, Desertification, and Hunger**, Dr. Arvo Tanner

53 **Migration and Development: The Elusive Link**, Dr. Phillip Martin

60 ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF MIGRATION

62 **Brain Drain, Migration Patterns, and Poverty**, Interview with Dr. L. Alan Winters

69 **Effects on Originating and Host Countries**, Interview with Prof. Delio Gianturco

74 **Migration and Developing Countries**, Interview with Dr. Ronald Skeldon

80 **Effects on and from Remittances**, Interview with Dr. Dean Yang

91 **The Benefits of Brain Circulation**, Interview with Dr. Yaw Nyarko

95 **Economic Effects of Migration in Central Europe**, Interview with Dr. Marek Kupiszewski

100 **Expanding the Definition of Remittances and Considering How Labour Protect Affects Migrant Workers' Income and Ability to Send Larger Remittances**, Gloria Moreno-Fontes Chammartin

105 **Remittances, Foreign Aid and Development: The Bigger Picture**, Dr. David Phillips

114 REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES

116 **The Political Consequences of International Migration on Sending Countries**, Dr. Tobias Pfitze

121 **Co-Development Policies in Europe: Objectives, Experiences, and Limits**, Dr. Catherine Withol de Wenden

134 Integration in the United Kingdom and Europe, Interview with Dr. Scott Blinder

139 Muslim Immigrant Integration in Europe, Interview with Dr. Justin Gest

144 Going Local: Human Mobility and Local Governance in Africa, Prof. Loren Landau

148 Irregular Migration in Europe: Problems and Solutions, Pavla Burdova Hradecna

153 Unintended Consequences of Diaspora Entrepreneurship During Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Dr. Maria Koinova

159 Migration Issues in Europe, Interview with Madeline Sumption

165 Immigrant Integration: Discourses and Policies in Belgium and in the EU, Interview with Dr. Marco Martiniello

171 The Future of Migration in the Asia Pacific, Dr. Graeme Hugo

177 Immigration Issues in the United States, Interview with Mark Krikorian

Student Writing Competition Winners

183 Targeting Immigration to Win Votes: Sarkozy and the Roma Expulsion, Raluca Besliu

186 Aiming at the Wrong People: A More Comprehensive Approach to Integration Policy, Sam Hansen

The FORUM

Discussing International Affairs and Economics

Printed in the U.S.A.

A publication of the Center for International Relations
933 N. Kenmore St. #22201, Arlington, VA 22201
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ABOUT THE FORUM

The Forum is a publication of the International Affairs Forum online journal. Inside each issue you'll find interviews, editorials, and short essays from academics and practitioners, presenting a wide spectrum of views and from around the globe. In this way, we wish to provide readers with an all-partisan, international look at today's major issues, and tap into the research and views of major thinkers and actors in the field within the 'space' between social science journalism and academic scholarship. That is, we look for carefully considered contributions that can nevertheless be published relatively quickly and which can therefore maintain the impetus of current thinking but which do not require detailed peer review. The extent of our review is therefore largely a matter of informed editorship. We think that this is a valuable approach to extending informed opinion on policy in the international sphere.

Another feature of each issue is recognizing winners of our Student Writing Competition Program by publishing their efforts. As part of our mission, we strive toward providing a platform for students to take next steps toward successful professional careers and as such, believe exceptional work should be recognized, regardless of experience level. The program is open to all college students around the world.

ABOUT THIS ISSUE

Over the past few years migration has started to become a phenomenon of major strategic importance in terms of its cultural, social and economic impact both within destination countries and origin countries. This is because unprecedented numbers of people are now migrating in search of short term work or better lives for the long term. We at IA Forum want to devote some time to understanding the issues involved and how migration might change the dynamics of the world economy.

In destination countries, such as the US, unprecedented rates of immigration have their most direct and immediate effect on demographics and on social cohesion. The population of any country generally does not like a rapid influx of people from other cultures. Along with this there is an immediate effect on

available resources and services. On the other hand in the longer run those immigrants have historically contributed richly to the culture of their destination country, or have made an important economic contribution. In origin countries emigration can similarly have a short term damaging effect, due to for example the loss of skills such as in the medical field. But on the other hand, further down the road, migrants can help their home countries through transferring funds for consumption, bringing back skills and knowhow, or boosting investment and entrepreneurship.

This issue brings together a group of papers and interviews with major figures in the field from a number of countries, organizations and think-tanks. To an extent, the organization of the report has been contingent on the content of the papers received which were largely decided by the writers rather than the direction of The Forum. Nevertheless, we have divided it up into three parts which we felt were most relevant to increasing the value-added of the report. In part one we have assembled a group of papers that deal with the character and scope of migration. In the second part we have included papers which deal with the economic effects and potential of migration largely for source countries (i.e. mainly poorer, developing economies) but also for destination countries. In the third part we have papers that deal with the same overall topics but with a particular country or regional perspective.

We hope you enjoy this issue and encourage feedback about it, as it relates to a specific piece or as a whole. Please send us your comments to editor@ia-forum.org.

Contributors




Dr. Scott Blinder is a Senior Researcher at COMPAS, working on the Migration Observatory at Oxford project. His research focuses on public opinion toward migration, multiculturalism, and related political issues. He has a PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago. Prior to coming to COMPAS, he was a member of the sub-faculty of the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. His primary line of research examines attitudes of native European majority-group populations toward immigration and multicultural policies. A particular interest is in investigating the extent, strength, and impact of social norms against racial and ethnic prejudice, how politicians can either use or circumvent such norms to pursue their electoral aims and influence public opinion about immigration. He has also conducted research on the politics of race and gender in the US.

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


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Dr. Arno Tanner
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Dr. Phillip Martin

International Migration and World Population

Dr. Joseph Chamie
Center for Migration Studies
UNITED STATES

From time immemorial, *Homo sapiens* have moved from place to place. Sometimes, those moves were in pursuit of opportunities, challenges and adventure. At other times, the migrations were brought about by economic necessity, environmental change, or persecution and conflict. Whatever the underlying causes, the migratory movements of *Homo sapiens* over thousands of years have greatly affected the size and distribution of world population as well as shaped the course of human history.

In the very beginning, perhaps some 200,000 years ago, the mobility of humans was limited largely due to primitive levels of social organization and technology. Based on early archeological evidence, the earliest humans were confined largely to eastern and southern areas of Africa.

Some 60,000 years ago, human populations expanded not only along the coastal and inland areas of the tropics of Africa but also to the coasts of South Asia and Oceania. This migration continued to the point that approximately 30,000 years ago most of Eurasia as well as significant portions of the western hemisphere, primarily North America, were being settled by human populations.

Two thousand years ago virtually all areas of the world had been affected by this human migration, with the result being that virtually no region at that time could be considered “empty”. Most of the migration that followed consisted of settlers or invaders moving into established human communities.

Large migration flows among continents began in the 16th century with the beginning

of the period of rapid European population growth and expansion. By 1750 less than three percent of the world's population of nearly 800 million lived in the Western Hemisphere. Two hundred and fifty years later, the proportion had increased nearly six-fold to 14 percent.

The conquest, exploitation and settlement of the Americas and Oceania by European powers led to huge human migration streams between continents. It is estimated that at least 10 million Africans were moved as slaves to North and South America between 1700 and 1850. In addition, between 1830 and 1930, 12 million people, mainly Chinese and Indians, were brought to the Americas as indentured workers.

Also with the establishment of Australia as a penal colony, about 160,000 convicts mainly from Europe had arrived there by the middle of the 19th century. Furthermore, during the 100-year period from 1830 to 1930, expanding economic opportunities attracted 52 million people from Europe to the Americas, with 32 million landing in the United States, and nearly 4 million in Australia and New Zealand.

By the 1930s, however, international migration bottomed out following the First World War and then the Great Depression. Migration increased greatly during and after the Second World War, with millions dislocated and resettled abroad. Decolonization also led to large migration flows. The 1949 Indian partition alone involved the migration of about 8 million people between India and Pakistan.

By 1960, the number of migrants in the world was about 76 million, or about 3 percent of the world's population. A half century later, the number of persons residing outside their country of birth in 2010 has nearly tripled to 214 million people, and again represents about 3 percent of the world's population of 6.9 billion. The majority of today's migrants, 60 percent, reside in the more developed regions

The United States currently has the largest number of migrants, approximately 43 million. It is followed by Russia with 12 million migrants, Germany with 11 million and Saudi Arabia, Canada, France and the United Kingdom each with about 7 million. The largest proportions of migrants are found in Western Asia, with Qatar in the lead with 87 percent, followed by the United Arab Emirates with 70 percent and Kuwait with 69 percent.

Over the next 40 years at least 2 billion more people are expected to be added to the world's current population. Virtually all of this projected growth will take place

in developing countries. The total population of today's more developed regions will change little, remaining around 1.3 billion.

Presently, six countries – India, China, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh and Indonesia - account for about half of the world's annual growth of 79 million people. India alone contributes 17 million people annually, more than a fifth of global growth, and as a result is expected to add approximately a half billion more people to its population during the first half of the 21st century.

In terms of rates of population growth, some of the highest continue to be found among the least developed countries of Africa. During the second half of the 20th century, the population of Africa more than tripled, increasing from 221 million to 819 million. Vigorous population growth is expected to continue in Africa, with the continent projected to reach 2 billion inhabitants by 2050.

With the populations of most migrant-sending countries continuing to grow relatively rapidly, many people of working age face serious difficulties securing gainful employment. As a consequence, large numbers of both skilled and unskilled workers, especially young men and women, are seeking – at times desperately - employment and economic opportunities in the wealthier receiving countries, especially in Europe, North America, the Middle East and Australia.

In contrast to developing countries, the populations of many industrialized countries are rapidly ageing and projected to decline relatively soon, the result of very low birth rates. Today fertility levels in 76 countries – representing close to half of the world's population - are less than the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman.

When fertility rates remain below the two-child replacement level long enough - and in the absence of compensating immigration - populations will age and decline in size. For example, by mid-century the populations of the Russian Federation and Japan are projected to decline by 25 million. Although fertility may rebound in the coming decades, few believe that fertility in most developed countries will recover sufficiently to reach replacement level in the foreseeable future. Consequently, for population growth as well as slowing down population decline, many industrialized countries will need to turn to international migration.

World demographic projections anticipate international migration remaining high during the 21st century. In terms of projected annual averages for the first half of

the 21st century, the major net receivers of international migrants are projected to be the United States (1.1 million), Canada (215,000), United Kingdom (170,000), Italy (150,000), Germany (110,000), France (100,000) and Australia (100,000). The major countries of net emigration are projected to be Mexico (-320,000), China (-300,000), India (-250,000), Philippines (-175,000), Pakistan (-155,000) and Indonesia (-155,000). In total, roughly 125 million people are projected to immigrate to the cities of more developed regions during the first five decades of this century.

The demographic consequences of these projected immigration flows on future population growth can be significant, but also vary tremendously by region and country. In the absence of international migration the projected populations of some sending countries would be considerably larger in 2050 than currently projected. For example, if migration were to cease, the populations of Mexico and the Philippines in 2050 would be approximately 20 million and 10 million larger, respectively, than currently projected. In contrast, without international migration the projected population of more developed regions in 2050 would be more than 90 million smaller than it is today.

“Migration trends point to even greater ethnic diversity within countries”

In addition to the important demographic effects of international migration, increased numbers of foreign born people and the continuing flows of immigrants are having significant social, economic and political consequences for both more developed and less developed countries. In contrast to past trends, the composition of the immigrants in many instances differs greatly from that of the receiving country. In Europe, for example, many of the immigrants in the past came from the relatively poorer countries of southern Europe, e.g., Italy, Spain and Portugal. Many of the immigrants of today from Africa and Asia are not only less educated and lower skilled than the native population, but are ethnically very different from the native population, raising concerns about cultural integrity, integration and assimilation.

Also, in the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11th as well as elsewhere, international migration has become an issue of national security, with many countries

tightening their borders and stiffening their migration policies. At the same time, economic and political crises in many less developed countries, combined with rapid population growth and urbanization, have increased pressures and desires among many populations especially the youth to migrate to wealthy nations.

In a number of receiving countries, the current socio-political situation is further complicated by the presence of large numbers of migrants who have entered illegally or lack documents for legal residence and employment. For example, approximately 11 million of the 43 million foreign born people in the United States are unlawfully resident.

How to address the growing presence of illegal migrants – many working at jobs natives tend to avoid – is an issue of heated debate in many countries around the world. Some wish to regularize the unauthorized migrants, i.e., grant amnesty; others want to repatriate the illegal migrants; and still others argue for something in between, e.g., temporary work visas possibly leading to citizenship.

In sum, in addition to playing an increasingly vital demographic role worldwide in the 21st century, the growing numbers and increased flows of international migrants will also have significant social, economic and cultural consequences. In particular, migration trends point to even greater ethnic diversity within countries than today and pose noteworthy challenges for effective immigrant integration. Moreover, these difficulties are not confined to developed countries; developing countries are increasingly facing these same challenges. Therefore, one may reasonably conclude that in the decades ahead international migration will continue to be a highly controversial and divisive issue not only for countries, organizations and communities, but also especially for the immigrants and their families.

*The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Migration Studies.

International Migration: A Long Term Perspective

Dr. Peter Schaeffer
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International mass migrations have a long history. Catherine the Great recruited German farmers to settle in Russia to improve agriculture. In the 17th century, the King of Prussia issued an edict welcoming French Huguenots, which included immigrants with advanced industrial skills, particularly in the textiles industry. In Geneva and the Swiss Jura region, Huguenot watchmakers started an industry that endures to this day. In the 13th century artisans from Flanders' woolen cloth industry fled civil war to Italy and England¹, where they accelerated the raise of the textile industries of those two countries. Similarly, in the 16th century Amsterdam gained economic power at the expense of Antwerp, which suffered from Spanish repression. Germany's staggering loss of scientific, cultural, artistic, and industrial knowledge and talent during Hitler's reign of terror is still evident, for example, in the relative loss of international stature of even that country's most distinguished universities compared to their position in the first part of the 20th century.

More recently, sub-Saharan Africa has been losing high percentages of the doctors and nurses it trains to more advanced economies, some of which actively recruit them.² The situation in some regions is so dire that the provision of even the most basic medical

1 In 1271 England's Henry III issued a decree that included a 5-year tax holiday to immigrant cloths maker

2 In the United States, the J-1 visa allows foreign medical graduates to stay and practice in a Medically Underserved Area (MUA) or Health Professional Shortage Area (HPSA). Although theoretically time limited, in practice this program can lead to a permanent stay. Many rural areas make frequent use of this program. The better-known H-1B visa program covers a much wider range of skilled immigrants.

Great Britain recruits medical professional, particularly physicians, nurses, and dentists, worldwide and enjoys an advantage in its former colonies because of similar education systems and a common language.

services can no longer be taken for granted. Today, many industrialized countries have special programs for skilled immigrants. These programs have detractors, but while citizens of rich countries argue over the merits of such programs, poor sending countries dispute their fairness.

Immigrants were not always welcomed. In the 19th century, opposition to Irish, Catholic, Italian, Jewish, and Eastern European immigration into the United States sometimes ended in violence. More than 100 years earlier, Benjamin Franklin expressed his disdain for the cultural and linguistic influence of German immigrants on American society. Although there are differences, a historic perspective shows that few issues are without precedent and that many regions of the world at one time experienced significant migrations that changed their societies and economies.

Some of the issues that migrations throughout history seem to have in common include the integration and assimilation of immigrants and their economic and political rights. Medieval cities had to decide who could become a citizen, and under what conditions. Not much has changed, except that the decision is now made at the national level or,

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Many regions of the world at one time experienced significant migrations that changed their societies and economies
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as in the case of the European Union (EU), partially at the supranational level. We can expect to see more developments in this direction, as globalization makes the mobility of employees from facilities in one country to another ever more important. Thus, trade agreements will more often include agreements about mobility.

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Immigration does not impact everyone equally. The guestworker migrations in post-WWII Europe had no negative impact on the receiving countries’ elites, and opposition to immigration came mostly from blue collar workers who felt threatened by the lower-wage newcomers. Similarly, the initial fiscal impact was positive, since only young tax-paying workers came, while dependents stayed behind. This changed as the migration matured, the “guests” stayed, and family reunification in the receiving countries became the norm.
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Suddenly the impact was felt more widely: in schools that had to provide services to children with rudimentary or no skills in the language of instruction, by teachers interacting with parents they could not communicate with, or renters who suddenly found a large new group competing with them for family-size apartments. France, in particular, also saw the beginnings of segregation of low-income immigrants and natives, and countries that award citizenship on the basis of the parents' citizenship have to contend with a large and growing number of permanent residents who are nationals but for their passport. The discussion in the United States about citizenship rights of children of illegal immigrants means that this could also become an issue here. Europe's guestworker experience displays parallels with illegal immigration to the United States in other respects, as well.

Any large demographic change happening over a relatively short period of time strains the ability of society to adjust and adapt. We see this even in the case of domestic migrations as, for example, when residents of Oregon and other western states expressed their opposition to the "Californication" of their state. It is a myth that integration and assimilation are all done by the immigrants. Every large group that came to the United States has left its imprint and changed aspects of society, and the same is true for immigrations elsewhere. Large scale immigration changes the immigrant and the receiving society. No wonder some natives oppose immigration if they fear that it will change their familiar environment. Twenty-five years ago few would have guessed that today in the public schools of the city of Zurich, Switzerland, non-native speaking children outnumber native speakers, one example of how large scale migration is impacting societies on all continents, not just in a select few countries.

Even if international migration were to stop immediately, a large number of countries would be dealing with the impacts of emigration and immigration for some time to come. No issue deserves more attention than the integration of the children of immigrants. Unfortunately, both in Europe and the United States, our societies are insufficiently responsive to this challenge. The riots in France a few years ago indicate what failure might look like. It is a challenge that must be addressed by governments and by civil society. Although I am an optimist and believe that eventually the descendents of the recent newcomers will become and feel as citizens of their adopted countries, we can do much to significantly shorten the time when this will be the case.

International Migration Between Political Propaganda and the Economy

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Migration in less developed countries is strongly influenced by poverty, economic difficulties, improper socio-economic policies, and political instability. Despite the fact that new technologies made it possible for people to communicate easily, strict visa requirements limit the freedom of movement. While national borders were invaded by international companies; only the highly skilled workers can find a pathway to be engaged in this globalized economy. In this essay I argue that the economy is the main determinant of migration rather than politics and political leaders.

Politics versus the Economy

In a globalized world, political leaders play with the card of migration in their electoral campaigns. However, one can confidently say that migration policies are determined by market mechanisms and economist rather than politicians. International economies stimulate most of contemporary migration streams; the legal migration as well as the undocumented migration streams. While International economies depend on undocumented migration to recruit cheap and unskilled labor needed for casual works, head hunting and the highly skilled migration programs are utilized to recruit the highly skilled migrants. This process takes away the highly skilled persons from developing countries to the developed. A salient example of this drain is the migration of medical personnel from Western Africa to Europe.

In a market-oriented international economy, head hunting and brain drain can be justified, but if we think beyond the market mechanism, developing countries does not have the incentives or the basic organizational infrastructure to keep their brains. Remittances of migrants are the most viable development-related aspect of

migration, but can they replace the drained brains? Migration includes hazards and potentials; undocumented migration is hazardous but at the same time it sustains the lives of millions of migrants and their left-behind families in origin. However, regular migration is not a sort of a hazard-free movement; it has its own consequences such as the problems of the left behind families in case of non-family movements. Also it implies the challenge of integration and the fear of assimilation in the countries of destination.

“*Encouraging the diaspora to invest in origin is an important way to boost trade between origin and destination countries*”

Towards a Fair International Migration Policy

It is important to establish a fair international migration policy that takes in consideration the potentials and hazards of people movement and protect developing countries from sacrificing their brains to the West. The current global scene reveals a sort of miss matching between labor supply and demand which is responsible about contemporary migration.

Economic imbalances in the international economy, globalization, and free trade agreements stimulate migration streams – regular and irregular (undocumented). Given the economic imbalance between the South and the North, migration streams will continue in the foreseeable future. The volume of irregular migration is a reaction of restricting regular migration. Economic aid as a means for reducing the volume of regular and irregular migration is not sufficient. It should be associated with “mobility Partnership agreements” between countries of origin and destination to ease regular migration and to reduce irregular migration.

The Way Ahead

Technical assistance and efforts to rehabilitate labor force in the South in order to be able to engage into the labor market is important. Technical assistance could take

the form of formal training, exchange programs, and qualifications and certificates recognition. Encouraging the diaspora to invest in origin is an important way to boost trade between origin and destination countries and to help creating more jobs in the South. Transfer of knowledge through national expatriates programs are highly appreciated and should be supported by both origin and destination countries. Despite some pitfalls, the UNDP experience in this field is highly appreciated and should be supported and strengthened. The appealing slogans such as “no aid but trade” should be transformed to programs to help developing countries cope with their economic difficulties caused by the transformation from the state-managed economy to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund’s led market liberalization in order to reinforce the so called globalized economy which works – so far – pro the Western international companies and leads to monopoly and more economic difficulties in the South. Globalization should be more humanized!

The Case for Global Governance of International Migration

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In contrast to many other cross-border issues of our time, such as trade, finance, or the environment, international migration lacks a coherent institutional framework at the global level. There is no UN migration organization; and states remain the principal actors in migration governance. The legal and normative framework affecting international migrants cannot be found in a single document, but is derived from customary law, a variety of binding global and regional legal instruments, nonbinding agreements, and policy understandings reached by states at the global and regional level.

The case for a more integrated legal and normative framework on international migration, and a more robust international institutional arrangement to implement it, rests on five main arguments.

First, contemporary international migration is now occurring at unprecedented levels and has a truly global reach. There are about 215 million international migrants in the world today - in other words one in every thirty-five people is an international migrant. Far more are affected by migration, whether partners and children left at home, individuals and communities receiving remittances from abroad, or host societies celebrating or commiserating multiculturalism. International migration has become an archetypal example of a global issue that is still largely governed at a national level.

Second, the forces that drive international migration are powerful. They include disparities in development, demography and democracy; the global jobs crisis; revolutions in communication and transportation; and social networks. The ability to modify those forces is limited, and national migration policies alone can no longer effectively manage

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International migration has become an archetypal example of a global issue that is still largely governed at a national level
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or control migration. There is an increasingly convincing argument that greater international cooperation is required simply to achieve national goals with regard to international migration. Look no further for compelling evidence than the fact that about one-third of the world's irregular migrants currently reside in its wealthiest and most powerful nation.

Third, there are growing numbers of migrants around the world who are vulnerable and exploited, and insufficiently protected by either states or international institutions. For example, perhaps one million people (often women and children) are trafficked across international borders each year into situations of near-slavery. The vulnerability even of migrant workers with legal status has been exposed again during the recent global economic crisis. Job losses for migrant workers have been recorded around the world, as well as deteriorating working and living conditions for those who have retained their jobs. There are significant shortcomings and gaps in international labor migration and human rights standards concerning migrant workers, and no international institution has a protection mandate applying to migrants.

Fourth, the effects of climate change on migration are likely to present new management and protection challenges. While it is hard to predict just how many people will be affected, most experts expect the number of international migrants to increase significantly, in the next twenty to thirty years, as a result of the effects of climate change. A significant case for global governance in the context of international migration resulting from the effects of climate change is that a proportion of those affected will fall outside the existing legal and normative framework.

One such group is that of cross-border environmental migrants. Because they will have crossed borders, they will not be covered by the soft law framework of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which in any case is nonbinding. Yet neither will they satisfy the criteria defined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of

Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which do not recognize environmental factors as a cause of displacement. A second group is those who may be forced to evacuate low-lying islands as they are submerged by rising sea levels. Exactly what their legal status would be were they to lose their territory and be resettled elsewhere remains unclear. Clearly, the resolution of such questions lies in the realm of international law and cannot be resolved in national laws and policies alone.

Finally, it is argued, momentum for change is slowly developing. More and more governments appear at least willing to talk with each other about international migration, and to consult in identifying effective policies and practices, for example through Regional Consultative Processes and the Global Forum on Migration and Development. Collaboration between global institutions with an interest in international migration has also accelerated in recent years, particularly in the shape of the Global Migration Group.

Convincing though these arguments may be, the obstacles to more global governance on international migration should not be underestimated. The reluctance of most states to yield national control over international migration is understandable. Sovereign states have the right to determine who enters and remains on their territory, and international migration can also impact on other essential aspects of state sovereignty, including economic competitiveness, national and public security, and social cohesion. In addition, some of the challenges to more effective international cooperation on international migration at times can appear insurmountable. In particular, it pits developed economies that want to protect national labor markets and admit migrant workers on only a selective basis against developing countries with rapidly expanding and youthful populations that demand greater and more unrestricted access to those labor markets.

At least some of the responsibility for slow progress in developing more global governance on international migration also lies with existing international institutions that are unable or unwilling to extend their mandates, often enter into competition with one another when they do, and fail to cooperate on even the most basic of issues such as common terminology or shared access to data on migration. What is more, even among advocates for reform, there is little consensus on how far-reaching the changes should be. Ambitions range from more effective regional cooperation, through more coherent global cooperation, to the development of a new legal and normative framework and new institutional arrangements to deliver the reforms.

Loading the Lottery of Birth: Forced Migration and the State System

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It's important when thinking about migration—and, more specifically, forced migration—to remember Spruyt's (1994) observation that one of the evolutionary advantages of territorial statehood was the limitations it imposed on predation “because social actors have more opportunity to exit... and to seek refuge and better environments elsewhere” (1994: 554).

However, Torpey observed that, in recent history “states, and the international state system of which they are a part, have expropriated from individuals and private entities the legitimate ‘means of movement’” (Torpey, 1998: 239) to the extent that opportunities for exit have been severely curtailed. Subjects have gradually been documented, membership assigned in the form of citizenship, and “closure” exercised against non-citizens (Brubaker, 1992: 23). Where once “little but their own poverty restricted migrants’ movements” (Hahamovitch, 2003: 73), the regulation of movement now effectively prevents them from “voting with their feet”.

Article 12 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights states that “everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.” Yet leaving one’s “own” country necessitates entering another, and there’s no universal protection of that right. Indeed, even those who fall under the protection of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and its related Protocol (1967) face enormous barriers to seeking refuge outside the borders of their state or territory of origin. They, too, must be “outside outside the country of [their] nationality” in order to do so. Yet despite this, the states that are most able to support refugees – those with the highest GDP per capita (UNHCR 2009: 9) – have actually responded to their responsibility to protect refugees by moving their borders outwards, resulting in ever-diminishing options for

asylum seekers to 1) exit their countries of origin and 2) seek out better environments elsewhere.

Visa requirements restrict entry to destination countries. Comparing, for example, the nationals exempted from EU visa requirements and those burdened by them – which includes all nationals of African states and nationals of so-called ‘refugee-producing’ countries – scholars observe that visa restrictions are simply a means of preventing asylum seekers from seeking protection (Stoyanova 2009; Hathaway 2005). Although refugee protection legislation would allow for the waiving of the visa requirement on entry into a European country, carrier sanctions ensure that commercial air and marine craft prevent those without visas from even departing their place of origin, let alone reaching a territory where they could claim this right (Feller 1989; Nicholson 1997; Foster 2009).

“Millions of people are born into the rightless limbo conferred by a citizenship which...holds the bearer captive without his or her consent

Those who in the face of the costs and risks of more formal transport options instead resort to boarding flimsier vessels and attempting to cross the Mediterranean from African to EU shores now also face borders at sea in the form of Frontex (Stoyanova 2009; De Haas 2008). Through agreements with third countries along the African Coast, the EU monitors departing vessels and intercepts them at sea, returning them to partner states such as Libya – which is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention or 1976 Protocol, and therefore offers no protection of asylum seekers against refoulement – from where they are returned to territories where their lives or freedoms are at risk. And what of those who do not fall under the protection of the 1951 Convention? The Convention pins refugee status upon the risk of persecution, thus overlooking the systemic civic disadvantage that is suffered by all citizens to an equal extent in most non-democratic states. It doesn’t protect the inevitable victims of collateral damage in territories whose despots offend other states, leading to war. In addition, it cannot assist

those who are born bureaucratically captive to ineffective states that cannot preserve the means to sustain life or prevent the outbreak of epidemics.

It has been argued that citizenship confers the “right to have rights”, being the basis from which all other rights could be expected to flow (Batchelor 1995: 7). But in the “organised hypocrisy” of the international state system, as Stephen Krasner (2001: 242) has termed it, this lovely principle remains a truism of legal positivism.

Millions of people are born into the rightless limbo conferred by a citizenship which, far from granting “the right to have rights”, holds the bearer captive without his or her consent. Since the internal sovereignty of a state may legitimately vary from democratic rule to dictatorship (Philpott, 1999: 571), the subjection of a territorial population to that supreme authority is not considered a form of persecution; it is considered legitimate, whatever the type of rule in place. The state system automatically designates subjects as members of a state, regardless of whether the subjects in question have any voice or rights within that state - there’s no necessary connection between misrule and illegitimacy. And although the state system can be seen to grant the right to misrule – “[a] state does not practice sovereign powers... unless it is surrounded by a community of states that recognizes these powers” (Philpott, 1999: 575) – the system offers no protection to those who face the blunt side of internal sovereignty.

In the absence of free movement, and in the context of poverty, the choices of better environments to which to move are greatly diminished. This may help to explain the recent counter-intuitive finding of a positive correlation between immigration and lack of political freedoms in host territories (De Haas 2010), as well as the fact that developing countries host four-fifths of the global refugee population (UNHCR 2009: 1). By extension, the territorial state system has ceased to inhibit predation and arguably encourages it, offering ‘sitting duck’ populations open for abusive rule.

In this context, the 1951 Convention becomes little more than wallpaper over structural cracks in an international order that, by inhibiting free movement, creates a context for, and sustains, refugee-producing socio-political environments.

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Immigration and Political Freedom

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Free international migration has numerous benefits. It enables many to seek out freedom and economic opportunity. For political dissidents and members of repressed ethnic and religious groups, it is often their best chance to escape oppression. But one important advantage of international mobility is too often overlooked: the opportunity it gives migrants to choose the government under which they wish to live. Recognizing the importance of this option greatly strengthens the case for expanding migration rights.

Migration as a Tool for Self-Government

Today, we take for granted the idea that people have a right to choose their government through some form of democratic process. Dictatorships and oligarchies are no longer seen as legitimate rulers because they don't give their people an opportunity to choose their leaders. For much of the world's population, however, the only possible form of political choice is to "vote with their feet" by leaving.¹ According to Freedom House, some 105 of the world's 194 lack fully functioning democracies.² These countries contain about half the world's population. The citizens of oppressive dictatorships such as China, Cuba, and Saudi Arabia lack any meaningful influence over their government. In partially democratic nations such as Russia or Venezuela, the existence of formally free electoral processes is undermined by government control of most of the media and intimidation of political opponents.

¹ Greater detail can be found in Ilya Somin, "Tiebout Goes Global: International Migration as a Tool for Voting With Your Feet," *Missouri Law Review* 73 (2008), 1247-64.

² Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2010* (2010), available at <http://www.freedom-house.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010>

For most citizens of these undemocratic societies, emigration is their only chance to choose what government they wish to live under. To the extent that such choice is considered an important human right, democratic states should be very hesitant in denying them entry, as many currently do. Refusing entry to those fleeing undemocratic societies often means consigning them to a life lived under despotism. To

“*Liberal democratic nations should adopt a presumption in favor of allowing immigration by migrants fleeing authoritarian or totalitarian states*”

their credit, democratic governments insist that authoritarian states give their citizens the right to leave. But the right to leave a tyranny has little value unless it is coupled with the right to enter a freer society.

It is easy for outsiders to suggest that citizens of oppressive societies should stay and work to change their government rather than flee. But doing so often exposes dissidents to imprisonment, torture, or death at the hands of the authorities. As recent events in Iran remind us, even a determined large-scale opposition movement can often be suppressed by an authoritarian regime willing and able to use force. Moreover, many undemocratic societies lack the social and economic preconditions necessary for a transition to democracy in the near future. Some lack the necessary levels of literacy and economic development. For example, the poverty and low education levels of Haiti have so far stymied efforts to establish a functioning democracy there, even when such efforts were backed by outside powers such as the United States and France. These preconditions could potentially be achieved over a period of several decades. But that is little comfort to potential migrants for whom those decades are likely to encompass most of their lives.

Current international human rights law and American immigration law already grant asylum to refugees fleeing political, racial, religious, or gender-based prosecution that has targeted them individually.³ These policies are laudable, but overly restrictive. The

3 Somin, “Tiebout Goes Global,” 1260-61.

victims of political despotism are not limited to those who are specifically targeted for persecution by the government. Even those citizens of oppressive societies who avoid individually targeted repression still suffer from the general lack of freedom, suppression of political choice, and economic underdevelopment that these governments produce.

Despite the many flaws of democracy, the data suggests that democratic regimes provide greater protection for human rights, a higher standard of living, and even more effective responses to natural disasters than authoritarian ones do.⁴ The difference between the enormous death toll of 250,000 from the recent 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Haiti and the much smaller one (under 1000) caused by the even larger 8.8 earthquake in Chile was in part due to the fact that the latter has a functioning democratic government, while the former does not.⁵ Democratic governments have stronger incentives to respond to natural disasters effectively because failure to do so is likely to be punished at the polls.

Democracy and the Case for Expanded Migration Rights

Given the tremendous suffering caused by nondemocratic governments and the importance of political choice as a human right, liberal democratic nations should adopt a presumption in favor of allowing immigration by migrants fleeing authoritarian or totalitarian states.

That presumption need not be absolute. For example, governments could still exclude migrants who pose a threat to their current citizens, such as criminals, terrorists, and perhaps carriers of deadly communicable diseases (assuming that the danger the latter pose cannot be controlled by less harsh means). Migration could also be restricted in cases where the migrants both 1) are strongly opposed to liberal democratic values

4 See Morton Halperin, *The Democracy Advantage* (New York: Routledge, rev. ed. 2010); Alastair Smith and Alejandro Quiroz Flores, "Disaster Politics: Why Earthquakes Rock Democracies Less," *Foreign Affairs*, July 15, 2010, available at <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66494/alastair-smith-and-alejandro-quiros-flores/disaster-politics>

5 See "Haiti Earthquake Death Toll Revised to At Least 250,000," *Daily Telegraph*, Apr. 22, 2010, available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/centralamericaandthecaribbean/haiti/7621756/Haitis-earthquake-death-toll-revised-to-at-least-250000.html>; Sarah Miller, "Confusion over Chile Earthquake Death Toll Sparks Frustration," *Christian Science Monitor*, Mar. 5, 2010, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2010/0305/Confusion-over-Chile-earthquake-death-toll-sparks-frustration>

and 2) numerous enough to undermine those values in their new country if allowed to settle and become voters. In such an extreme case, migration restrictions could be the only way to preserve the liberal democratic institutions that make the host nation attractive to migrants in the first place.

This rationale for restriction, however, is unlikely to apply in very many situations. Most migrants from authoritarian states are conscious of the advantages of liberal democracy and have no desire to replicate the regime they fled in their new societies. Moreover, given open labor markets, liberal democratic societies create very strong incentives for cultural and political assimilation of migrants. If nothing else, such assimilation will be attractive because it tends to improve migrants' economic prospects. In addition, recently arrived immigrants are likely to have little political influence. For at least several years, they will not even have the right to vote. Even after gaining voting rights, it takes a long time for immigrants to acquire the resources and political clout necessary to compete for political influence with natives on an equal footing. That leaves plenty of time for assimilation to mitigate any illiberal tendencies they might have. Nineteenth and early twentieth century fears that Eastern European and Asian immigrants would undermine democracy in the United States turned out to be radically off-base. We should be skeptical of similar claims today.

Some Common Objections to Increased Immigration

Some contend that liberal democratic governments have no obligation to allow immigration by victims of undemocratic regimes. After all, Americans and Europeans are not responsible for those regimes' oppressive policies. Even if it is true that liberal democratic states have no duty to affirmatively assist the victims of these governments, they at least have a less sweeping duty not to interfere with the victims' own efforts at self-help. Democratic governments can, perhaps, legitimately choose to deny affirmative government benefits to migrants, such as welfare payments or resettlement grants. But, as philosopher Michael Huemer has pointed out,⁶ denying migration rights goes beyond this. Governments that exclude immigrants prevent them from helping themselves by using their own resources and those of current citizens who wish to voluntarily aid them or conduct economic transactions with them.

6 See Michael Huemer, "Is There a Right to Immigrate?", *Social Theory and Practice* 36 (2010): 429-61.

It is one thing to deny immigrants access to various welfare programs, as the 1996 US welfare reform act did. It is quite another to forbid migrants to help themselves by means of voluntary transactions with individual native-born citizens and previous immigrants. When governments do the latter, they use the threat of force to compel migrants to stay under the rule of oppressive governments, thereby becoming partially complicit in that oppression themselves.

Many critics of immigration analogize immigration restrictions to private property owners' right to keep unwanted visitors off their land. They analogize the United States, for example, to a private "club" that has the right to keep out unwanted entrants.⁷ However, there are crucial differences between a government and a private club. The latter includes only members who join voluntarily and agree to follow all of the club's rules. If members wish to leave the club, they can generally do so while retaining all of their property and other rights. By contrast, most people do not choose to accept the domination of the government they live under; they are instead born into it. Even in a relatively free society that allows emigration, it is difficult for citizens to fully escape the rule of their government. Emigration is costly, and does not enable the migrant to take all of their property (especially land) with them. Democratic governments are more consensual than authoritarian states, but not nearly as much so as the private club analogy implies.

Some who are sympathetic to expanded migration rights in principle worry that migrants may consume too many resources, putting too much of a strain on host nation's economies. However, if the host nation does not subsidize the migrants through welfare payments, they are only likely to come if they can support themselves through their own labor. They will thereby produce at least as much wealth as they consume. Historically, large-scale immigration has contributed enormously to the American economy. Surveys consistently reveal that the vast majority of economists across the political spectrum believe that expanded immigration would benefit the American economy far more than harm it.⁸

American conservative opponents of immigration often worry that expanded migration is likely to lead to pressure for the expansion of the welfare state to unsustainable levels, as relatively poor immigrants vote for more and more government benefits.

7 See, e.g., Stephen Kershnar, "There is No Moral Right to Immigrate to the United States," *Public Affairs Quarterly* 14 (2000): 141-58, pg. 143.

8 See, e.g., Daniel Klein and Charlotta Stern, "Economists' Policy Views and Voting," *Public Choice* 126 (2006): 331-42.

Even if this expansion of the welfare state both happens and turns out to be a harmful development, the resulting damage must be weighed against the enormous benefit to migrants who are able to escape oppressive regimes. In practice, it is far from clear that new immigrants will necessarily support expanding the welfare state more than native-born citizens do. To the extent that they do so, and native-born citizens perceive that immigrants are receiving a disproportionate share of welfare state benefits, that is likely to lead to an offsetting reduction in support for the welfare state among natives. Public opinion research in both the United States and Europe shows that most people become less supportive of welfare spending if they believe that it is primarily assisting members of other ethnic groups at the expense of their own.⁹

Conclusion

Recognition of the value of self-government strengthens the case for expanding migration rights for citizens of oppressive regimes. Not all such people can be saved through migration. The vast majority probably cannot. Many are unable or unwilling to face the cultural, professional, and other adjustments that migration requires. Others cannot move for economic or health reasons. Expanding migration rights is not a panacea for the evils of political oppression. But it can save millions of people from poverty and tyranny. They deserve the opportunity to vote with their feet for a better life.

9 See, e.g., Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser, *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Maureen A. Eger, "Even in Sweden: The Effect of Immigration on Political Support for Welfare State Spending," *European Sociological Review* 26 (2010): 203-17

Migration Effects due to Climate Change

Interview with **Prof. Rafael Reuveny**

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UNITED STATES

International Affairs Forum: It's clear that environmental disasters such as Hurricane Katrina can cause the migration of large groups. You've discussed that in some of your work and also believe that more gradual climate change can have an effect on the migration of large groups of people. Can you expand on this?

Professor Rafael Reuveny: Societies that depend on the environment for their livelihood - that would include farmers, growers of cash crops, herders - are very vulnerable to changes in environmental conditions. For example, if the temperatures in the summer become warmer, many crops cannot grow, and the land becomes less productive. It gets dryer over time and the amount of nutrients in the land declines.

With the climate getting warmer over time, the number of droughts is rising and as this pattern continues, the amount of water flowing into rivers is going to slow

down. This is going to have an effect on areas where people depend on fishing. As the amount of water in the rivers is reduced, areas close to the ocean are not able to maintain the salinity of the water the way as before. The seawater encroaches into the water in greater and greater parts of the river estuaries, and the waters around where the river connects back to the sea get saline. So providing fresh water to people and providing fresh water to agriculture declines. These are slow moving processes and their effects accumulate over time.

That slow moving environmental degradation is one type of effect from climate change. Another is an increase in the frequency, intensity and geographical scope of weather related disaster. Some of the slow moving, environmental degradation effect type of situations can also take the form of increasing precipitation and increasing floods, because areas may exhibit an increase

in rain, depending on the geographical region. As a result, there are going to be more and more floods, and those floods have a lasting effect on the quality of the land. They create more erosion and take away topsoil with them. The ability of the land, once the waters are receding, to sustain agricultural productivity the way they have done it before declines. So both of those processes are a byproduct of climate change, and both of them can affect the livelihood of people, particularly those that depend on the environment for livelihood, and this happens to include about 75% of the people on Earth that live on less developed countries.

You also believe that the movement, the migration of these people can lead to violent conflict in the areas that they relocate to...

Prof. Reuveny: Yes. First, when we make such a prediction, we can only come up with a theory that would try to ask, why do we expect an increase in violence? That would include examining factors such as a mix of people from different ethnicities, a mix of people from different religions, and where relevant, movement of people against the background of previous conflict and tense relations. Conflicts typically do not start overnight. They have a history, baggage of bad feelings. Other

forces in the theory include predicting what might happen if there is increased competition over jobs. If the receiving area doesn't have enough resources on its own, there could be increased competition of the resources in the receiving area. In general, the world, while it is getting more and more globalized economically and becoming increasingly one unit, is not going through such a process culturally and politically. Countries are not agreeing to give up their jurisdiction, and there is always animosity against newcomers. You can see that in the United States and Europe now.

What makes a movement due to environmental forces special is that it can be abrupt, and it can involve what we call mass migration, where a lot of people are moving over a relatively short period of time. We know that the receiving countries in the developed world are very

“If we see that environmental forces play a role in legal migration, we can make the argument that it should also play a role in illegal migration”

suspicious of migrants and very unhappy to see large movements of migration into the countries. There are migration quotas in place, which are really not that large. The problem of the legal migration is not the problem though, it's the illegal migration.

If we see that environmental forces play a role in legal migration, we can make the argument that it should also play a role in illegal migration, because the only difference between legal and illegal migration is one of luck; someone was able to obtain papers, and someone was not able to obtain papers. All of them are moving because of the same reason: they want to better their lives. So we established the illegals are also going to move because of environmental issues. Now we can ask ourselves, what happens empirically when a lot of people are moving over a relatively short period of time due to environmental calamities and create a subsample to focus on.

There are numerous examples in the recent decades where the arrival of newcomers to areas was met by violence and led to violence between newcomers and residents. We can learn from both intercountry movement and intracountry movement.

Moving is moving is moving, right? It doesn't really matter if you are in New Orleans, and Katrina comes, and you are moving you are fleeing away, and you are

going to Houston or to North Carolina, or wherever, and you are being met with hostility, or you are in Sub-Saharan Africa, and you are moving somewhere else. The first movement was within country, and the second movement is, say you are in Chad, you are trying to steal the border into Italy, and you are met with hostility. It's the same distance. It really doesn't matter. It's movement, movement, movement.

There are numerous examples, including in this country, where large movements of migration due to climate change lead to a hostility between residents and newcomers. The cases of intramovements that lead to violence are even more alarming, as these are people from the country so they share something presumably. In the case of Katrina, race appears to be an additional factor. During the 1930s, there was the calamity of the Dust Bowl, when people migrated from the Great Plains and there was a large influx of several hundred thousand people into California. Police were sent to the border, blocking people from getting in. There was no race element here, most were white people, and those who came from the Midwest were labeled as Okies, even though not all of them came from Oklahoma. When they came to California, they were met with ridicule, and they lived in Okie towns, very run down areas, shanty towns. They were beaten and discriminated against in the job markets. The locals wanted to turn them back.

This experience is not unique to the United States. It's something that's human nature. It's seen in Bangladesh to India, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Philippines, the Soccer War in 1969: El Salvador to Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador to Honduras. There are numerous examples like this.

So, take these examples and consider the possibility that this is going to be the wave of the future in terms of the environmental problems and the intensity and the scope, which of course is going to accumulate, and now is going to be more and more people that are going to make the move.

What do you consider to be areas for potential violence because of migration in the future?

Prof. Reuveny: One area is the Southwest of the United States. In my view, it's just a matter of time before something bad will happen there. The Arizona law that is now being litigated is just one manifestation of these bad feelings that are rising.

Another region is Southern Europe. There were numerous examples of severe violence, including beatings and injuries in Southern Italy and Greece on people who are mostly from Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. Even though when someone enters the European Union, they can presumably move freely, these immigrants are targets for racial profiling

because they look different. Racial profiling is also what some people argue is what that Arizona law is all about.

Yet another area has been, and continues to be, between Bangladesh and India. There were horrific acts of violence in the '80s and the '90s when thousands of people were slaughtered over some few days of rampage and violence. In the state of Assam and in the state of Tripura in India, there were migrants who were coming from Bangladesh. Bangladesh is particularly susceptible to weather related disasters, and if climate change continues, it's predicted that the country may lose essentially about 20-25% of its land, because it is very low lying in terms of the height above sea level. This is another example of slow moving environmental degradation that can lead to movement of millions.

Do you see this problem in other parts of the world?

Prof. Reuveny: Some of the largest cities in the world are low lying, such as Lagos in Nigeria, where millions of people will have to move because their place of living is going to be invaded with water. In Alexandria in Egypt and the city and the area around Shanghai in China, where tens of millions of people are at risk, are other areas of concern. The Sub-Saharan countries have seen increased droughts already, reduced precipitation, and

encroachment of the desert as the Sahara expands to the south and to the north. This impacts the borders between these countries, such as Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Senegal, Somalia, and Ethiopia. In many cases such as Sudan, borders are sometimes are not even marked.

The whole region is disproportionately going to be affected by climate change. Wherever people move, most of the movement is going to be within the region.

In Sub-Sahara, everything is poor. So when migrants come to the receiving area, they face the same type of, more or less the same type of competition. For example, movement along the Senegal River between Senegal and Mauritania has led to violence between the countries, and this continues. Then superimpose that on existing ethnic tensions and nationalistic tensions, say in Ethiopia between Eritrea and Ethiopia, or Somalia, which is a failed state, or Mauritania and the African aborigine people of Senegal. This is hostility that has been going for some time.

The Future Dilemmas of International Migration: Ongoing Brain Drain, Desertification and Hunger

Dr. Arno Tanner

Universities of Helsinki and Tampere

FINLAND

Today's economic uncertainties are particularly hazardous for the poor in developing countries that are a) exporters of skilled migrants and b) simultaneously in a weak economic or political position. Many African countries, as well as Pakistan and Bangladesh in Asia, are continuing to export a large number of doctors, scientists and business specialists, while suffering from famines, natural disasters, and deficiencies in democracy or the rule of law at home.

Two global challenges remain that are, for the most part, unresolved and contribute to migration-related problems. These accelerating problems are a threat, not only to global stability and regional viability, but also, to many offshore national interests:

- 1) Western cherry-picking of the "best and brightest" continues, and remittances cannot sufficiently tackle the brain-drain problem
- 2) Climate change is causing acute and slow desertification-related migration, as well as expensive food prices leading to hunger-related rioting and refugee flows

Remittances unable to fully tackle brain drain

The role of remittances as a controller of excessive emigration of the skilled from developing countries is anything but a resolved issue in spite of the current decline in media attention. It is largely agreed that labor migration produces massive remittances back to the country of origin. This sum, often estimated to be greater than the total foreign development aid, alleviates the most acute suffering that is caused by the loss of skilled workers. In order to facilitate this form of "relief", remittance-sending has been welcomed and supported, and continued remittance-induced investments and

businesses are recommended. However, remittances are not able to overcome the serious problems caused by the ongoing emigration of the skilled. Many significant logical flaws in the issue of brain drain have gone under-analyzed and under reported.

The major problem is that the better the immigrant's integration to the country of destination, the less the immigrant sends remittances back home. Not only does the well-integrated immigrant send remittances less often, but the amount of the individual remittances decreases as well. Many integrated immigrants stop sending remittances altogether. In this sense, remittances are a sort of "Pandora's box" or black hole; in order to receive a constant sum of remittance revenues to a particular country of origin, this country needs to constantly send further emigrants abroad, as the older migrants tend to be a less probable and lucrative source of this revenue. Hence, all programs and projects that endeavor to stop skilled emigration from a particular country would – if successful – soon lead to diminishing remittances to this country.

Another issue with remittances is the question of the allocation of remittance benefits in the country of origin. Although the circles that send emigrants will benefit, e.g. through real estate investments, medical service use etc., the poorest segments of the country of origin are unlikely to see any major benefits from remittances. On the contrary, inflation may ensue, causing those with no remittance benefits and to suffer.

A third problem with remittances concerns the grand sum of all global remittances. A fluctuation of economic conjunctures in the countries of destination may further shrink remittance flows. Already prior to the global downturn of 2009, only half of one survey's respondents replied "currently sending money back home", whereas in 2006, three out of four respondents were sending money back home (Inter-American Development Bank, 4/08). In Mexico and Brazil as well, the amount of all remittances decreased by 3–4 percent between 2006 and 2007. According to the World Bank, *trillion dollars* were sent to developing countries in 2007, but this amount decreased by 200 billion in 2009. It is probable that in 2009 and 2010, during and in the aftermath of the downturn, decreases in GDPs in destination countries will cause further decreases in remittances to the countries of origin.

Finally, the uncertain character of remittances also shakes the politics of countries of origin that are heavily dependent on remittances. For example, remittances account for up to 16 percent of the GDP of Nepal, and 9 per cent in Bangladesh. If there are heavy decreases in remittance revenues, these countries may be on the verge of bankruptcy, in a region that is already very fragile due to floods and economic instability.

Climate change and nutrition-related shortages force people to move

Although the scope and domain of climate change is still under question, we already see unfavorable local climatic developments. Increasing dryness, in combination with ineffective use of agriland, is making ever larger areas uninhabitable. Desertification is obliging many to move to the cities; however, cities may not be able to employ and integrate such an increase in rural immigrants, resulting in : a) an increase in slums, causing further political and other instability, and b) an increase in the number who may choose to emigrate from the cities to other countries, due to poorer prospects in the cities. The former may contribute to refugee flows, and the latter to economic migration – whether regular or irregular. Sooner or later, the continuing decrease in the amount and fertility of arable land will cause increased migrant pressure on the Mediterranean (e.g. through Greece) and the US-Mexico border.

Another migration-causing factor related to limited agricultural resources is expensive food prices. It is a fact that a 3 billion share of the world's population lives on 2 dollars per day. A 20 cent grain price increase thus means a 10 percent increase in daily expenses. For many of the destitute, as much as 70 percent of daily expenses go to food; with such low incomes, this price increase may be fatal and hunger will rapidly cause unrest.. In the recent past, we have seen serious food demonstrations in Mozambique, Haiti, Ethiopia, the Philippines and Indonesia. Basic food commodities such as rice and wheat have become so expensive that the destitute cannot afford them. The constantly high food prices, due to commodity scarcity, may cause further societal turmoil, consequent conflicts and refugee flows.

The close future

Brain drain, weakening agriland and food-related scarcities will continue to involve the same countries. Countries such as Mozambique are but one example. Another is Pakistan, where brain drain has long been a major problem, and now the flooding and potential hunger emigration is making the situation even more acute and complex. This may lead to all kinds of migration from Pakistan.

Russia's decision to ban grain exports will set further upward pressure on food prices. We may expect to see more African countries affected by both brain drain and hunger migration. In special danger are the small Sub-Saharan countries. Both brain drain and nutrition-related scarcities are hence acute challenges concerning very populated regions.

What can be done to minimize the negative effects of reckless emigration from developing areas?

First of all, one needs to acknowledge the potential “Pandora’s box” character of remittances: although beneficial in themselves and at given times, remittances as a stable flow of money for the countries of origin is improbable and would require a continual outflow of new emigrants. Rather than encouraging further migration, the international community and bodies such as the UN and the EU should encourage a portion of the “brain drained” to return to benefit their country of origin. All kinds of return and development programs are recommended as is the decrease in heavy reliance on remittances as a panacea.

Second, brain drain also binges the middle classes of developing countries. If emigration remains a major option and few skilled migrants return, the middle class remains small, leaving the country vulnerable to corruption, democracy deficiencies and conflict. Such setting often is a base for refugee flows. Therefore, fighting brain drain may also mean fighting and consequent refugee flows.

Third, in addition to brain drain, the decreasing amount and productivity of arable land may cause conflict and further refugee flows. Rising food prices are a global function of the amount and use of available agriland. Food riots, as seen in Mozambique and many other countries, may easily turn into forced migration flows, e.g. across the Mediterranean. Here, adjusting the Geneva convention to include hunger-based migration could give the forced migrants a better status than they have as merely irregular migrants. Today, such irregular migrants might be just scrupulously stopped at the Mediterranean or the Mexican-American border.

In conclusion, better control of food prices and channeling new foreign help to creating and sustaining good agriland in developing countries would strongly prevent conflict and alleviating influence, relieving pressure from hunger migration. Also a ban against companies in developed and rich countries buying agriland in poor countries, or a ceiling on grain exports in developing countries afflicted by hunger might prevent large streams of hunger migration. Another way to increase food production would be the imposition of a ban on producing vehicle fuel at plants that were originally meant for local food production.

Migration and Development: The Elusive Link

Dr. Philip Martin

University of California, Davis

UNITED STATES

The number of international migrants, defined by the UN as persons outside their country of birth a year or more, more than doubled between 1980 and 2010, from 103 million to 214 million (<http://www.unmigration.org>). Most migrants moved from poorer developing to industrial or richer developing countries. About 10 million (or less than five percent) of the world's migrants are refugees, persons outside their country of citizenship and afraid to return because of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion (www.unhcr.org).

The 128 million migrants in more-developed countries were 10.3 percent of their 1.2 billion populations, while the 86 million in less-developed countries were 1.5 percent of their 5.7 billion people (www.unmigration.org). The countries with the most migrants in 2010 were the US, which had 43 million migrants; Russia, 12 million; Germany, 11 million; and Saudi Arabia, Canada, and France, about seven million each. These six countries included 87 million migrants, or 40 percent of the total. Countries with the highest share of migrants in their populations were mostly Gulf oil exporters such as Qatar, where over 85 percent of residents were migrants, and the UAE and Kuwait, with 70 percent migrants. The countries with the lowest shares of migrants in their population include China, Indonesia, Vietnam, Peru and Cuba, where less than one tenth of one percent of residents were migrants.

Migration and Development

Economic development, the process by which poorer countries become richer, is most often measured by average per capita national income. Developing countries were

classified by the World Bank as low income in 2005 if their average per capita incomes were less than \$905, as middle income if their per capita incomes were between \$906 and \$11,115, and as high income or developed if their average per capita incomes were above \$11,115. About 170 of the world's 200 countries are considered developing (World Bank, 2008).

As average per capita incomes rise, migration in search of higher wages declines. In the 1960s, millions of southern Italians migrated to France, Germany and Switzerland in search of jobs and higher wages. However, by the late 1980s, when per capita income in Italy surpassed per capita income in the UK, Italy was a net immigration country, attracting migrants from both Eastern Europe and Africa. Similarly, thousands of Koreans migrated to work in the Gulf countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but since 1990 Korea has attracted migrants from other Asian countries. On the other hand, Mexico-US migration has been increasing despite rising average incomes in Mexico.

Migration and economic development have increased unevenly over the past quarter century, leaving the relationship between more migration and faster development unclear. Experience shows that there is no automatic link to ensure that more migration leads to faster development—in Italy and Korea, migration likely speeded up development, but not in Jamaica or Mexico. This means that migration can accelerate development in countries poised to grow while perpetuating underdevelopment in other countries.

The effects of migration on development are often grouped in the 3 “R channels” of recruitment, remittances, and returns. Recruitment refers to who goes abroad—international migration is generally most beneficial to developing countries if low-skilled workers who would have been un/under-employed at home find jobs abroad. Remittances, the portion of foreign earnings sent home by migrants, increase incomes and improve living standards for most of the families that receive them, and can also provide capital needed to spark economic development. Returns focus on what migrants do after employment abroad—do they return and use newly acquired skills or return to rest and retire?

The impacts of these 3 “Rs” on development can be captured by extremes summarized as virtuous or vicious circles (Martin, Abella, Kuptsch, 2005, Chapter 3). Sending Indian IT workers abroad is an example of a virtuous migration and development circle; the out-migration of computer workers helped to launch an industry that today employs

millions in India. The emigration of African doctors and nurses may be an example of a vicious circle, as disease in their home country goes untreated and productivity declines. Virtuous circles are more likely if migrants are abroad for only a short time, they send home significant remittances, and they return with new skills and links to industrial countries that can increase trade and investment.

The major beneficiaries of migration from lower to higher wage countries accrue to migrants whose incomes are raised. Some of these higher earnings are remitted to families in migrant countries of origin, reducing poverty and having second-round multiplier effects as remittances are spent. Migrants who return to their countries of origin with savings, new skills and ideas can be the sparkplugs for the development of their countries of origin. On the other hand, some migrants return home to rest and retire, which can slow economic development for lack of motivated workers.

One universal way to ensure that migration accelerates development is to get the economic fundamentals correct in migrant-sending countries. If the exchange rate is correct, and there are incentives for profitable small investments, migrants will remit and invest; non-migrants may also be motivated to save and invest. Special programs to spur remittances and investment are more uncertain, such as Mexico's 3x1 program, which provides \$3 in federal, state, and local funds for each \$1 contributed by migrants abroad for improvements in their areas of origin.

The Mexican 3x1 program has a limited impact on development because it is small, steers funds to migrant priorities that may be different from those of non migrants, and reduces funds available for other development projects. Mexican migrants contributed \$20 million under the 3x1 program in 2004, which was 1/10 of one percent of the \$20 billion in remittances. Spending the total \$80 million available was sometimes problematic, since migrants often wanted to improve their local churches for weddings and festivals, while non migrants may want water and sanitation system improvements. Matching funds come from government development budgets, so migrant contributions effectively "leverage" limited development funds for purposes that may run counter to priorities of non migrants.

Cooperation at the GFMD

Since 2007 in Brussels, more than 150 governments have met annually at the Global Forum on Migration and Development (www.gfmd.org) to discuss cooperative ways to ensure that migration speeds development. The two-day government meeting is

preceded by a two-day civil society meeting that features NGOs who assist migrants discussing the problems faced by migrants and mechanisms to protect the human rights of migrants.

Government discussions at the GFMD center on the themes of three roundtables. The first, selected by the host government (Mexico in 2010), focuses on partnerships that include shared responsibility for shared prosperity. The Greek government in 2009 explored ways to integrate migrants in ways that also contribute to the development of their countries of origin and the Philippine government in 2008 emphasized the importance of protecting the human rights of migrants.

The second roundtable deals with some aspects of guest workers. Most countries richer than their neighbors have programs that allow their employers to recruit and employ

foreign workers. As a result, employers can get work done cheaper than if there were no guest workers, and migrants can earn higher wages that raise the incomes of their families and can spark development in migrants' areas of origin.

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However, it is sometimes hard to translate these micro gains of employers and migrants into macro benefits for sending and receiving countries. Guest worker programs aim to add workers temporarily to the labor force without adding settlers to the population. Guest worker programs generally fail, in the sense that employer need for foreign workers tends usually to persist longer than anticipated and slow development makes some workers and their families dependent on foreign jobs. These employer distortion

and worker dependence factors help to explain the aphorism that “there is nothing more permanent than temporary workers.”

At the GFMD, governments discuss the features of new or modified programs, mechanisms to smooth consumption and maintain social services to families that send workers abroad, and tools for maximizing remittances and investments to spur

development in migrants' areas of origin. There is often a special focus on particular groups, such as the women who dominate the ranks of migrant domestic helpers and health care professionals, and on issues ranging from high recruitment fees to cooperation between migrant-sending and receiving governments to train nurses and others for employment abroad.

The third roundtable deals with data and policy coherence. There is better data on international migration than ever before, but it remains difficult to know who is migrating where, what they do while abroad, and if they return. In many countries policies are contradictory, as when the US laments an influx of unauthorized farm workers but erects barriers to imports of the labor-intensive commodities that could be produced cheaper in migrant countries of origin.

The GFMD was launched by a high-level dialogue on migration at the UN in September 2006 and is due to report on its accomplishments in 2013. The experience so far demonstrates that 150+ governments can constructively discuss migration and development issues; what is less clear is whether these discussions can promote a significant number of new cooperative partnerships on migration and development that benefits all parties concerned.

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


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BRANDS



62 **Brain Drain, Migration Patterns,
and Poverty**
Interview with
Dr. L. Alan Winters

69 **Effects on Originating and Host
Countries**
Interview with
Prof. Delio Gianturco

74 **Migration and Developing Coun-
tries**
Interview with
Prof. Ronald Skeldon

80 **Effects on and from Remittances**
Interview with
Dr. Dean Yang

91 **The Benefits of Brain Circulation**
Interview with
Dr. Yaw Nyarko

95 **Economic Effects of Migration in
Central Europe**
Interview with
Dr. Marek Kupiszewski

100 **Expanding the Definition of
Remittances and Considering
How Labour Protection Affects
Migrant Workers' Income and
Ability to Send Large Remittances**
**Gloria Moreno-Fontes
Chammartin**

105 **Remittances, Foreign Aid and De-
velopment: The Bigger Picture**
Dr. David Phillips

Brain Drain, Migration Patterns, and Poverty

Interview with **Dr. L. Alan Winters**

Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex

UNITED KINGDOM

International Affairs Forum: On the one hand, the population in developed countries aged 20-64 is expected to decline by 23 percent from 741 million to 571 million by 2050. On the other hand, according to the IOM World Migration Report 2008, population aged 20-64 in Africa is expected to nearly triple from 408 million in 2005 to 1.12 billion in 2050. What do these demographic trends imply for international migration?

Dr. L. Alan Winters: These numbers clearly imply considerable pressure towards migration flows. Migration does not respond to population directly; it is not just the number of people, but the effect that numbers have on the ability of people to earn an income, which impacts immigration. These trends contrast the shortage of labor that developed countries will suffer, with the incipient surplus that Africa and other parts of the world, like the Middle East, will experience as the number of young people increases. As a

result, there is going to be greater pressure to move to find a job; even more than there is today.

In your opinion, what are some of the greatest challenges posed by international migration? How does temporary migration address some of these same problems?

Dr. Winters: I think the greatest challenge for host countries is that of integrating migrants into the society, in whichever form they choose to come. This could involve both facilitating the integration of people from other countries as permanent citizens, or finding a reasonable way in which temporary workers can be significantly incorporated without suffering a great deal of exclusion and discrimination.

More immediately the host countries need to face another question, which is how to best balance the economic pressures

towards accepting immigrant labor and the costs in terms of social stresses. Even though I am strongly in favor of a very liberal attitude towards migration, one could not possibly throw open the borders of every rich country, as the tension that this would create would undermine the coherence of the society in question, especially so far as its willingness to provide public goods was concerned. Balancing the benefits that migrants can bring, and also the huge benefits to migrants themselves, with the need to keep a coherent society is quite problematic.

In terms of the challenges for the home countries, the question is how to best take advantage of the opportunities that are abroad, whilst trying to ensure that you do not lose the brightest or the best. Migrants are special people and you are typically going to find the most adventurous and the most entrepreneurial people leaving.

How does temporary migration help to solve these problems? For one, it allows host countries to worry less about the long-term fiscal commitment to migrants as they age. In other words, it removes some of the worries surrounding people coming to the host countries to work for 10 or 15 years and then requiring 25 years of social support. For another, and in principle, I think it should allow the home country, the origin country, to think less about brain drain and more in terms of the circulation of skills, and the acquisition of skills abroad, which will eventually

be used for domestic activity. After all, temporary migration implies that people eventually return to their home country. Furthermore, temporary migration, whereby migrants leave for relatively short periods of time, not only implies the return of skills, but with it possibly the return of experience and knowledge of what is possible elsewhere. Of what is possible, for example, in terms of politics, such as liberal regimes or the absence of corruption. As more people experience first hand what is possible abroad there is greater knowledge of what issues can be tackled and solved at home.

There is a growing consensus that migration represents an important livelihood diversification strategy for many in the world's poorest nations... For one, worldwide remittances have continued to rise and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that as of 2009 remittances reached US\$ 414 billion. Amongst other things, remittances have been shown to decrease inequality and help smooth macroeconomic shocks. How can governments harness this potentially very efficient poverty reduction tool? What are some of the dangers?

Dr. Winters: Well, I think the first thing to remember about remittances is that these are transfers from one private individual to another private individual. It is for this particular reason that one needs to

consider closely the question of whether governments should try to harness this tool and whether International remittances should be treated differently from internal remittances or, indeed, transfers from one family member to another. Even when we live together in the same house, I transfer some money regularly to my wife. But there have been brief periods when I have worked in one country and my family has had to stay in another. On these occasions, I would have deeply resented the government if it had attempted to capture some of this regular remittance and decided where it should be spent. Thus, the first point to make is that we need to think really carefully about whether governments should have a role in these types of transactions to begin with.

How do remittances help development under these circumstances? Remittances are a source of income, and if you think that people ought to save them, you need to set up a system whereby people are encouraged to save any extra income that they have made. Governments should not single out remittances for particular

World Bank that suggests that remittance flows do indeed encourage people to integrate more into formal financial systems, leading to continuing benefits for economic activity. It is also very clear that remittances do help to relax families' financial constraints so that they can, for instance, spend more money on the education of their children, something that they might otherwise not be able to afford. Therefore, remittances can play a very important role in development, yet it is not my opinion that governments should necessarily insert themselves into that process.

How has the debate surrounding the so-called 'brain drain' changed since the 1960s?

Dr. Winters: In one of my papers on European skilled migrations since the Second World War, one of the conclusions was that, in some ways, the 'brain drain' discussion has not changed very much at all. The term 'brain drain' was actually coined by a British journalist in 1962

If you think that people ought to save [remittances], you need to set up a system whereby people are encouraged to save any extra income that they have

treatment. Now, having said that, remittances clearly do play an important role and there is recent evidence from the

- when Britain was agonizing about the emigration of its scientists, (almost all to the United States) in very similar terms

to those we hear now. For example, the 1960s discussions worried that, countries invest in the training of specialists but do not benefit from their employment; that it is not uncommon for the most skilled to be the ones who are most likely leave; that there are network effects (an example would be the professor who emigrates and is followed by his students), and so on. These are all very relevant issues today. So in some sense, it seems to me that in the 1960s, the people who discussed the brain drain, who actually were not generally economists or social scientists, had caught onto some very important issues. Where we have got to now is not that the set of questions has changed but that we are now starting to analyze them more formally and to build up bigger datasets. Hence, and quite interestingly, it is the quality of the debate, or the quality of the analysis, rather than its nature, that is starting to change.

Do you believe that there are more positive aspects to the brain drain for developing countries?

Dr. Winters: Yes. The so-called ‘beneficial brain drain’ is one of the newer sides of this debate, a topic that did not really emerge during the 1960s discussions. The argument for the beneficial brain drain - that the possibility of emigrating encourages people to get educated – is that it increases the stock of skilled people at home as not all who become

educated are in fact able to leave. Yet, the evidence is contradictory – favourable in some cases and not in others. This should not come as a surprise: the idea that all possible migration flows around the world will result in the same effect in all circumstances is simply not plausible. What is required for a beneficial brain drain to take place is (a) that you do have to be educated to be able to exit; (b) that the supply of education be flexible, so that the more people demand education, the more people are able to receive education and (c) that only some of those who are educated and wanting to leave actually do so. There are some circumstances where these conditions do not apply - for example, when a government of a developing country controls the supply of education, e.g. medical education, and does not increase training numbers when more of them want to leave. On the other hand, in some cases one can find evidence that people being able to leave does increase the supply of education, think about the private schools in the IT sector in India, and their strong and flexible response to emigration.

There is interesting work conducted by Frederick Docquier and his colleagues that suggests that, for at least a number of countries and at the macro level, the possibility of migration has encouraged overall educational attainment. Contradicting this are two particular exercises suggesting that if there are strong incentives to migrate to a country

which does not value your educational qualifications, the possibility of migration will undermine education. This is the case for Mexico, where many Mexicans emigrating to the U.S. receive little recognition for their Mexican qualifications. This has led to young men being less likely to continue with their secondary education than otherwise. Surveys show that those Mexican communities where migration is a very strong phenomenon have lower secondary school enrollment rates than other communities where migration is not as common. John Giles has found exactly the same trend for internal migration in China. In China, when a migrant moves from the countryside to the city, he is often taken to be an ignorant peasant and will only be hired to do low-skilled jobs. As a result, spending time in school in rural China does not give you better opportunities in the cities; hence the earlier drop out age rate found in the countryside. So whether or not there is a beneficial brain drain becomes a very case-specific matter.

In your opinion to what extent do a country's size and the sectoral dimension in question actually affect the benefits of the so-called brain drain? Do you believe they have an important impact on the sending country?

Dr. Winters: Although I believe that these two factors play an important role I unfortunately do not have much evidence

to back up these claims. The reasons for which these arguments seem to me to be very plausible hypotheses are the following. First, if you come from a really small country, such as Saint Lucia, there is very little return to being the best nuclear physicist or the best lawyer in the country as there are only 60,000 people in the market. So, if you are from Saint Lucia, and are highly talented, there are only really benefits in emigrating to a city such as New York where the salaries are much higher than those earned back at home. Second, if you are from China or India, countries with huge populations, there is no disproportionate damage to the local economy if you lose a few thousand talented people. Thus, the countries for which the brain drain might be really important are medium-sized ones, where losing, say, 30 or 40 people a year from the very top tier undermines the creation of a critical mass of very skilled labor. Remember that skilled people are much more productive in the presence of other skilled people, as creativity thrives through spills from one person to another. Hence, if a country can hold onto all of its very best people it might be able to get over that threshold where positive feedback starts to take place. In these cases a middle-sized country could be undermined when it loses some top people to migration. Although this remains (to me) a very interesting theory, I do not know of any exercises that have robustly tested it yet. I would greatly welcome additional research on the topic.

Despite the budding research on the topic of international migration, there is still a paucity of data that needs to be addressed. In your opinion, what is the future agenda for research on this topic?

Dr. Winters: Indeed, this area of research has been severely hampered by the absence of data. Moreover, gathering the required information is going to be extremely difficult. Think what it is that we want to accomplish and what we would have to do to accomplish it. First, we would have to follow people throughout half their lifetime, starting from a very early age. We would need to find a sample that is large enough to include sufficient numbers of highly talented people. Second, we would have to analyze the question of whether the possibility of migration had influenced their educational decisions. Third, once they have made the decision to pursue higher education, we would have to analyze the question of whether they managed to migrate? Comparing how these individuals manage to leave in comparison to those who have similar backgrounds but who for one reason or another have decided not to pursue higher education or migration. Thus, ideally, not only would we have to follow their decision-making process from a very early point but we would also need a very large sample to test. The challenges are immense. Now, there exist some interesting research efforts collecting detailed life histories where people are interviewed about their decisions to

migrate. It seems to me that there is some future in some of these very specific exercises attempting to gather detailed data from individuals. However, the caveat about collecting recall data in this manner is that it is not quite as accurate as it would be if you could follow people from the very start.

But what about the future of international migration research? What we dream of, so to speak, is that somebody will discover (probably by accident) some way of getting around the particular issues surrounding data collection. In the future, I believe that the interesting research will not be conducted at the macroeconomic level, but at the microeconomic one, questioning how people's experiences and how certain changes, such as in education provision, have impacted their decisions. This is a field that is calling out for some really inventive thinking to pin down particular examples. Although one needs to be wary of making generalizations from a particular case, this is in fact something that we can live with if we actually understand the example itself.

In the past, when faced with acute labor shortages, the industries of developed countries have shown preference for relatively flexible mechanism. American and European service industries in particular have been pushing for a "liberal policy" for movement of labour as "service providers," especially in the

hotel and restaurant, software, insurance, and financial industries. What evidence, if any, is there that these features have become more important in the recent period?

Dr. Winters: I am not sure if we have much evidence that they have in fact become more important, other than to say that those sectors themselves have become more important. It is correct to identify this as a particular group of industries where the attractions of an accessible labor force - or in the case of the financial sector, a very talented labor force - are very strong. Both sets of sectors find it very attractive to either cope with the ups and downs of labor supply – or the need for very high, very particular, talent – by sourcing it from abroad. These industries have become more significant as they have increased their share in the economy, but, I am not sure whether or not their interest in recruiting from abroad has significantly increased. Perhaps the aggregate shift towards hiring foreign labor has occurred just because as these sectors have increased in size, relevance and assertiveness. A second factor to consider is that there was not much of a debate on migration 30 or 40 years ago. However, in the last 10 or 15 years, migration has increasingly entered the policy debate in a way that would have been quite surprising years ago. To recapitulate, the sectors in question have grown, the ability to talk about migration has increased, and with that, its visibility. But in my opinion the

basic phenomenon has not changed very much.

While barriers to trade in most goods and some services including capital flows have been reduced considerably over the past two decades, many remain. Do you believe these policies to be particularly harmful to either sending or hosting countries?

Dr. Winters: Yes, I firmly believe that this is the case. The benefits of drawing experiences or of buying inputs from a very wide range of sources, i.e. internationally, are a very strong contributor to economic growth and the growth of incomes. Furthermore, anything that tends to prevent efficient suppliers from providing a service or a good to a wide range of markets will tend to discourage growth both in the potential purchasing countries, because they will have access to fewer or lower quality inputs and ideas, and in the potential supplying countries because the incentives to produce excellent goods and ideas are lower. Hence trade barriers are a particular problem for both the demander and the supplier of goods and ideas: richer countries are at a disadvantage if they do not 'shop widely', and simultaneously developing countries cannot better their incomes by supplying larger markets at higher prices. It is for these reasons that I believe that trade barriers are particularly damaging.

Effects on Originating and Host Countries

Interview with **Prof. Delio Gianturco**

George Mason University

UNITED STATES

International Affairs Forum: Do you think net benefits of remittances back to the originating countries outweigh the costs?

Professor Delio Gianturco: I think it benefits both the originating countries and the host countries - every bit as important as the transfer of loan and equity funds for direct investment, transfers, and sales of goods and services. There is no debate about the fact that worker remittances benefit the country from which the migrants come in that it increases foreign exchange inflows, raises per capita income, and thus strengthens the development process. Remittances also are evidence of the benefits to host country employers of hiring workers who offer the best comparative advantage and thus contribute to the maintenance or improvement of the host country's standards of living. Finally, remittances reduce the pressure for greater migration from poor countries to rich countries since

they offer a way for many families to stay in their country of origin while increasing their incomes.

How significant do you think remittances are in the economic development of originating countries?

Prof. Gianturco: Until about 2000, very little scholarly attention was paid to worker remittances as a form of capital transfer to developing countries. But both the IMF and the World Bank began studying this intensively about 10 years ago, realizing that remittances were a rapidly growing source of money for developing countries, and that some significant amount of these funds contributes to the development process. Remittances have increased by at least 25% in the last decade alone, and now amount to over \$400 billion per annum. The conclusion of experts is that this does not have the same developmental impact as moneys from financial institutions that

are dedicated to development purposes. But the latest estimates for 2009 are that the total amount of money which is transferred by immigrants' remittances exceeds that from all official sources for development purposes—more than overseas development assistance and multilateral development banks combined—and that every 3% increase in remittances results in a 1% decrease in poverty in the recipient country.

Even though economic development is not the primary purpose of these transfers, the use of remittances has had a profound effect on social and economic progress in the developing countries. For example, a man who did gardening work for me several years ago regularly sent over half of his earnings back to his family in Central America. This not only paid for their day-to-day expenses, but also provided money for that vital development expenditure of education for his children. In addition, my worker bought two American trucks here with his earnings and exported them to his country of origin where they form the nucleus of a family-owned trucking business that is heavily involved in local economic development.

What policies and programs in the originating countries, particularly developing countries, do you think could facilitate increased remittances?

Prof. Gianturco: The recipient countries

are of course very interested in increasing the amount of worker remittances. In order to accomplish this, a growing number have adopted measures to liberalize monetary transfers, facilitate the holding of foreign currency accounts by their citizens, improve the regulation of local bankers as safe harbors for money received from abroad, and encourage the development of national stock and bond markets as alternative investment vehicles for money earned in other countries.

A criticism of brain drain is that it has a significantly negative impact on health and education in the originating countries. Do you agree? Do you consider these impacts of such a level that brain drain has an overall negative effect there?

Prof. Gianturco: I do not believe that "brain drain" has an overall negative effect but I do think that it has had some impact on the development of health services and technology industries in countries like India. A question arises as to whether developing countries would have developed local opportunities to keep skilled migrants at home if they had not been encouraged and enabled to work abroad. The general consensus, is that the "brain drain" migrants would not have had the same economic and social impact if they had stayed at home. So yes, I think it's had some negative effect, but I think that the traveling brains have made a greater contribution to human

development on a global scale by being migrants than they would have if they had remained at home.

What about the effect of brain gain in the host country?

Prof. Gianturco: It's been a very important part of economic success in industrialized countries generally, and in the US particularly. Especially during this period of globalization when there have been so many people who have come to this country and have brought their skills with them, people who came with, or who attained, college degrees once they arrived here. The result of that transfer has been very important for our economic development.

has yet become a major issue. Although the Great Recession has reduced job opportunities in many fields and countries, it has not yet assumed the properties necessary to trigger a massive reflow of educated migrants to their home countries. Furthermore, in many cases these individuals came to their new homes not only for economic reasons, but also for personal security, political freedom, and other intangible benefits. Most of these conditions have not deteriorated appreciably in the industrial countries in the last few years.

Europe and Asia – China, in particular – are projected to have increased ageing populations. Do you think immigrants are necessary for the health of their economies?

It's important for critics of immigration to realize that even for the illegal immigrants, who for the most part do not pay income tax, this does not mean that they are avoiding a major contribution to our tax structure

There are more and more concerns about reverse brain drain, something recently considered a problem in China. Do you consider it a major issue?

Prof. Gianturco: I do not believe this

Prof. Gianturco: I do, particularly in Europe. That's a key point, which has been highlighted recently in the national press. There's a profound shift in demographic patterns between the United States, Europe, China, and India. In China

and Europe, there are rapidly ageing populations as a result of government policy, and individuals' determination to limit family size. India has a youthful population by comparison because large families are still viewed as socially, and personally, desirable by most people. In the United States, we have had a trend toward much smaller families, but we have also had fairly high immigration. As a consequence, it's estimated that our working age population will continue to grow at a, reasonably moderate pace, not an excessive one, whereas the working age population of China and Europe is going to decline as a percentage, of the total population. As a result of those trends, it is anticipated that there will be less dynamism in China, and in Europe, than there is in the United States.

Much has been made of the impact illegal immigrants have on wages in the United States. Do you consider these fears valid?

Prof. Gianturco: It would seem that the impact on salaries here is very, very minimal. A majority of migrants in the US have taken low-income jobs—those in which most native-born Americans are not interested. Many of them are working at minimum wage positions or in many cases for illegal immigrants below minimum wage. So their impact on salaries is minimal. For the higher wage positions—for medicine, for example—it

appears that migrants have had the effect of mitigating, not increasing, salaries since the main problem appears to be a lack of supply of trained professionals. In high-tech industries, it appears that qualified migrants attract generally lower wages than their domestic counterparts, but there is no evidence of a crowding-out effect.

What about other impacts on the economy and societal costs like health care, education?

Prof. Gianturco: It's important for critics of immigration to realize that even for the illegal immigrants, who for the most part do not pay income tax, this does not mean that they are avoiding a major contribution to our tax structure because they pay things like general sales tax, taxes on gasoline, taxes on real estate, personal property taxes, telephone taxes, alcohol and tobacco taxes, indirect taxes incorporated in imported goods, user taxes, etc. Furthermore, even if they filed income tax returns, most would be eligible for earned income credit, which would result in little to no income tax liability for those earning less than \$10,000 a year, a figure which most illegal immigrants do not exceed.

With regard to benefits that migrants receive in terms of social programs, many of these are for children, most of whom are the progeny of legal immigrants, or are

otherwise eligible for full citizenship rights according to the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution. I think this increases our soft power globally and thereby improves our national security. I believe this is something we can be very proud of and although it may cost us more in the short-run, we will end up with a population of both migrants and native-born citizens who are happy and well-disposed toward making a full contribution to our national growth and development.

Migration and Developing Countries

Interview with **Prof. Ronald Skeldon**

University of Sussex

UNITED KINGDOM

International Affairs Forum: Do you believe the economic effects of migration can play a significant role in development?

Professor Ronald Skeldon: It does play a major role in development. I don't think there's any question about that. When looking at human development, migration is a large part of the great transitions from rural to urban, from agriculture to industry and so on. You can't imagine urbanization without migration, and there's no advanced society that's not primarily urban. The concentration of population is very much part of that development. Also, you couldn't have had the development of the United States without migration because it has depended upon migrants throughout its history.

What about the effect on promoting economic growth in developing countries?

Prof. Skeldon: That's a much more difficult issue. Initially, some countries looked at migration and thought if the country of origin became developed, then migrants would stay where they were. In other words, if you develop the source areas in the developing world, then people would stop leaving the developing world, stay where they are. I think that was a dominant attitude in many countries, but it's quite wrong. Because what we do see is that with development, people move around more and there's a positive relationship between development and migration.

By developing a country of origin, you're going to accelerate migration. That's where we see that key link between migration and development. In a way, migration is an integral part of development. It's neither good nor bad, it's just there. It happens.

What effect does migration, and remittances from migrants, have on

achieving a primary objective of the Millennium Development Goals: eradicating poverty?

Prof. Skeldon: Does migration help to alleviate poverty? I would have to say, yes it does. It at least facilitates the reduction of poverty. The clearest examples can be found in China and Vietnam. Looking at China, it was a poor country until Deng Xiaoping embarked upon reforms from the late 1970s. The resulting movements between rural and urban village and town in China have been associated with a huge reduction in poverty.

However, I don't think that you can point to migration and say that migration caused the development. It was the reforms that were implemented that brought about the migration that brought about the reduction in poverty. In other words, it's wrapped in a package of developmental change of which migration was a critical part of that package.

Examining the question from an international migration aspect, we know remittances are one of the largest flows in the world today and are unquestionably important.

But I'm a little skeptical about the whole issue of remittances and poverty reduction and remittances and development in general. This might seem to contradict what I just said about China and Vietnam. But consider that the number of migrants

within a country is much larger than those who move internationally. So migration as a component of change is much more significant internally - you can see the association between migration and development much more clearly in the case of internal migration.

Looking at international migration, we have to build in some other things. First, it's a minority number of people who cross an international border. The second thing is that it costs money to migrate internationally. These people tend not to be poorest. Sometimes they might look poor, but they're not among the poorest. They're going to have to have accumulated capital to move internationally. Relative to the populations from which they come, they're relatively well off. So the remittances are going back to groups that are wealthier than the population from which they come and the remittances go back to very specific parts of those countries of origin. For example, in Peru, 57% of remittances go to Lima, and 82% go to urban, coastal areas. So in other words, only a relatively small proportion of remittances from international sources go to rural areas. Unquestionably, remittances improve the well-being of the families that receive them. But bear in mind that these may not be the poorest families, and they may not be in the poorest areas.

Having said that, there are some small-island countries such as Fiji where there's evidence to show that overall, migration

and remittances have helped to alleviate levels of poverty.

So I'm ambivalent. I don't think remittances themselves actually promote development. However, I do think they improve the well-being of families that receive them.

You've written that the idea of developing country gain (brain drain/brain gain/brain circulation) is an oversimplification of a complex situation. Would you expand?

Prof. Skeldon: This is a very emotive issue, particularly in reference to Africa and the UK. In some ways it's a convenient way to criticize the developed world and link it with the evils of colonialism. But it's much more complex than this.

If we're looking at the global flows of the highly skilled in general, we find that they are dominated by movement within the developed countries themselves plus movement out of a relatively small number of middle-income or rapidly developing economies. These economies are primarily China, India, Mexico, the Philippines, and Egypt. That makes perfect sense because to become highly skilled you've got to have the institutions to create the highly skilled, and many of the poorest developing countries don't have the institutions required to train people to that level.

Now you may say we're not interested in the macro level flows - that if we look at some of these small, poor countries, they're losing their brains. But we have to look at where these people are trained. If proper training can't be achieved locally, wealthier families tend to send the children overseas. We've got to look at place of training as well as place of origin, and quite often we see that the place of training will be in the developed world. This makes perfect sense, because it gets over the whole issue of accreditation. If you are trained in Canada, you have a qualification to a Canadian standard that's likely to be recognized throughout the developed world. If you are trained in Lesotho, you're probably going to have to be retrained or go on bridging courses to bring yourself up to the standard.

As another example, look at Ghana, where they train people to international standards, and the health minister has made it categorically clear he doesn't want a second-rate medical service. You can't fault that. But at the same time, you've got to say, if you train your graduates to global standards, you have to expect them to move globally. These people essentially come from the largest cities of Ghana, Accra and Kumasi. But that's not where the big problem as far as MDGs and poverty is concerned. It's in up country Ghana. We must ask the question: if the skilled doctors hadn't left Accra for overseas, would they go up-country in Ghana? It's a hypothetical question but an

interesting question because why would they? In some ways, it'd be a waste of their brains to go up-country. They don't need a highly skilled doctor, trained to global standards, to work in up-country Ghana. You need somebody with really basic skills. These countries should bring graduates up to global standards, and expect to lose some, but they also need to train people to a standard that will be appropriate for up-country Ghana or Mali or Malawi or wherever. If you're trained to local standard, then your retention rates are going to be higher. It's as much about your strategies of training as about whether people are moving.

Using OECD figures we can see that there were some 35,000 vacancies for nurses in South Africa at the turn of the century. Many could point to that and say 'all the nurses are gone'. But the OECD data also showed there were 38,000 nurses in South Africa who are unemployed, or who had chosen to leave the sector. So there's a brain drain from the sector, but not the country. The overall conditions in the public health section are so bad that people opt out that stay in the country to do something else. So that's why it's not that simple.

How important do you see the Diaspora in assisting development?

Prof. Skeldon: I tend to hold out some hope for this because we have a lot of

highly educated people in the developed countries of the West who are connected to the home countries and they would very much like to play a role in improving conditions back home.

I think there's a place for the highly educated in the Diaspora to go back home and play a role, particularly in government. But migrants will only go back if there's something to go back to. We've seen this in the rapidly developing economies of East Asia. Once these reforms really got

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development going, an increased numbers of migrants returned. We've seen this in China and Hong Kong, but particularly in Korea and Taiwan. It's not that migration

was causing the development, but it helped facilitate it. Migrants from Korea and Taiwan, particularly those living in the United States, said, 'look things are really going on. I think I can make more money, taxation is lower, I'm back with my own people, or they can do a good job back home'. An increased number did go back, and they went back to participate in the new prosperity of East Asia.

I don't think we're seeing that yet for sub-Saharan Africa, except perhaps in Ghana. We can work on policies to help these people to go back but I don't think that in itself will promote development. The impetus for development must come from within the country. It might be as simple as saying, 'we're going to allow the private sector to participate in providing medical services'. Doctors within the developed world may decide to go back and establish a private clinic. Now that private clinic is not likely to be in the poorest parts of the country, it's likely to be within a city. But they'll go back and they'll participate in the development.

My home country, Scotland, has a huge Diaspora. Yet, has it really encouraged development in Scotland? I think that's an open question because the potential for development in Scotland isn't great. Some may look at Carnegie's role on Scottish development - yes, he sent back money to establish libraries, to promote education, but what did that really achieve? It put in the minds of young Scottish people

that, 'if I go to the United States, maybe I'll become like Carnegie'. So rather than enhance the development in Scotland, it accelerated the out-migration.

So, I think the jury is still out on the impact of Diaspora. I remain hopeful however because I know that within the Diaspora community there's tremendous goodwill and there are people who really want to promote development. But I'm not sure how effective that can be without development first really taking off in the homeland. After that happens, they can return, and then it can be effective.

What role should institutions, including the World Bank, play in managing the economics of migration?

Prof. Skeldon: Let me touch on just a couple of institutions that have this as an important part of their mandate. The first one is the International Labor Organization (ILO), a specialized agency of the United Nations. It's got a very important role in establishing global standards for the recruitment of labor, looking after migrants' rights, lobbying for standards of decency, and decent work amongst the migrant laborers. That's a fundamentally important role that institution has to play, and so the ILO has got a clear mandate. The mandate of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is slightly different because of its different roots. It's not a United Nations

organization, it's an international organization, but quite clearly is playing a role in advocacy and in raising migration at the international level to a much higher profile.

The World Bank clearly enters this debate, primarily through remittances and the role that they can play in development. As I discussed earlier, I'm ambivalent about remittances and I'm not sure it's a good idea for the Bank to become involved - remittances first and foremost belong to the migrants themselves and the migrants' families. These are transactions between the migrant and the families. If institutions become involved in that and say migrants should invest their money through a government scheme, migrants may back away.

Quite clearly, remittances are a major financial flow, as they may be able to be associated with microfinance schemes. I've seen some interesting schemes being promoted by local banks on microfinance. For example, if a bank sees that a family is receiving \$200 a month in regular remittance payments from the United States or from Europe, then they may contact that person and ask whether they would like a preferential loan that might help to establish a business or improve the welfare of their local area. There's potential for microfinance and the World Bank may have a role to play in this regard.

So yes, definitely, international

institutions do have a role but maybe not in an overarching role such as generally remittances, particularly in areas of development. I think it's going to be at a much more micro level.

Effects on and from Remittances

Interview with **Dr. Dean Yang**

University of Michigan

UNITED STATES

International Affairs Forum: Remittances are seen by many as a very positive aspect of migration as a means to assist those in developing countries. Your thoughts? How well do they work to alleviate poverty? Increase investment, not only in business but in public sectors such as health and education?

Dr. Dean Yang: There's a great deal of evidence that remittances have a number of positive effects, and bring a number of benefits to households in developing countries that receive them. All the ones you listed are areas that are likely to be affected: small business investment, poverty reduction, improvements in educational investments, and increases in human capital in remittance receiving households. The evidence on health is there as well. One publication that does a good job of reviewing the state of knowledge on this topic is a World Bank report, *Global Economic Prospects* (2006).

The bottom line is there's a great deal of evidence from micro level household surveys in developing countries that households receiving remittances do much better on a number of different dimensions than households that don't: on the income dimension, the poverty dimension, education of their children, small enterprise investment. The natural question that arises, of course, is whether these differences across households that do and don't receive remittances reflect the impact of remittances, or do they reflect other things that are different across these households? Is it really because of any causal effect of remittances? Or is it just the fact that these households differ on other dimensions as well? Do the heads of these households tend to have more education, for example? Are they more ambitious on some dimension, etc? A great deal of hard thinking and statistical analysis is applied to this question in development economics to really understand whether these differences

across remittance receiving and non-receiving households truly reflect the causal impact of remittances, or whether they reflect differences along some third factor.

Some of the most creative studies have actually found that remittances have a positive causal impact on families. You may think that this is a bit of a no brainer, that more money coming into a household would be a good thing but there are some people in migration studies that will argue that remittances are a source of dependency, remittances make people lazy, and encourage people not to work and simply rely on the remittance coming in from overseas.

My own work and the work of many others have found no evidence of that. It's not to say there aren't some individuals and cases where individuals reduce their labor supply and make less effort in the home country because they're receiving remittances. But in my own research, for example, I've found that when households receive more remittances from overseas, they actually invest more in small enterprises and devote more labor hours to work in their household enterprise. That's a striking finding, and I think a strong piece of evidence against those who would argue that remittances on average make people lazy and reduce work incentives in developing countries receiving remittances.

You've performed considerable research on the effect of shocks on remittances. Would you elaborate on these, your work on exchange rates first perhaps?

Dr. Yang: What I've done is to look at exchange rate shocks that were due to the Asian financial crisis in '97, and look at how that affected remittances migrants sent home, and subsequently how that affected what was going on in the remittance receiving households. In that situation, many Filipino migrants around the world experienced quite a windfall in the sense that the Philippine peso depreciated dramatically in the wake of the Asian crisis while the currencies overseas where migrants were earning their income tended not to depreciate by as much, if at all. The migrants who were earning US dollars did the best as their peso value of overseas earnings increased by about 50% as a result of the depreciation of the Philippine peso. What that meant was that they could send much more home in Philippine pesos, which essentially meant higher purchasing power for their families back home.

What I show is that families back home responded to this windfall by investing more in small enterprises and taking any children who were working out of the labor force, investing more in their children's schooling. Basically we saw reductions in child labor, increases in child education, increases in small enterprise investment, and increases in labor supply in small

enterprises.

These analyses take advantage of what is known in economics as a natural experiment, and it's one way of trying to get at the causal questions that I mentioned earlier: what is the causal impact of remittances on outcomes in remittance receiving households? That paper is probably one of the more widely cited papers in the literature when scholars and practitioners are looking for evidence that remittances bring positive benefits to the families that receive them.

And your research on the effects tied to shocks from droughts and hurricanes?

Dr. Yang: Another set of work that I've done is related to negative shocks that developing countries experience and how remittances help cushion the effects of those shocks. That's an important but different type of benefit that remittances may bring. Remittances tend to be counter-cyclical. They rise when adverse shocks occur in recipient household countries. They tend to fall, or at least remain stable in more normal times.

In other words, remittances often serve as a form of informal insurance. In developing countries that tend not to have well developed, government run social insurance systems, like unemployment insurance or disaster recovery funds, remittances can serve a very important

informal role for families that have members who are working overseas. For example, one paper I wrote looks at the Philippines, and that remittances from overseas respond quite strongly to a drought. It looks at remittances over a certain time period, across families in the Philippines who have migrant members overseas. When some of the families (and not others) were exposed to drought that occurred in certain parts of the Philippines, and family incomes drop because of it, remittance flows come in and make up about 60% of the declines in income that these families are experiencing. So the informal insurance provided by remittances provided a 60% replacement rate for income that was lost due to low rainfall. That's just one example of a general point that remittances can serve as insurance in the wake of negative shocks experienced by families with migrant members.

Another paper takes a more global perspective and looks across countries that experienced large hurricanes. I find that in a subset of countries, particularly the poorest countries, remittances do replace a large fraction of losses due to hurricanes. In the poorest half of countries, for example, remittances replace about 20% of hurricane induced financial losses. This is at the aggregate at the country level, looking at countries over time.

So in sum, whenever I discuss the impacts of remittances, I usually describe these

two types of benefits. First, increased funding for current consumption, as well as investment in households. And second, insurance in the wake of adverse shocks.

What effects on remittances have you observed related to the recent world economic downturn?

Dr. Yang: I think the recent downturn is actually quite striking. It supports another general point that's related to this idea of insurance, which is that remittances tend to be much more stable in the face of economic downturn than other types of international financial flows. This is in some ways sensible when we think about what remittances are. They're transfers between family members who have very close social ties. Unlike foreign direct investment, which is very motivated by private interests and private profit, in large part, remittances are motivated by altruism and aren't going to decline nearly as dramatically in times of economic stress as will other types of international financial flows that are more profit oriented, like portfolio investment or foreign direct investment. We can see that quite dramatically in the data for 2009, when remittances were fairly stable and fell by only about 6%, vis-à-vis their level in 2008 globally, if you're looking at remittances going to developing countries. But that's quite a small decline compared to declines in other private financial flows, like foreign direct investment which

essentially fell off a cliff in 2009. FDI flows to developing countries contracted by roughly a quarter vis-à-vis 2008. That's just a huge fluctuation from one year to the next, obviously driven by the global crisis and credit crunch. So the fact that remittances only fell by 6% is quite striking.

Basically, unlike other types of international financial flows going to developing countries, remittances tend to stay quite stable in the face of crisis. This most recent crisis in '08/09 is just the most recent example of the remarkable stability of remittances in the face of economic fluctuations.

How important do you see remittances relative to other sources of external finance? Do you think remittances should be promoted for development more than other sources such as ODA?

Dr. Yang: I'd rather not say that any type of financial flow is inherently more or less effective at spurring development. Each type of flow has different characteristics. Foreign direct investment is the largest type of financial flow going to developing countries. In some years, they tend to be roughly twice as large as remittances. In other years, they may not be much larger than remittances. In 2009, FDI to developing countries was in the \$450-500 billion range, with remittances at roughly \$320 billion.

The comparison with Official Development Assistance is also striking. Official Development Assistance has risen in recent years, but still is only in the realm of about \$100 billion a year, only about a third the size of remittances. Just in terms of magnitude of flows, remittances are three times larger than ODA, and ODA gets a great deal more attention in economic circles and international development circles as a flow that's promoting development.

The relative sizes are the first point but there is still the question of which is the most effective, which type of flow is more effective dollar for dollar at promoting development. That's really a question that we don't have very good data on yet. But even if it's hard to say which of these types of flows have the greater effect on development overall, remittances are likely to have distinct different effects that are worth emphasizing and supporting. In particular, it's very attractive that remittances go directly to individual households and families as opposed to going through government and bureaucracy. That's attractive purely from an efficiency standpoint if you think that government bureaucracies or international bureaucracies are a source of inefficiency and cause some waste of resources as the resources channel through official channels. It's also attractive if one is worried about corruption from the standpoint of siphoning resources away once they get into a government

bureaucracy.

Another positive is from the standpoint of public opinion. One of the biggest challenges facing those who argue for greater levels of efficient development assistance is the public perception is that ODA is often wasted because of the problems of inefficiency or corruption that I just mentioned. Remittances don't have that problem. The fact that they go directly to the needy families is a very important characteristic of remittances that isn't shared by ODA or foreign direct investment.

Remittances are a very large flow, and yet we are still learning about what their exact impacts are on various aspects of economic development. We're still learning about how to magnify or maximize the impact of remittances on economic development. When one thinks about policy measures that can be undertaken to maximize the impact of remittances on development, the list of proven strategies is very short. It's close to non-existent, actually. It may be true of many types of international flows, but the entire community right now is struggling to find evidence as to how the development impact of remittances can be maximized. That's the central subject of my own research and of others who are interested in this area. I think it's a gaping hole and it is very important to really figure out what policies and strategies can be undertaken to maximize the impact of remittances on development.

What policies do you think should be adopted or enhanced in host and originating countries to enable more and better utilization of remittances? What role do you think world financial institutions should play?

Dr. Yang: On the first question, I think there are two interrelated lines of inquiry. First, how can one increase the flow of remittances to developing countries? And second, for a given amount of dollars that are channeled back to a particular developing country, how can one increase the short run and long run development impact of those resources? There are some strategies that actually help address both questions simultaneously. The approach that I've been pursuing in a number of projects recently is the idea that one can potentially achieve both objectives simultaneously by finding ways to give migrants more control over how the remittances they send home are used by recipient families. This is analogous to conditionality in foreign aid.

On the ODA side, it's widely accepted that even though it's hard to do, it's desirable to have some controls in to monitoring and direct how foreign aid is used by recipient countries. One tends not to think about public policy approaches to this kind of issue when it comes to remittances because it's a private flow between individuals and within families. But it doesn't take away from the fact that when one interviews migrants, a large

concern that often comes up is concerns over misuse of remittances, difficulties in getting families to allocate remittances to long term investment purposes, as opposed to short term consumption or even luxury consumptions, difficulties in making sure that the money is used exactly as intended. For example, if the money is intended to sponsor the education of a child or a young relative, concerns are often voiced that the money is siphoned away, or that, in the extreme, aren't even used for the intended purpose.

That difficulty in controlling and monitoring how remittances are used does two things. One, it may end up channeling resources more towards short term consumption rather than long term investment, and away from educational investment and small enterprise investment. In addition, it is likely to reduce the total amount of remittances that might be sent home. If migrants can't be assured in many cases that the remittances sent home are going to be used as they desired, migrants on the margins are probably going to be sending home less than they otherwise would if they had more control.

This is the general idea. We're starting to get some evidence that there is something to this idea, that giving more control to the migrants has positive effects. But overall, it's a research agenda that's just starting. The most developed piece of work on this topic is a project I've done with migrants from El Salvador in Washington, DC.

We've been looking at what happens when you give Salvadoran migrants in the DC area greater control over a particular use of remittances in the home country: savings. One thing that migrants often say is, I'd like my mom and dad back home not to spend the remittance money I'm sending to them all at once. I'd like to have them save some of the money for the future and create this little buffer stock for themselves, so they don't have to keep asking for money in emergencies, or for some other long term savings purpose. The frustration many migrants have is that it's very hard to get families to do that when you're in the US, and family members are back home.

So we worked with a Salvadoran bank and set up a facility to create joint bank accounts between migrants in the US and family members back home. These are bank accounts that the migrants and the family members back home had joint access to, had joint ownership over, and which the migrants in the US could monitor. They could monitor the amount of savings that were maintained in these accounts. We found that when we offered these accounts to migrants, savings went up quite dramatically in the remittance recipient households. So it's actually giving migrants more control over these resources, giving migrants control over savings accounts in El Salvador, which led to dramatically higher savings in El Salvador. In general, we think that a higher savings rate in a country contributes to

overall economic growth. So increasing migrant control over savings can form part of a strategy for raising aggregate savings in El Salvador and aggregate growth in the country.

Another example would be a project that's just getting started in the Philippines that I'm running, where we're working with financial institutions to give Filipino migrants overseas the ability to directly pay for educational tuition and to get reports back from the schools as to how the students are doing. They will be able to get reports on attendance and grades of the students that are being sponsored. This is a way of directly alleviating the control problem, the inability to direct funds to the schools for fees, and also reducing the problem that migrants have difficulty figuring out whether students are actually attending school and doing well in response to being sponsored by the migrant. These are some initial strategies that I'm pursuing in a couple of different contexts at international financial institutions like the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. I think the initial signs are quite positive at this point.

Now, the question that you may raise is, what role does this type of approach imply for institutions like the World Bank, the IDB, or USAID, because these are products that one could imagine offering on a purely private basis. Bank accounts that are joint between a migrant and

a family member back home, that's a private product. A payment service and an information channel on how students are doing back home is also something that can be provided as a private service. As with many things, I think the roles for

bank account between a migrant in the US and a family member back home is something that's in a grey area in terms of legality from the standpoint of US money transmission regulations. It's quite unclear as to whether a private bank from

Anything that lowers the cost of remittances is likely to have a big impact on remittances sent home

international development institutions can be to serve as catalysts to get private sector players to offer these types of services.

I'm optimistic that these types of services and facilities can be offered on a profit making basis. But they are very new products, and organizations may need a little prodding to try them out and to figure out how they can be made to work. They may also not be as profitable as other initiatives that bank institutions may want to pursue. Some amount of prodding or subsidy from international funding institutions could be useful in terms of encouraging them to try these products out. Very simply, pilot projects demonstrating that these products can be offered profitably while simultaneously having development benefits can be useful in prodding private institutions to offer these types of products. There are also some regulatory issues that developed countries can address in making these types of facilities easier to set up. For example, setting up a joint

El Salvador or elsewhere can offer these products on a wide scale to migrants in the United States. There are many good reasons to have financial regulations in place such as to avoid money laundering and so forth but one thing that's not as well recognized is that remittance flows can have enormous development benefits. Some loosening of regulations to allow these types of potentially beneficial financial innovations (such as products that enhance migrant control over remittances) could potentially have big benefits. I think that's the one place where public policy in the US and other developed countries could help facilitate maximizing the development impact of remittances.

A common policy recommendation is that remittance transaction fees should be lowered. Do you agree?

Dr. Yang: I think there is an important set of policies that can lower the cost

of remittances from the standpoint of migrants. Anything that lowers the cost of remittances is likely to have a big impact on remittances sent home. Related work that I've done among the Salvadorans has shown that when you lower the cost per remittance transaction, migrants respond quite dramatically. They actually send more frequently and end up sending more resources home in total over a given time period.

The study we undertook among Salvadorans in DC involved essentially giving migrants discount cards they could bring to a remittance money transmission institution we worked with. Different people got allocated different prices, anywhere from \$4.00 to \$9.00 in dollar increments. These cards were allocated to people randomly, experimentally, and we tracked their remittance flows over the course of the next year. We got the data from the partner money transmitter and we also surveyed them in the end to ask them about their remittance behavior. We found quite a dramatic response. Our estimates indicate that for every one dollar reduction in the price of sending remittances, migrants sent about \$25 more in total per month. Aggregated over the course of the year, that's about \$300 a year in additional remittances. That's quite a dramatic increase, for just a one dollar decline in remittance, much larger than anyone expected, actually.

I think this is the first estimate as to

how much more migrants send home in response to getting per use prices for their remittance transactions. That's very encouraging. The general takeaway from this is that policies to reduce remittance prices are likely to have a large impact on remittance that migrants decide to send home. Then the question is, what kind of policies are likely to lead to lower remittance prices?

One of the most remarked on patterns in the remittance price area is remittance channels or remittance pathways (for example, Washington, DC to El Salvador is one pathway) with higher remittance volumes also tend to have lower prices. Another pattern is that remittance pathways that have more competition between and among money transmission services also have lower prices. Here, public policy needs to find the right balance between removing barriers to encourage competition and regulations that inhibit money laundering, which comes at the cost of inhibiting competition in the money transmission industry. Reducing regulation and increasing competition in the money transmission industry can have the benefit of reducing remittance prices, and therefore can lead migrants to send more money home. That's probably the most obvious policy implication.

Another implication is that innovation in payment services that lead to lower costs should also be encouraged, or at least not inhibited by public policy and

regulation. So cell phones, the internet, facilities that allow much lower cost remittance sending, for example, are on the horizon, being tested out at various scales and in a variety of places. There's always a question as to whether these new services should be regulated. There might be good reasons to regulate these types of services, again, for the purpose of reducing money laundering, but regulators should keep in mind that any regulation is likely to increase the cost of using these services, and possibly choke off the additional remittance flows that may arise due to reductions in cost and increases in convenience.

What challenges have you experienced in gathering data for your work? Finding good, reliable data, that is. What would you recommend to obtain better data?

Dr. Yang: I think there is a very important data collection and centralization effort going on at the World Bank right now, the Migration and Remittance Factbook, led by Dilip Ratha. That effort is doing an excellent job at centralizing aggregate annual data on remittances at the country level. The more pressing need in my mind is for micro level survey studies that try to shed light on how migrants make their decisions on remittances that they send home, how exactly they send it home, with what frequency they send money home. How much they send each time? Who do they send their remittances to?

And what impacts do those remittances have on receiving families in the home country? That is the type of data that's extremely rare today, and if we had more such data, it would be incredibly insightful for analyses of remittances, and in shedding light on policies that could facilitate remittances and increase their impacts.

For example, there are very few data sets that that reveal individual remittance decision making on the part of migrants in a developed country and simultaneously the use of those remittances, the impact of those remittances in the receiving household back home. Now, because the migrant and the family back home are separated geographically, it's inherently a very difficult type of data to collect. But these types of data are essential for understanding in depth how migrants make remittance sending decisions and how these remittances affect the families that receive them.

There are very few data sets that collect data on both sides of the remittance transaction. One of the few exceptions is the work I've done among Salvadorans that I mentioned, surveys with migrants and the families in El Salvador that receive remittances from these migrants. We have a very unusual window into the remittance decision making of the migrants and what's going on in the remittance receiving households.

I think the most pressing need in remittance studies today is for more such data sets, more such studies, and surveys of migrants in the developed country and the family members in the home country that are receiving remittances. That, and to not only collect data, but also test new and innovative approaches designed to increase the development impact of each remittance the migrants are sending. That is, in my mind, that's the most data needed at the moment.

The Benefits of Brain Circulation

Interview with **Dr. Yaw Nyarko**

New York University

UNITED STATES

International Affairs Forum: The concept of brain drain suggests that the loss of bright minds considerably weakens capacity for development in migrant originating countries. Moreover, low income countries in areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa suffer disproportionately high percentages of college graduates that live outside their countries. You're argued though that the benefits of brain drain actually outweigh the costs, that brain drain could be good for Africa. Why?

Dr. Nyarko: In some sense the question is the wrong question. There isn't a brain drain per se, it's brain circulation. A lot of people leave African countries, and a good fraction of them eventually return as well. Many return with good experiences working in the industrialized world with a generally high level of enthusiasm and entrepreneurial spirit, and in many cases, an improved educational level. Once you think about it in those terms, you see that

there's something else going on. Those who leave don't just leave and never pay any attention to their home country, and half of those who leave eventually come back. Many of those who do go back to Africa today do so with a lot of the dynamism. In Ghana, a major domestic investment bank is run by someone who recently returned, and a liberal arts college, Ashesi University, has been established by a former Microsoft executive.

More specifically to the question, even those who don't return to the home country give a lot of remittances back, sending money back to their relatives, with many of them in the villages. That's sustaining a lot of people, a lot of poor people, a lot of hungry people. By some estimates for countries like Ghana, remittances are now the number one foreign exchange earner. What I have done in some of my own work is to compute the pluses and minuses of remittances. This is by examining a government that spends money educating

people, and in the future, receives remittances back from those who have emigrated. Even at that level, not taking into account people who return to their country of origin with more skills and a greater entrepreneurial spirit, it's very positive.

Recent preliminary work by you and Dr. Easterly suggest that "creative thinking about the brain drain could provide mechanisms for dramatic increases in education levels within African nations; and by at least one metric, one of the big successes of African nations in this period has been its spending on education and the consequent brain circulation which many have argued is so critical for economic development." Would you elaborate?

Dr. Nyarko: On the face of brain drain statistics, it looks bad. In some countries 40%, 48% of all the tertiary educated people from that country have left the country. But when you dig a little deeper, you realize the main issue is not so much that so many people have left, but that so few of them are being produced. For example, in Ghana, as of 2000, which was

the last census for which we have accurate data, the total number of tertiary educated Ghanaians is on the order of about 160,000-170,000 people. Half of those reside outside the country. Now consider that New York University has 40,000

students on its campus. That total, for just one university, equals about a quarter of all the tertiary educated Ghanaians. Remember, Ghana is a country of 20 million people. So those statistics suggest that not enough tertiary educated people are being trained. As another example, there are about 3,000 Ghanaian doctors on the planet. About a third of them are outside of the country as of 2004 data. Again, NYU Medical School alone has about 1,500 medical students.

The key issue is that not enough people are being educated in the country of origin. If you take the data that we have, it shows that people have the capacity to send back a large amount of remittances. That suggests that by creatively thinking

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There isn't a brain drain per se, it's brain circulation

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about ways in which you could educate people, find money to educate them, and then find ways to get back money from those who emigrate, after they've become doctors or lawyers or professors. You say,

we had to borrow some money to send you through the school system. Now it's time to pay that money back so we can educate the next group of students. What Ghana should be doing is not worry about the half of these people who are not there, but instead worry about multiplying the total number of university enrolled students by a factor of 10. The main point is that if there's a net profit in these new computations, there is room for extracting repayment from people who have been educated through some financing.

What benefits can remittances bring for investment into sectors such as health services and technology in Africa?

Dr. Nyarko: Yes, so there are two aspects. First of all let me just talk about remittances just in terms the dollar remitted. The technical use of the word remittance typically refers to individuals who sent money to their families back home. It's usually in cash, to buy something to eat, to cover child care expenses, and things like that.

In India, you see a lot of returned brain drainers setting up technology companies. The expectations are that we may begin to see that in Africa, but that's not being seen right now in the technology field. Again, remittances are most likely used for what we call in economics consumption exchange, which includes payment for health services. That's more the demand

side. It may also have an impact on the supply side. For example, if there's more of a demand for particular services then you see, as in the case of Ghana, a lot of doctors setting up private health care facilities to cater to the demands of people who've returned from abroad and are demanding higher quality medical services.

There's also investment in real estate. If you go to many African countries you'll see a lot of real estate development now. It's usually hidden from official statistics, but it's very important. There's been a lot of investment in areas like real estate, and to a small degree also in businesses, as I mentioned earlier on.

What policies, if any, do you think should be promoted by an originating country to adjust to the effect of brain drain and brain gain, and facilitate their public to benefit?

Dr. Nyarko: The first thing originating countries should not do is to restrict the flow of people who are leaving. That's the worst of all possible situations. It's going to cause distortion and unhappiness. Circulation is a very, very good thing. What originating governments should be doing is to find ways of enhancing that circulation. That involves things like making it easier for people to send back remittances. Within the various ministries, many countries have ministries of Diaspora

Affairs or Tourist and Diaspora Affairs, and governments should provide those units with enough resources to be able to extract aid from people who have left the country. Most important, however, is as I said before, governments should realize that there is a brain circulation. That brain circulation, for the most part is a positive, and that the issue is actually a provision of the educational system. That should be pumped up with more doctors produced, more academics produced. Governments should understand that a fraction of them will leave and some of them eventually will come back. So if you want a hundred new doctors, you just need to train 200 more doctors.

And from the host country side, and that of international institutions?

Dr. Nyarko: For the host country side, it is analogous but opposite. A primary issue is that of restricting flows. There have been some efforts in the United Kingdom's National Health Service to restrict the flow of doctors from Sub-Saharan Africa to the NHS. If that's not handled carefully, it could actually backfire because it could reduce the incentive people have to study medicine in the first place. .

International institutions like the World Bank should also be careful of this rhetoric. In a joint paper with Dr. Easterly, we remark about some statements at the Bank that African doctors and surgeons

should be trained at a level lower than that in the advanced world so they don't leave. You think about it, saying that an African doctor should be substandard is the worst possible thing that could be said by an international institution. Just consider the psychological consequences of that. The whole thing is backwards. Those kinds of attitudes should be avoided.

It should be recognized that many of the African leaders will come to the West and ask for money and will use any excuse that they can. Often, they will say they are losing so many people through the brain drain so give us some more money. People in the receiving countries should be aware of this rhetoric. It's usually not accurate so donors should act accordingly.

The universities in the developed world should also be aligned to provide useful human capital training for African countries. It shouldn't stop. For example, if the Western world decides that they're going to shut off the production of economists from Ghanaian sub-Saharan African, that has an implication, and it's not necessarily a good thing. So that's what I think should happen on the other side.

Economic Effects of Migration in Central Europe

Interview with **Dr. Marek Kupiszewski**

International Organization for Migration

POLAND

International Affairs Forum: Would you discuss some of your research regarding migration patterns, including labor migration - particularly regarding countries in the former Soviet Union?

Dr. Kupiszewski: The most important factor, making migration research difficult from the methodological point of view, is the change in the timing of migration over the last 20 to 40 years. That is, from dominance of migration for a long time or for the rest of their lives - lifetime migration - to the dominance of short-term circular migration that we see now. This means migrants who leave a country of origin and spend money there, but actually earn money in one or more countries somewhere else. As a result, there's a change from a fairly stable pattern of migration previously where someone moves from country A to country B and stayed there for a long time, to a very unstable pattern of migration where a substantial share of migrants come for a

short period, perhaps in weeks, months, or a few years, and then move back home or elsewhere.

What economic effects from migration have you noticed from the side of the originating countries?

Dr. Kupiszewski: It's difficult to assess. Certainly there's the outflow of labor and the composition of the most recent generation of migrants has changed in the last 10 to 20 years. It's considerably younger than it was in the past. Young people complete their education and sometimes don't even attempt to find employment in the labor market in their countries and instead go abroad. That's to some extent a loss, which fuels concerns about brain drain.

This loss of the young population is a very important problem. In the next 10 years or so, all central European countries, as well as countries in the former Soviet Union, will have to face a huge number of

baby boomers retiring. In these countries, the baby boom is much more prominent than in Western Europe or the United States. This means that the proportion of those leaving the labor force will be much higher than in Western Europe. It will create a gap in the labor market. This could potentially be compensated by young people entering the labor market, but if they migrate, this effect will not only be reduced, but will create imbalances on the country's balance of payments as less people will be working and more entitled to their benefits.

There are some that believe a policy of replacement migrants will help solve the problems of an ageing European population. Do you agree?

Dr. Kupiszewski: We did some research on this, analyzing how many migrants are needed to maintain certain population indicators or keeping population characteristics unchanged. The numbers are huge. For example, in many European countries, to keep the age structure of the European population unchanged (constant Old Age Dependency Ratio) over fifty years would require immigration in the magnitude of 2 to 2.5 times the initial population of the country. It's even more staggering for Poland – an extreme case - with a population of 38 million and exceptionally low fertility, about 150 million immigrants would be needed over 50 years. That's completely

unfeasible. First, it's difficult to find that number of migrants. Second, this wouldn't be acceptable socially and politically because it would change the very nature of the country.

So no, I don't think replacement migration is feasible. I see it as a very theoretical concept which is being used by demographers to present an abstract measurement of a demographic deficit in the future. But it shouldn't be used for policy making and policy decisions.

Are there any alternative policy and/or program options you would recommend to address this?

Dr. Kupiszewski: The problem is the balance between the working population and not working population. As I said earlier, immigration doesn't feasibly provide the answer. It may alleviate some local problems or labor deficit in specific industries, but it won't solve the problem nationally. An increase in fertility is another solution. It's very low in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union countries, with TFR (Total Fertility Rate) hovering around 1.2 to 1.4 depending on the country, very far from the replacement level of 2.1. France and Scandinavian countries have introduced pro-natalist policies, which resulted in TFR being close to the replacement level. Perhaps this is the way to go.

The third component of the equation is the labor force participation. We should increase it. We have huge numbers of people who are in the prime ages for work but aren't in the labor market. Attempts to mobilize this potential labor should be the aim of governmental policies, and there's plenty of possibilities, mostly introducing flexible forms of employment and eradicating these social security benefits which stimulate passive labor market strategies. Our research has shown that this is the most effective way of dealing with the problem of ageing and depopulation.

Do you consider brain drain and brain gain to be significant factors in Europe?

Dr. Kupiszewski: I think brain drain is significant. For example looking at the literature on migration in the Western Balkans, I haven't found any paper on brain drain/brain gain that would not consider it a real problem of migration policy there. They incur losses of 40, 50% of academic and research staff and there's no sign that those people will be coming back in large numbers. Overall, the outflow of educated people is a very important problem for all countries in the region.

Now whether there will be a brain gain, yes I think there is some brain gain. It varies from country to country. While I haven't performed research on whether brain gain compensates brain drain or

to what extent, I believe it does not. It doesn't in Poland and certainly doesn't in the Western Balkans. The issue of brain gain is strictly related to economic performance and to social and economic reforms. We might expect that if a country develops and offers improved economic conditions, the number of returning migrants would increase. When migrants find that they can return, even perhaps at a lower financial level than they had in their host countries, many would probably do so, because there are other factors besides finances a migrant will consider in returning, such as family, friends, and culture.

So development can be a way to facilitate migrants' return. In such cases, programs should be established by the originating country to help returning migrants resettle because quite often, after several years abroad, migrants find it difficult to function in their original environment.

What have you seen as value – or impact - of remittances on originating countries in Central Europe?

Dr. Kupiszewski: That should be discussed on three levels: the individual level, local level and the state level. On an individual level, I see remittances as being beneficial as a poverty-alleviating measure, at least in the short-term. If remittances are invested in creation of work places or education, the benefit may be long term.

Remittances are also helpful for the development of local economies. In Poland, we've had estimates that total remittances to some local communities could be in the neighborhood of the

was so small relative to remittances that it didn't make sense to work in agriculture for those people.

While I see remittances as an important

On a national scale, remittances help maintain a healthy inflow of hard currency. But it's a very unstable source of income...

budgets for these small communities. So, it's substantial.

On a national scale, remittances help maintain a healthy inflow of hard currency. But it's a very unstable source of income because if there is a financial crisis, migrants are the first to lose their jobs. So remittances may rapidly change over time due to economic circumstances. Also, when migrants bring their families, this remittance channel is closed because there's no reason to send remittances to the country of origin if there are no families there. Such changes are particularly unpleasant for countries in which remittances constitute substantial fraction of their GDP.

There are also signs that remittances might be counter-productive in terms of development. Some research has shown that in Albania, remittances transferred to rural areas reduced the level of activities in agriculture. The income from agriculture

source of financial support in the short and medium-term, I'm worried that they're not being used properly for development and instead being overly used for consumption.

Several Western Balkan states are poised for accession into the EU. Do you see any particular areas where policies will change regarding migration upon accession into the EU?

Dr. Kupiszewski: I'm sure that all incoming countries will have to accept restrictions on the freedom of labor movement as was the case with the accessions of 2004 and 2007. They likely won't have liberty to move, at least initially. In the 2004 and 2007 accessions, the maximum period of restrictions was set at seven years. It's quite likely it will be a similar timeframe for the Western Balkan countries.

What does it mean? First of all it, there

won't be a very dramatic outflow to the current EU member states. In 2004, there was a huge demand for migration and countries that didn't apply restrictions, as was the case with UK and Ireland (but not Sweden), received a very substantial wave of immigrants. Given the current economic climate, I think that all affluent EU country will apply restrictions. They might be lifted by less affluent countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, or Hungary but it's doubtful that these countries are attractive destinations for migrants from the Western Balkans.

I believe there will be a moderate increase in the level of immigration from applicant countries initially. I expect it would stabilize fairly soon, in two to perhaps three years. As the restriction of labor movements are lifted, which will happen most likely on a country by country basis, there might be some small waves of increased immigration, but nothing very high as we observed in 2004-2005. One of the reasons why I don't expect any dramatic movements is that a lot of people have already emigrated from the applicant countries, so the potential migrant population is already substantially depleted.

Also, research we've done has shown that migration propensity, the declaration of willingness to emigrate, has been decreasing toward moderate levels in almost all countries of the region.

In regards to your country, Poland, what immigration policy recommendations would you have for it?

Dr. Kupiszewski: An important objective is to create good economic conditions for the return of emigrants, especially those who emigrated recently. They've learned languages, mostly English because most of them went to the UK and Ireland, learned new skills, and new ways of working. These people would be a very valuable asset. They are also predominantly young, which as I said earlier, is an important factor in the balance of social security payments. But I don't really believe there's a need for any dedicated migration policy. They won't return because of a migration policy, they will return because the economic situation changes for the better.

So I think that the correct migration policies for Poland are to develop the economy. To that end, first of all there's the issue of liberalization of the labor market and bringing more people to work. Also, curbing the social security system, which basically is quite ineffective because it supports not only those who are in need, but also those who are not in need. A lot of money spent on social security is being wasted. This has a direct impact on all economic indicators because it generates a huge gap in public finances.

Expanding the Definition of Remittances and Considering How Labour Protection Affects Migrant Workers' Income and Ability to Send Larger Remittances

Gloria Moreno-Fontes Chammartin

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SWITZERLAND

Recent research work on migration is giving more emphasis to separating the monetary aspect of migration from the non-monetary role and broadening the scope of the studies linking migration, gender equality and development. For this reason, in considering the nexus between migration, gender equality and development, international debate is increasingly expanding the definition of remittances into three or four different categories: 1) monetary remittances (individual or collective through hometown or diaspora associations); 2) human capital remittances (improvement of migrants' children education and skills, of migrants' own skills, and the transfer of their skills and knowledge acquired abroad); and, 3) social remittances (ideas, beliefs and new values on rights and opportunities); and 4) other non-monetary remittances (development of new markets, creation of commercial ties between countries of origin and destination, transfer of technology, etc).

1. The first category of remittances is the widely known, monetary remittances. As such, it will not be developed in this paper.

2. On the second category here mentioned, social remittances, there is generally little research that has been done and even less on the gender differences of social remittances. However, social remittances seem to be contributing to the promotion of gender equality. Women and men migrants often acquire knowledge about different rights and opportunities in countries of destination that can later be exported and can

be influencing their countries of origin by disseminating information on existing ideas, behaviors, new values on rights and opportunities, identities and social capital in countries of destination. Diaspora associations, for example, have played an important role in informing women in patriarchal societies about women's rights in countries of destination where men and women's roles and responsibilities are considered more egalitarian. They have also helped some countries of origin move towards greater democratization and respect for human rights.

According to a report prepared by Harvard University, there are three subtypes of social remittances -- normative structures, systems of practice, and social capital. Normative structures refer to ideas, values, and beliefs. They include norms for behavior, notions about family responsibility, principles of neighborliness and community participation, and aspirations for social mobility. They encompass ideas about gender, race, and class identity. Systems of practice are actions shaped by normative structures. These include how individuals delegate household tasks, the kinds of religious rituals they engage in, and how much they participate in political and civic groups. They also include organizational practices such as recruiting and socializing new members, goal setting and strategizing, establishing leadership roles, and forming interagency ties. Lastly, social capital is about how migrants can sometimes harness the status they acquire in the host country to advance their cause in the homeland. Social remittance exchanges occur when migrants return to live in or visit their communities of origin, and when non-migrants visit those in the receiving country or through exchanges of letters, videos, cassettes, e-mails, and telephone calls.

The same report found some linkages between social remittances and gender roles: "when married couples came back to visit, they seemed to make decisions together and the husband seemed to treat his wife with more respect. In response to these social remittances, women migrants demanded a different kind of partnership. They did not want to marry a man who had never migrated and who continued to treat women in the "old" way. They wanted to be with someone who would treat them as equals."²

On the linkages between social remittances and development, the author mentions that "Social remittances play a key role in bringing about social changes. Not all social remittances are positive, however. What some consider a force for greater

1 LEVITT, Peggy, *Social Remittances – Culture as a Development Tool*, Wellesley College and Harvard University, plevitt@wellesley.edu, http://www.un-instraw.org/en/images/stories/remittances/documents/Forum/peggy_levitt.pdf

2 LEVITT, Peggy, *ibid.*

democratization and accountability, others hold responsible for rising materialism and individualism. Furthermore, culture does not flow only one way. Migrants introduce new ideas and practices to the countries that receive them which transforms the host culture, in both positive and negative ways as well.¹³

3. The third category, human capital remittances or the linkages between migration and human development such as the **improvement of migrants' own skills, the education and skills of the next generation, and the transfer of skills and knowledge, have not been researched enough, either.**

However, available research indicating that women are more likely to spend remittances on family welfare such as education, health and nutrition of children, should be seen in a wider context. Such spending constitutes an important investment in future human capital and has been shown to be a major contributor to reducing poverty in the longer term.

There are few studies that examine the linkages between remittances and schooling. One study in the Philippines showed that remittances can lead to greater child schooling, reduced child labour and increased educational expenditure in origin households. A study done in El Salvador estimated that remittances reduce the probability of children leaving school by 10 times the effect of other sources of income in urban areas and by 2.6 times in rural areas. In Guatemala, remittance-receiving households were found to have a higher propensity to invest in education.⁴

In addition, some countries of origin have promoted temporary return programmes that permit migrants abroad to share their acquired skills and knowledge with their compatriots. These temporary return programmes are often organized with the support of diaspora communities.

Return migrants, in particular, bring back their skills and work experience from abroad, thus boosting productivity, and expatriates who remain abroad contribute funds via remittances while they also transfer knowledge, technology, and investments to countries of origin, which, in turn, boost productivity and economic development. However, there needs to be more gender oriented research on the linkages between schooling and remittances in order to determine how to better enhance its human capital benefits.

3 LEVITT, Peggy, *ibid.*

4 The World Bank: *Global Economic Prospects, Economic Implications of Remittances and*

4. Lastly, there is even more limited gender-sensitive research covering the issue of non-monetary remittances such as the development of new markets, creation of commercial ties between countries of origin and destination, transfer of technology, etc. Remittances are used for investment often with the support of diaspora associations familiar with the business practices both in their countries of origin and of residence (marketing products and services).

Generally, the national and international development community and organizations working on migration and gender equality concerns consider that each of the different types of remittances can have a positive or negative impact on the promotion of gender equality. However, there needs to be a greater understanding of the nexus between gender, migration and development, so that the right policies and practices can be put in place to ensure equal opportunities and outcomes for migrant men and women.

But, the main issue to be considered here is or should be: How does labour protection affect women and men migrant workers' income and possibility to send larger remittances?

As we all know, employment opportunities of migrant women and men depend to a great extent on their migration status. Indeed, a documented or regular migration status has been recognized to be the most important means to guarantee the protection of men and women migrants against discrimination, exploitation, and social protection. Documented migrant workers have greater opportunities to obtain a decently remunerated job and can be in a better position to send back home larger amounts of remittances.

In considering the strengthening of the positive linkages between migration, gender and development, it cannot be forgotten that women and men migrants often have to accept harsh working conditions and sacrifice living conditions, health care, nutrition and education in order to be able to remit funds back to their families. Some studies on remittances have examined how incomes and remittances interact. Findings suggest that transfers increase the higher the sender's income. The effect of rising incomes of the migrant sender thanks to respect for minimum wage laws, decent working conditions & employment opportunities normally shows up as an increase in remittances. These findings can be viewed in light of the large number of migrant workers (mainly those undocumented) that receive very low wages, have their wages withheld or never receive them from their employers.

These factors seem to acquire even more importance when studying migrant women who tend to be concentrated in gender-specific jobs that typically pay less than traditional male occupations or that often work as unpaid family workers. Not only do they not enjoy pay equity compared to men migrants, but they also usually earn less than native-born women.

ILO's 2009 report "A Global Policy Package to Address the Global Crisis" has recognised that young persons, migrant workers and notably women workers in precarious and informal jobs are particularly exposed to the hardships of the current financial downturn. It states that job losses are affecting and will affect disproportionately the low-skilled and vulnerable groups, and that income inequalities can be expected to rise further as a result of the crisis.

Recommendations in ILO's 2009 Report "Tackling the Global Jobs Crisis. Recovery through Decent Work Policies" of the Director-General, presented in the 98th session of the International Labour Conference mentions that in times of crisis the precarious situation of migrant workers and families is more acute. They require special attention to ensure the full application of the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination. Measures include protection of their rights as workers, including social security rights and special attention to cases of discrimination in treatment, for instance in access to unemployment benefits or training programmes. Similarly, employment and social protection measures are needed to assist families hit by declining remittances. It also states that social partners can play an important role in fine-tuning policies on labour migration during this harsh period.

As part of the broader commitment to promoting decent work, the ILO seeks to maximize the benefits to all that can flow from labour migration when it is properly governed. The ILO believes that labour migration is to be integrated and mainstreamed into national employment, labour market and development issues, and that labour migration has the potential to serve as an engine of growth for all parties involved – origin and destination countries and the migrant workers themselves, if migrant workers' labour protection is respected.

Remittances, Foreign Aid and Development: The Bigger Picture

Dr. David Phillips
GBRW Consulting

UNITED STATES

How big is migrant finance?

Over the past twenty years international migration has risen significantly, surpassing 200 million migrants by 2008. Recorded remittance flows have risen at an even faster pace. By 2008 they exceeded \$300 billion and after a brief dip during the recession they are headed upwards again. They are also substantially underestimated, especially in Africa, because of informal transfers, underreporting and statistical misclassification by Central Banks. This is clear since according to World Bank statistics Kenyan migrants send home on average over \$1000 per year while in neighboring Tanzania migrants send home just \$25. In addition the recorded amount only applies to first generation migrants domiciled in a destination country for over a year. If the wider diaspora (e.g. first and second generation migrants and beyond, plus short term workers) is included and if misclassified reverse capital flight is taken into account then the flow levels are potentially much larger.

How large? Well, recorded remittances alone are now running at about three times the level of official foreign aid worldwide, and are equal to direct foreign investment. In certain regions of the World like East Asia remittances exceed foreign aid by many times. Bangladesh in South Asia received \$2 billion in official aid in 2008 compared with \$9 billion in recorded remittances (over 11% of its GDP). In Africa the officially recorded amount (about \$21 billion a year) is still less than aid (about \$38 billion) but it has been increasing very rapidly over the past few years, and if unrecorded flows are added it probably exceeds aid by a significant amount overall. IFAD for example has calculated the annual remittance values alone at \$40 billion to Sub Saharan Africa. Other estimates have put the amount at \$50 billion. According to the World Bank Kenya

in 2008 received \$1.4 billion in official aid and \$1.7 billion in recorded remittances and employee compensation, significantly more no doubt with unrecorded flows. Thus total private, non-business flows are now a major economic resource.

What is the significance of migrant finance?

Migrant finance is large and that is the reason why it has been attracting attention (eg the World Bank has a special migration and development unit, and the IADB, ADB, the IOM and numerous think tanks and academic institutions are tracking it). But it is not important just because there is a lot of it. More important is its possible strategic significance in World development. If we compare remittances flows to foreign aid flows there seem to be several strategic advantages to remittances, which can be summarized as follows.

Firstly remittances and other private current flows are not tied to high donor country prices (e.g. for consultants) which reduce the real value of donor aid; secondly they are not subject to the large transaction costs of aid money such as agency administrative costs which alone consume 7 to 8% of donor budgets (over \$10 billion a year), nor the corresponding major costs incurred by the receiving Governments who manage the aid inflows; thirdly, they do not need formal monitoring and evaluation to satisfy donor country Governments and taxpayers but are under the control of their senders and receivers; fourthly they are not subject to outside conditions imposed by donor Governments or international organizations and therefore are not held hostage to outside perceptions of appropriate policy, good or bad; fifthly, they do not risk undermining local accountability in the same way as much research has found donor aid flows are doing, and they are not likely to fuel corruption within Governments; sixthly they are in an important sense a local resource because they are under the control of individuals who have personal ties to the receiving country, reflected inter alia in their lower country risk perception. These flows thus empower local communities and investors in ways that aid does not. In this sense remittances and other private transfers are high powered money compared to aid flows. The international diaspora may in these circumstances be a significant force for development.

Could migration replace foreign aid?

Regardless of their scale, why should private flows including remittances be treated as a substitute for foreign aid flows? After all, it is not generally suggested that export

revenues or direct foreign investment should substitute for foreign aid despite the amounts involved. The reason for making the direct comparison between aid and private transfers is that remittances and other private flows do in fact potentially bring with them other key developmental inputs, that is, public goods. They can successfully expand the domestic supply of technical and professional skills and entrepreneurial knowhow, including knowledge of foreign business practices, legal procedures and markets, and the enhanced business confidence that accompanies such knowledge. The knowhow transfer effect is especially significant if skilled migrant workers are motivated to return to their home countries, a phenomenon that appears to have been increasing in countries such as India as its business climate picks up, and as occurred previously in South Korea. Furthermore whereas knowhow transfer through capacity building by external consultants has had a poor record for a long time, it may be expected that transfer between citizens of the same country would be a different matter.

Numerous diaspora organizations have emerged in the last few years to mobilize assistance for the home country. Websites have been set up to advertise jobs back home for emigrants and otherwise coordinate political and business initiatives such as collective investment in many countries including in Africa. Diaspora investor conferences have been staged for many African countries. Research shows that while the majority of remittances, especially from low skilled migrants such as mineworkers, are used for consumption by low income families, increasingly as the average skill level of migrants rises these private flows are going to real estate, small business, investments and education. Where Africa is concerned it is notable that its migrants to rich countries appear to have relatively high average education and skill levels. A large proportion of qualified African doctors for example work outside Africa.

Overall statistics on diaspora investment flows are not available because even the most detailed balance of payments data, provided by Central Banks and the IMF, do not break down inflow categories sufficiently to identify what is happening, and adequate surveys have not been carried out. However there is much suggestive evidence. Many migrants associations, such as the Home Town Associations in Mexico, have established collective investment vehicles to channel resources into community investment projects such as roads, schools and power, sometimes assisted by the Government through matching funds. Financial institutions in some countries have set up schemes to attract remittance money. Governments have removed legal barriers and taxes, encouraging remitters to channel cash through the formal financial system where it can find its way into investment. Remittance transfer costs have been substantially lowered and

mobile phone banking is making enormous progress in Africa. Financial products such as diaspora bonds have been launched in many countries, and remittance flows have been used as collateral for international loans. Through financial intermediation these flows could in principle be resources for larger scale investment, for example partnering the public sector in infrastructure projects. While it has to be remembered that most of the money flows directly into the consumption of poor households increasingly it is also going into the kinds of places that aid money is supposed to go but it does it at far lower cost.

Are there problems with remittances?

In some cases remittance money has not helped. This appears to have applied especially in some poor communities who have treated the incoming cash as a kind of welfare subvention that allows them to reduce their own efforts to improve their living standards. In other cases money for rural projects has not stopped migration to urban areas. A potentially larger problem is the possible effect of large inflows on appreciation of the exchange rate, resulting in rising prices for exports and a reduction on competitiveness. This is the so-called 'Dutch Disease' effect. However research has not shown serious problems with this, perhaps because the way the resources are deployed does not bid up wages. Similarly while unintended labor supply and internal migration responses might be occurring in some local communities, these also do not seem to have a substantial impact on the aggregate benefits of the inflows. The costs of transferring funds has been a further issue but competition and Government efforts have led to a significant reduction in the past few years.

The implications for foreign aid

The potential of private non-business flows, especially if they continue to increase at the recent pace, along with business investment, is that foreign aid will be increasingly unimportant, both in terms of its relative scale and because of the widely documented baggage that it brings to the poorest countries in terms of tying, fragmentation, failure of coordination, politicization, undermining of accountability, dependency, and disempowerment, even if the assistance itself is technically of satisfactory quality. If we add private current inflows to capital inflows then foreign aid in 2007, before the crisis, may have fallen to as low as 10% of the total package of inflows, far below historic levels, at the same time as the number of donors, agencies and projects continues to rise relentlessly further increasing the transaction costs of aid. In particular aid for

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The best way for donors to assist with advisory services, is to follow a hands-off, minimum footprint

“

themselves to the anomalies, bureaucracy and sheer waste of time associated with foreign assistance as it has been practiced.

Countries such as Malawi, Tanzania or Uganda, with high aid dependency and apparently low remittance receipts will have to wait longer to pursue development alternatives not only because of more limited resource inflows but also because foreign aid has infiltrated to a greater extent their Governmental structures, processes and budgets. More than one in five dollars of Malawi's GDP is supplied by official donations, more if NGO flows are counted; this is a level of dependency significantly higher even than in the decade after the country's independence when outside help really was needed. Neighboring Tanzania, a country with ample natural resources, extensive land, and long-term political stability, is even after fifty years quite inexplicably receiving 12% of its GDP as donations from outside, without counting NGO assistance. But in the meantime these countries can still prepare for an eventual reduction of foreign aid, negotiating a gradual phase out, along with the realignment of their Government departments and institutions. Those African countries whose Governments and investors seize opportunities to take the lead in this endeavor, either relatively rich countries like South Africa, Botswana, Nigeria and Angola, or countries with wide diasporas like Ethiopia and Kenya, may be able to provide the stimulus to development without aid by pioneering and accelerating cross-border private investment and generating spillover effects on the rest of the sub-continent. Private initiative is much more likely to succeed in this than inter-Government Declarations of Intent, provided that the Governments act to lower the costs of trade, investment and business within Africa, just as in other

so-called capacity and institution building may qualify to be phased out on such grounds. Finally after fifty years of poor results many of the poorest developing countries may have the opportunity and resources to start saying goodbye to the aid business. This certainly applies to Asian countries and may also apply to African countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Ghana. Why should these countries, which have themselves supplied large numbers of their own skilled citizens to the outside world, continue to subject

poor areas of Asia and Latin America.

Outlines of future aid strategy

Numerous studies of foreign aid have found its results to be unsatisfactory, both at the macro level in terms of the impact of aid on growth and at the micro level in terms of its effectiveness in individual projects. Most macro studies have found a zero effect overall, some a mildly positive effect and some a negative association between aid and growth. The latter is quite plausible if aid is creating diseconomies through for example undermining accountability within Governments. Outside assistance cannot however necessarily be dismissed as intrinsically a failure: the problem is not the provision of outside goods and services per se but more the political and social relations that have underpinned the process of provision in the case of the poorest countries. If private transfers are now a power to be reckoned with, and if they are potentially able to do many of the things that aid has tried to do and in a more effective way, then the rationale for continuing general foreign assistance is further weakened. At the least the donor countries in collaboration with the recipients must define far more clearly exactly where and how value added can be provided through foreign aid. The donors have at last started to do something like that during the 2000s decade at a series of conferences – in Rome, Paris and Accra, but the full implications of changes in the dynamics of the international order have apparently not yet been understood.

Helped by a surge in private contributions from African citizens and a partnership between the diaspora and the home country there may now be potential opportunities for a radical realignment and reduction of Aid to Africa and the poorer countries of South Asia and Latin America. The new approach of Official Aid should be much more focused on what the poorer countries cannot do by themselves in the foreseeable future, such as the financing of cross-border investments including large scale infrastructure – road, rail, power and telecommunications and other public goods including global health and promotion of global trade through removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers. The rich countries will always, of course, need to be prepared to help in emergencies such as earthquakes, floods and famine but they have a reason to retreat from long term economic aid, especially for non-capital projects in which they just provide advisory and capacity building services many of which have added no value. Where advisory services continue to be justified they should follow a hands-off, minimum footprint model allowing the maximum local financial and administrative accountability with far fewer individual donor agencies in each country.

The US's Millennium Challenge Corporation, set up in 2002, was a step in the right direction in terms of leaving the assistance choice to the recipients but it has inexorably been drawn into detailed programming, monitoring, evaluation, and delay, pulled in contrary directions by on the one hand the need to reduce the costs of aid and on the other hand the need to set up costly administrative systems to justify it to Congress. For the future a minimum footprint economic aid industry genuinely responding to developing country requirements is most likely what is needed if it is to complement successfully the effects of private non-business transfers, augmented by domestic and foreign private investment and traditional public budgetary funds.

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
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REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

North America



MIGRATIONS

- 116 **The Political Consequences of International Migration on Sending Countries**
Dr. Tobias Pfutze
- 121 **Co-Development Policies in Europe: Objectives, Experiences and Limits**
Dr. Catherine Wihtol de Wenden
- 134 **Integration in the United Kingdom and EU**
Interview with
Dr. Scott Blinder
- 139 **Muslim Immigration Integration in Europe**
Interview with
Dr. Justin Gest
- 144 **Going Local: Human Mobility and Local Governance in Africa**
Prof. Loren B. Landau
- 148 **Irregular Migration in Europe: Problems and Solutions**
Pavla Burdova Hradecna
- 153 **Unintended Consequences of Diaspora Entrepreneurship During Post-Conflict Reconstruction**
Dr. Maria Koinova
- 159 **Migration Issues in Europe**
Interview with
Madeline Sumption
- 165 **Immigrant Integration: Discourses and Policies in Belgium and in the EU**
Interview with
Dr. Marco Martiniello
- 171 **The Future of Migration in the Asia Pacific**
Dr. Graeme Hugo
- 177 **Immigration Issues in the United States**
Interview with
Mark Krikorian
- Student Writing Competition Winners*
- 183 **Targeting Immigration to Win Votes: Sarkozy and the Roma Expulsion**
Raluca Besliu
- 186 **Aiming at the Wrong People: A More Comprehensive Approach to Immigration Policy**
Sam Hansen

The Political Consequences of International Migration on Sending Countries

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In today's world of ever increasing cross-border mobility, there seems to be no lack of interest in the political consequences of international migration. In the United States, pundits are busy trying to predict the effect of a larger Hispanic vote on future elections; and observers of many European countries are wondering how today's ethnically homogeneous societies will be changed by an ever larger proportion of children with immigrant parents. Yet, with all the attention focused on host countries, the impact of international migration on the politics in sending countries has, until recently, received relatively little attention.

Given the relative novelty of this research agenda, the aim of this short piece is not so much to present any clear cut solutions, but rather to give the reader a general idea of the different theories that are currently being proposed. It will also point to the difficulties in empirically testing the different causal mechanisms suggested by these theories.

I will illustrate this discussion by focusing on the particular case of Mexico, which for good reasons is the probably most studied country in migration literature. Mexico is not only the sending country in the world's biggest migration corridor, but it also offers a large amount of high quality data which one would not be able to find in most other middle income countries. More to the point, Mexico's recent (and by many accounts still unfinished) democratic transition and the persistence of autocratic practices at the state and local levels make it an ideal setting to study the effects of emigration on political institutions.

Most of the academic literature on the subject has traditionally focused on particular

case studies, such as the financial support of the emigrant community for certain political actors (e.g. the Kosovo Liberation Army), without the attempt to construct a broader theoretical framework. For the case of Mexico, this literature has mostly dealt with the role of home town associations (HTAs). As the name suggests, HTAs are (mostly informal) clubs formed by migrants who hail from the same town in Mexico. Their primary aim is to pool donations from their members in order to finance public goods back home (everything from town fairs to sewage systems). In the process they gain a lot of clout, as their collective remittances often surpass the official budget, which converts them into important political players (de la Garza and Hazan (2003), Smith (2001), Smith (2005)). But, while most researchers agree that HTA members themselves become politically more involved, there is no consistent evidence as to the direction in which they influence politics, nor whether as a result local politics becomes more participatory for non-migrants as well.

Only recently have political scientists started to chart these waters in a more systematic fashion. Generally speaking, one can distinguish between three different lines of thought. The first one, which could be called the “alienation hypothesis”, conceives that international migration is largely detrimental to the functioning of democratic institutions. It makes the argument that citizens in high migration communities become increasingly estranged from the political process for two reasons. Firstly, as they will always have the option to migrate themselves with relative ease at some point, they are holding less of a stake in their home polity’s future.

Secondly, and partly pertaining to the literature discussed above, as migrant organizations such as HTAs step in to provide most of the goods and services traditionally supplied by the public sector, citizens will disengage from the state and switch their allegiance to the migrant community. The empirical evidence presented in favor of this hypothesis shows that high levels of migration are systematically associated with lower voter turnout at elections (after adjusting for the number of migrants who left), as well as lower levels of political engagement, such as participation in political events (Bravo (2007), Goodman and Hiskey (2008)). The principal drawback of this analysis is that as it relies only on cross-sectional data (no longitudinal data is available), clear causal channels are not identified. It could, for example, perfectly be the case that communities with lower levels of political participation are more prone to sending migrants. Furthermore, in the Mexican political context it is also possible that lower levels of political participation point to a weakening of the formerly dominant state party PRI, and that a higher level of migration is associated with a lower degree of autocratic control.

Next is what could be termed the “positive spillovers hypothesis”, which contends that as international migrants over time adapt to the civic and political culture of their host countries, these values will also be transmitted back to their place of origin. As many destination countries are mature democracies, while most sending countries are not, this will largely have a positive effect on attitudes towards democracy in the latter. The transmission can take place by return migration or simply through regular communication of migrants with their family and friends back home. The focus on civic values in explaining political outcomes has a long tradition in political sciences, and it is therefore not surprising that this approach to the analysis of the political effects of migration has garnered great prominence. The empirical evidence presented in favor of this theory is usually based on survey data in which respondents are asked about their contact with migrants, as well as on a battery of questions related to their political views and practices.

A recent paper (Perez-Armendariz and Crow (2009)) presents evidence that Mexican citizens who have personal ties to a migrant abroad or simply live in a high migration community show higher levels of civic and political engagement. For the case of the Philippines, it has been shown that the political attitudes of temporal migrants differ systematically from non-migrants (Rother (2009)), even though these results are not always statistically significant. The downside with the evidence presented is, again, that it largely draws a causal interpretation from a simple correlation. It remains unclear to what extent migrants, and by extension members of migrant households, systematically differ in their political attitudes from non-migrants. As most researchers in this camp conduct

their own data collection, results are usually based on a small sample of observation at a single point in time. Panel data sets on political attitudes and practices are mostly non-existent.

Lastly, one has what should be called the “political economy hypothesis”, which maintains that migration changes the incentives faced by political actors, and that as a result, political outcomes will change

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These results provide strong evidence for migration to have a positive impact on democratization at the local level.
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as well. Especially the receipt of remittances by a household is likely to significantly alter the economic and political incentives faced by its members. It has, for example, been argued that higher income due to remittances will probably change a recipient's ideal policy outcome and thus party preference (Merino (2005)). With respect to the effects of remittances on democratic institutions, this line of thought is closely related to the broader literature on clientelism. It argues that remittances make a household more independent from clientelistic transfers, such as vote buying, and other forms of patronage. As a result, its members will be able to vote according to their true political preferences.

It has to be pointed out that the positive spillovers and political economy hypotheses are not inherently incompatible, so that both effects might well be at work simultaneously. The principal challenge at the moment lies in empirically disentangling the two competing effects. Using data on electoral results at the municipal level in Mexico during the period 2000-2002, I showed in a recent paper (Pfütze (2009)) that high levels of migration have a causal effect on the probability that the former state party PRI loses a local election for the first time. No effect on electoral results could be found in places where the PRI had already been out of power at some point in time. Taken together, these results provide strong evidence for migration to have a positive impact on democratization at the local level, but they are equally compatible with either hypothesis. While it might appear at first sight that this problem could simply be solved by separating the respective effects of remittances and migration, it turns out that the two are too highly correlated to make this approach possible. One way to move the research agenda forward is to test for additional implications of either theory. In a follow-up paper (Pfütze (2010)), I showed that the observed negative effect of higher levels of migration on electoral participation is almost entirely due to a lower turnout for the PRI, and that this effect is most pronounced in municipalities where it has consistently been in power. This result gives more support to the notion that migration reduces clientelistic practices than to the idea of knowledge spillovers.

In any case, a proper understanding of the likely effects that an ever increasing number of international migrants will have on political outcomes in their places of origin is not only a fascinating research question in its own right, but should also be a crucial consideration in the formulation of immigration policies. If the effects are indeed favoring democratic practices, as a large part of the current research indicates, it has the potential to sway the immigration debate in unexpected ways. That said, more research on this topic is definitely needed. As always, more and improved data is on top of the wish list. Survey data with a large sample size and a longitudinal design would definitely

be ideal, but might not be a realistic option given money and time constraints. Most the results discussed here refer to the case of Mexico with its particular characteristics. That is, migration is mostly permanent, migrants tend to come from the poorer segments of society (albeit not the poorest), and remittances are large and sent frequently. Results might well be different for countries where migrants are relatively better off or tend to return after a stint abroad. Given countries' important idiosyncrasies in their migration patterns, as well as political settings, I do not believe analysis at the cross-country level to be a very promising approach. Therefore, more work on other individual countries should be on the forefront of research at this point.

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Co-Development Policies in Europe: Objectives, Experiences and Limits

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As of this year, there are an estimated 214 million migrants in the world, or about 3% of the world population. This phenomenon has seen rapid growth in the last 20 years: from 75 million in 1965, 150 million in 1990, to 191 million in 2005. But south-north migrations are merely one third of this global movement -- there are 63 million south-north migrations, 62 million south-south, 50 million north-north and 14 million north-south, with the rest being east-west or west-east migrations. Sixty-one percent of migrants live in developed countries, with 28 countries welcoming 75% of migrants in the world, half of them in Europe and the United States. Among the migrants living in developed countries, 54% of them are from developing countries and 80% of migrants who live in developing countries are from other developing countries. In 2030, the world will have 8 billion inhabitants and the population of Africa, with one billion inhabitants and a projected two billion by 2090, will be more than the populations of India and China (which themselves will represent one third of humanity).

In spite of this global context, migrations in the world are more and more regionalized in a series of complex systems of unsaid 'complementarities' of demographic and economic supply and demand. Europe belongs to a regional set of transnational networks with Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa due to geographical neighborhoods, former colonial links, language, family bonds and the economics of illegal passage. Most development policies have been directed towards Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa during the last 30 years, although other initiatives have been developed, particularly between Germany and Turkey.

Several factors explain the rise of migration in the Euro-Mediterranean region: the

demographic gap between poor and young countries and rich and old countries, the unequal share of resources, influence of media and other forms of information in countries of departure about the Western way of life, salaries, remittances, the existence of transnational diasporas and cultural links, the economy of passage, the rapid urbanization of developing countries which are passing from 70% rural to 70% urban (like in Africa), the absence of hope, and the environmental challenges which will strike mostly the south.

Another new point is the changing effect of migration in international relations, which was marginal some years ago but has become a central issue today. The countries of arrival and of departure try to use migrants and their activities (remittances, elite diasporas, associations of co-development) as development tools in countries of origin while supplying an answer to labor shortages and to demographic decrease in welcome countries. The win-win strategy is up-to-date, as well as the changes in the mechanisms of multilateral governance of migration policies, which have included concern over development in migration debates: migration is more and more politically linked with development.

The development by exile, a new idea

Lessons from Europe: a false path

For a long time, it has been considered that development was an alternative to migration because in the European past, southern European countries have ceased to be countries of emigration when they met economic growth and democracy. This is certainly true for Eastern Europe, whose pendular migrations are due to aspirations owing to their entrance into the European Union. In southern Mediterranean countries, the equation (more aid, less migration is a false approach because the hypothesis linking aid to growth, then to lower poverty and lower departures) is false. In the long term we can presume that development (economic but also political) and demographic transition will weaken the strongest pressures to low qualified migration (Fargues, 2006). But in the short term, the relation between migration and development are reciprocally dependent. Development is a factor of exile and exile a factor of development. The prevention of civil wars, the fight against corruption and a securitization of human mobility are often lacking and are more likely to use migration as a factor of co-development.

The links between migration and development are confusing because in the past, the

development of southern European countries and particularly their entrance into the European Community has progressively (Italy) or rapidly (Spain, Portugal, Greece) stopped migration. In Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, along with their membership in the European Union, migration has decreased or disappeared. The comparison with southern Mediterranean countries is, however, very difficult for several reasons. The first one is due to the demographic situation. Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece have experienced a fast demographic decrease and have ceased to be a reserve labor force for northern Europe. The second reason is the progressive convergence of living standards coupled with the freedom of circulation which have made migration less attractive. This last factor can be grouped with opportunities of circulation without settlement, a trend which has also developed in eastern European countries, a settlement into mobility as a way of life between Romania, Poland and western European countries (Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain and Portugal). All southern European emigration countries during the last 30 years have become new immigration countries, namely Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe.

The situation is not the same for Maghreb, Turkey and sub-Saharan Africa. Even if Maghreb and Turkey have become transit and emigration lands, they have not benefited from the European solidarity and they are still reserves of population and a labor force. On the southern rim of the Mediterranean, 50% of the population is less than 25 years-old, the median age (which shares in equal parts the total population) is 19 years-old in Sub Saharan Africa and 41 years-old in Italy now (it was 28 years-old in this same country in 1950). The rate of unemployment reaches 30% to 40% in some countries and the elites as well as the unskilled labor force have difficulties entering the labor market. The GNP varies by a factor of one to five between the countries of the region and European countries. Development programs often lead to urbanization which also causes internal and then external migration, due to scholarship and abandonment of agriculture. So, we cannot imagine in those cases that development can be an alternative to migration as it was for Europe in the 1960s and 1970s.

Mobility, one of the main factors of development

On the contrary, migration and mobility are becoming a factor of development in countries of departure. The UNDP 2009 Report declares that mobility has become the major factor of Human Development. This one is measured thanks to several criteria such as life expectancy, educational level and living standards. Migration improves one's way of life, weakens the risks (economic, political, social) in unsafe countries of origin without any insurance, brings remittances to families (\$328 billion in 2008),

promotes the individual as the main actor of his destiny, but sometimes causes a trust gap between migrants and their countries of origin. Most of them do not think about resettlement and they prefer to send their money to their families than give it to the state. Mobility develops transnational economic networks (such as around the Mediterranean), decreases unemployment and allows those who remain to live better. Many southern countries are confronted with rural exodus, as was the case in Europe during the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The trend has just begun to appear.

The relations between migration and development are among the most controversial. Several policies have been implemented in European countries and in the United States since the 1970s. The first one has put the emphasis on return policies put in place in Germany towards the Turkish since 1972, in the Netherlands for Moroccans since 1975, and in France for all migrants and specifically for Maghrebians since 1977. The slogan "Leaving to settle at home" ("partir pour rester") was very popular in public policies. Some money was allocated to migrants willing to come back home (the famous "million" of Lionel Stoleru, State Secretary for Immigration and Manual Work in France in 1977) with reinsertion programs in order to help migrants to resettle with a productive economic project.

In France these reinsertion programs were implemented in 1981 (French-Algerian agreement of return and reinsertion), 1983 (with a partnership between the State and the firms) and in 1998 (this last one with the mission Migration and co-development led by Sami Naïr). Few of them were successful because of the short time training programs without a long follow up and because most migrants intended to come back as pensioned workers -- sometimes as taxi drivers and shopkeepers for example -- and use their money to build large homes in their villages as a symbol of their successful migration and return.

But few of the projects were productive because few migrants had the temperament for management and they often lacked previous training courses, met obstacles from the administration in their countries of origin and sometimes had to deal with corruption. The situation still has not changed much because the profiles of returnees, their intentions and their educational level do not allow them to manage their own development. Most of the money from remittances sent home (\$328 billion in 2008, \$237 billion in 2007) go to families to improve their daily lives and are used as insurance (against health, environmental, political, economic risks) in countries where the future is unsafe. A small amount of money is dedicated to collective investments because migrants bring

little reliance on the government of failed states.

Another view on remittances and brain drain

In recent years, the analysis of remittances has shifted markedly. In the 1980s, they were first considered low productive investments, turned towards ostensible projects of housing and consumption or coffee shops, groceries and taxis in rural and isolated regions without any prospect for economic development. As remittances gradually appeared to be the most important investment in many countries of origin, more so than public and private aid to development, and as the evidence that migrants going abroad went on to send remittances even if they did not necessarily intend to come back, the interest of public policies has been focused on remittances.

A new strategy, stressing co-development, began to emerge in the mid-1990s. Facing the relative failure of return policies and experts' analysis on the mutual and concomitant dependence of migration and development in the short term (Tapinos, OECD, 1994) the strategy consisted of supporting immigration countries in the initiatives of migrants towards their countries of origin across associations of development, remittances and transnational economic diaspora in agreement with countries or regions of departure. The destination of funding is a crucial point, because much public aid and subsidies in the past never reached the population and was used by governments for private endeavors.

The European Commission begun directly to help associations of development in Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa such as MEDA programs included in the Barcelona process (1995-2005), focused on collective projects of public interest and sustainable development (water, electrification, education, health, roads, rural tourism, urban housing programs). Some projects of decentralized cooperation have been led between regions and big cities of the north (Europe) and the south (Maghrebian or African cities) without the mediation of the states. But the limited extent of such initiatives has remained dependent on the mobility of the actors (those of the south are restricted with visas, if they are not migrants with long term residence cards), on the lack of expertise and empowerment of associative migrant leaders in economic entrepreneurship for development and on the trend of associations of development in non democratic countries of origin to use those associations as tools to pursue political ends (Lacroix, 2005).

So, the focus has been put on remittances as main factors of development, with the

immigration countries trying to make sending money easier with low taxation. On their side, the emigration countries try to collect the money of migrants in banks which help them to make long-term investments in collective projects. Other co-development policies are now the counterpart of readmission agreements. According to these bilateral or multilateral agreements, the departure countries accept illegals in exchange for so called co-development policies. Fourteen bilateral agreements have been signed by France with Maghreb and sub-Saharan countries between 2007 and 2010. The most recent agreement in terms of development was signed with Tunisia in July 2010. The term co-development, publicly used in political discourses by the Minister of Immigration, had in 2009 become “développement solidaire”. The agreements speak of “partenariat de développement solidaire et durable”

In the meantime, the brain drain, another crucial debate in north-south relations, has gradually become considered a source of economic dynamism in the south and a win-win-win approach: migration can become positive for migrants, countries of immigration and countries of emigration. Some observers often remind us that there are more doctors from Malawi, one of the poorest countries in the world, in Manchester than in Malawi and that one fourth of doctors trained in Africa do not practice medicine in Africa.

Some European countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany and France have reopened their borders (closed to salaried workers since the 1970s) to highly skilled workers from all over the world in the context of strong competition to attract the elites. These highly skilled workers from developing countries have often little chance to find a job corresponding to their skills in their countries of origin because of low segmented labor markets and absence of democracy leading to nepotism and corruption. However, skilled and highly skilled people go on to send remittances to their countries of origin, maintain transnational networks and make a profitable link with development that under some conditions may change brain drain into brain gain. Immigration, thanks to co-development programs, can become a factor of shared resources instead of aggravating the gap between sending and welcoming countries.

The situation varies according to sending countries. While for India or China, the departure of highly skilled elites does not harm development in these countries due to their huge populations, for some small African countries with large emigration of elites, it may be worrying.

Migration and development: a self-generated phenomenon

Migration makes development

Migration is a factor of development. The remittances towards the countries of origin have continuously increased. They represented \$280 billions in 2006, \$337 billion in 2007 and \$328 billion in 2008. The amount of public aid to development, meanwhile, reached \$104 billion in 2006. For Europe, 14 billion euros were sent by immigrants in Europe to their countries of origin in 2005, 80 billion now (Morocco 6 billion, Tunisia 4 billion). These remittances represent 20% of GNP in Cabo Verde, 19% in Senegal, 11% in Mali, 9% in the Philippines (where one in 10 Philippines residents are migrants) and 9% in Morocco. In other countries remittances are not transited by banks but informally, such as in Algeria.

Transnational networks (families, economic links and cultural exchanges) contribute to co-development policies, bringing greater wellbeing in regions of departure. Migration also exports unemployment and social claims and offers to the highly skilled, job opportunities corresponding to their aspirations for wages. Immigrants can become actors of development in their regions of origin thanks to decentralized cooperation initiatives. Some historical analysis has even shown that in the past, migration of an important part of the population in northern Europe has offered to those who have remained the opportunity to live in better conditions due to the scarcity of land and agricultural pressures. (Bade, 1994).

But migration can also introduce a dependency of departure regions towards countries of immigration and remittances. Some field studies show that immigrant families are less competitive in agriculture or enterprises when they receive funds from abroad (Gubert, 2007) and that immigration encourages brain drain. Why do immigrants go on to send remittances, all the more when they are low skilled workers? They send funds

Some field studies show that immigrant families are less competitive in agriculture or enterprises when they receive funds from abroad

for better schooling for their children, for the housing of their families without having to move to big cities or abroad, and to reduce poverty. Migration becomes a strategy of adaptation and development in countries of low resources which have entered a

transitional economic process : in the Philippines, the care drain (the migration of nurses or “badanti” dedicated to old people in Italy) (Weber, 2004) becomes a source of brain drain for the children trained in private schools to leave and work abroad. Is there a real will in this case to reduce migration in countries like these?

European policies which try to encourage African states to be responsible for controlling illegal migrations (bilateral agreements between France and Senegal, Benin) may be inconsistent if migration and remittances are key to their economies and offer well being to emigrant families. We also need to remember that 69% of migrants in the world do not leave the south and that two thirds of refugees are welcomed by other developing countries, sometimes poorer than themselves. So, development offers in bilateral agreements cannot prevent migration.

Development makes migration

Inversely, development often provokes migration. The rapid modernization of agrarian structures, sometimes resulting from world programs of development such as the IMF or the World Bank, favor a rural exodus which first affects urban peripheries of big cities of the south and then overseas destinations. Many developing countries are confronted with a situation which looks like Europe in the nineteenth century, when economic growth led to a rural exodus and a massive urbanization which has also resulted in migration abroad (such as Italy, Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom). Development can also mean from migrants themselves a distance, even suspicion by individuals towards their countries of origin when these are non democratic, corrupt, poor and when they do not offer any opportunities in politics or the labor market. The most educated, informed and urban migrants decide to succeed elsewhere, using migration as a tool to escape the fate they have been burdened with in such countries. They consider that, at home, there is no hope even if they are not the poorest ones. The foreseen urbanization of developing countries, as well as the massive growth of the big cities in the south will increase migration, due to access to information and transportation offered in those areas.

Finally, migration and development have often made together a “dialogue of the dumb” between departure and arrival countries. The countries of departure generally consider their own national emigrants a positive factor for their societies, whereas welcoming countries often consider immigrants a negative factor for their societies. In Europe, European and national policies have, since the mid-1970s, tried to develop return, giving legitimacy to such policies by offering development perspectives (Germany in

1972, the Netherlands in 1975, France in 1977 with Lionel Stoleru and then with the French-Algerian agreement of 1981, the return and reinsertion program of 1984 and the migration and co-development mission of 1998 headed by Sami Naïr). Those experiences have rarely been successful because they all gathered return policies to reinsertion programs in countries of origin without checking the ability of home infrastructure to allow productive returns.

All these programs followed the difficult idea that reinsertion could put an end to migration: reinsertion was a kind of hypocritical “alibi” to draw acceptable return policies for public opinion, for emigration countries and for migrants themselves. Few migrants have played the role except if they intended to come back after a life of salaried work, after difficulties of legalization of their status or if their countries were planning to be more open thanks to their entrance into Europe (Spain, Portugal, Romania).

Other initiatives, inspired from NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) between the United States, Canada and Mexico have tried to substitute mobility of trade with mobility of people, but they have had no impact on the decrease of migration, such as between Mexico and the United States, which has now roughly 12 million illegals. Euro Mediterranean programs (MEDA) settled inside the Barcelona Program (1995-2005) are proceeding from the same logic, putting the emphasis on a partnership in development thanks to a better collection of remittances (using the banks more and promoting micro-projects), facilitating the direct exchange between migrants as senders and their families as receivers without the mediation of states or institutions.

These initiatives encourage programs of collective interest belonging to decentralized co-development: water, electricity, roads, rural tourism. The Moroccans and Malians in France, along with Senegalese are the nationalities who have the most invested in immigrant associations of development subsidized by Europe or by immigrants themselves. Is it fair today to ask migrants to subsidize with their money the development of their countries of origin, when the international funding has decreased, the national economy has failed and public or private help has decreased? Migrants’ projects remain local, modest, sometimes communitarian (in the example of Murids, a Senegalese group in the region of Tuba) (Schmitt di Friedberg, 2000), and rarely turn towards national aims. They remain overall a very small consideration in the huge development gap of their countries of origin, without being able to shift the trend of migration flows. Most migrants are drawn to Europe not by demographic pressure nor by deep poverty but by the desire to change their lives, to flee from their countries even if border crossing

may lead to death. This is why one must not seek in development or co-development the miraculous solution to solve and stop migration, nor to see in migration the unique solution to development. Migration dynamics is a short term answer which has to be dissociated from development, which is a middle or long term process.

A series of highly differentiated situations across the world

A review of case studies conducted in various regions in the world for qualified and unqualified migrants sending remittances to their countries of origin shows that there is no definitive answer to the question about relations between migrations and development. The outputs of migrations from Latin America, China, sub-Saharan Africa, Morocco (remittances, associations of development, illegal migration networks, elite diasporas) are viewed from their relations with development in the regions of origin of migrants.

The impact of migration on development and of development on migration differs not only between short term and long term schemes, but also according to the profiles of the departure countries. In the United States, research on the role of Latin American immigrant associations on development in the country of origin has been analyzed by Alejandro Portes and Cristina Escobar (Princeton University). It shows that recent projects led by migrants have led to changes in the view of migrants in their own countries of origin. They were formerly viewed as “flyers and traitors”, but their image has been rehabilitated thanks to their remittances. The Mexicans, Columbians and Dominicans have created transnational associations with their regions of departure the success of which is linked with the trust in their state, its tradition of partnership with civil society, with the diverse profiles of migrants according to the three nationalities, with the types of projects and tools used to implement them in the country. The Mexican associations of development are the most successful because they have been working with the state for more than ten years (Tres por Uno program). The two others are more independent from the state (in the Columbian case) or less transnational (in the Dominican case).

In sub-Saharan Africa, remittances are a rather efficient tool to fight against poverty, but overall can't fight against uncertainty towards the future (Flore Gubert, IRD): illness, civil wars, unemployment, family disruption and environmental crisis. Remittances are mainly used for insurance. The countries which have a strong dependence on remittances are intrinsically fragile (such as Burkina Faso). In Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, many local activities have been created and last thanks to immigrant associations which send remittances for collective purposes (OSIM): health and schooling programs, water

and electricity. Remittances are rarely invested to develop productive activities, due to an unfavorable environment for investments (lack of trust towards administration and mediators, political instability, weakness of the structures accompanying micro-credits). More often, migration incites migration but it is not an alternative to development. Only the promotion of circulation of people between emigration and immigration countries thanks to visas with multiple entrances will be able to weaken the gap and allow the projects to work.

Morocco has become a welcoming country while remaining a country of departure. Many initiatives of co-development have been led (Lacroix, Bouiyour) : return-reinsertion policies, banking of remittances, delocalization of activities implying a big labor force, aid to delocalized cooperation, direct foreign investments, free circulation of trade as an alternative to migration. None of these initiatives has yielded significant results because the individual decision to migrate is often very far from the policies of the departure country for development, as well as from the viewpoint of welcome countries. Unemployment creates mobility of qualified and unqualified workers and a diaspora of knowledge in Europe which has made associations with development.

China, in its relations with Western countries built largely on migration, perfectly illustrates the “liberal paradox” analyzed by James Hollified (Frank Pieke, Xiang Biao): economic liberalism coincides with the closing of borders in countries of arrival. The deregulation of the labor market in this country has created a new underclass attracted by the new informal sector of Western countries and it has also created numerous diasporas. The ‘professionalization’ of the economy of emigration in China has led Chinese in Europe to take ‘non-ethnic’ jobs. The distinction between desired or undesired migration is very ambiguous in China and in European countries as well.

In many southern countries, elite diasporas of knowledge (Meyer) are engaged in development. In 1974, Baghwati and Hamada considered brain drain as contrary to the development of departure countries. Other research (Rapoport, 1997) is in favor of the “diaspora option”: migration of human capital may have a potential effect on economic development and on the pursuing of training in countries of origin (Kapur) for export of a qualified labor force but also for a better image of the country abroad. South Korea, Colombia, India and China are engaged in this dynamic of elite networks. But the diaspora option as a tool of development is often only complementary to the existing dynamics in knowledge transfers. The success of the Indian computer industry shows that social networks allow a better management of information and make for a highly intensive scientific activity in the country of origin and so increases returns. The

paradigm of global circulation is so substituted for brain drain.

The win win win approach

Most European countries rely heavily on migration for demographic reasons. Meanwhile, international aid for development and remittances may help to find sources of subsidies for health and education. The impact of remittances is unequal because those who are leaving are not the poorest. Aid is a positive factor on the indicators of human development but may also be a negative one: it is inefficient to reduce mortality while remittances are contributing to reduced mortality of the very young (Gubert, 2008). Contrarily, remittances have a cost: medical brain drain for example has a negative impact on health indicators and youth mortality.

There are winning and losing countries. In the Mediterranean basin, migrants from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey send fewer remittances than those from sub-Saharan Africa because they have weaker reasons for transferring money for current expenses. The profile of a typical person who sends remittances is an old migrant, with a house built in his country of origin, having arrived during the 1970s in Europe. The attachment to his country is very important. The new wave of migrants is sending less money, but there is also a diversification according to welcoming countries. Those settled in Quebec send less than those settled in Europe (El Mouhoub), for instance.

Recent developments: Migration in the European agenda of the European Pact for Immigration and Asylum and in the Union for the Mediterranean

The French presidency of the European Union has recently led to another turning point for migration and development policies. For the first time, the Ministry in charge of Immigration appointed by President Sarkozy in 2007 was named Ministry for Immigration, Integration, National identity and co-development, then changed to solidarity development. This suggests a link between migration and co-development at the French level, mainly bargained through bilateral agreements with countries producing illegals from sub-Saharan Africa. The agreements are exchanging repatriations against co-development policies of training and green cards named “competences et talents” for skilled workers. Then, the French presidency of the European Union scheduled co-development to be among the five points of the European Pact for Immigration and Asylum, which implies all the 27 European countries in the project in a context where

few European countries were previously really engaged in co-development policies across the southern Mediterranean. Co-development policies have taken another turn with the launch in early October 2008 of the Union for the Mediterranean.

The Union for the Mediterranean follows the Barcelona process of 1995-2005, led by the idea that the exchange of goods and free trade would replace the mobility of men, such as in NAFTA agreements. Its aims were peace and security in the region, economic development and a dialogue of cultures. But the lack of empowerment of southern Mediterranean countries and the diverse involvement of all European states, added with the failure of UMA (Union for Arab Maghreb) as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has provoked the semi-failure (or only semi success) of the initiative.

The Union for the Mediterranean was launched in order to find an answer to the “no” to the Turkish application to the European Union and with the desire to conduct a policy of having a neighborhood to the south. The first idea was the Union of the Mediterranean, which would have included all the countries involved. The content of the project took a long time to be finalized. The Union for the Mediterranean is the result of a low level of consensus about the involvement of the 27 European countries with the South, with the objectives of development including: energy and sun energy, ensuring a clean Mediterranean Sea, protection against climate change, development of enterprises and exchange of students (a Euromed Erasmus) among the main measures. But migration has been progressively cut from the project because it would have implied a more demanding policy for visas (with multiple entrances and for more categories than just very skilled workers). The Union for the Mediterranean could have been an observatory for a regional governance of migrations applying to nation states of departure and arrival, associations of migrants for development, enterprises, trade unions and other multilateral actors. And it also had the chance to link development policies and mobility.

Integration in the United Kingdom and EU

Interview with **Dr. Scott Blinder**

University of Oxford

UNITED KINGDOM

International Affairs Forum: Earlier this year, Kenan Malik wrote in *The Guardian* that, as a political policy, multiculturalism's desire to put people into ethnic boxes has left many minorities feeling misrepresented and that while diversity is good for England, multiculturalism has been bad for England. Do you agree?

Dr. Scott Blinder: I don't feel that I can judge "multiculturalism" as a whole, particularly since that word has so many different meanings for different people. I do agree that Malik and others identify real tensions inherent in policy-making in a diverse society.

First, I agree that emphasising ethnic categories runs the risk of entrenching them in policies and political institutions, and perhaps even more dangerously of reinforcing them in the way people think. There is a real argument—with research supporting it from studies of small groups

like classrooms—that the best way of overcoming biases and inequality is to create conditions that emphasise a larger, superordinate category that we all belong to, rather than categories that divide us into different camps. So – the larger "us" instead of the smaller "us" and "them". But the other side is that this should not mean ignoring the existence of minority groups and their real, distinct needs and interests. And it's not policy alone that entrenches racial and ethnic divisions – it's also inequality, segregation, any actual disparate treatment in society can set people apart along group lines. So I would not blame multiculturalism alone for creating and sustaining divisions in society.

On the particular point about misrepresentation, it's quite possible that members of minority groups feel misrepresented by their leaders. In fact, I'd say it's inevitable that some minority individuals feel misrepresented -- but that's

an inevitable aspect of representation itself, isn't it? No one person can perfectly and accurately represent large numbers of people who often disagree amongst themselves, even if they share a particular identity. If we keep in mind that ethnic minority groups are not monolithic, and are going to be internally divided on many issues amongst themselves – just like any large group of people – then the problem of representation is pretty much inevitable if members of ethnic minority groups are to have a voice in our communal affairs at all, and of course they should.

But to really answer that the misrepresentation part of the question, we'd need to see more research on the opinions of minorities themselves – just as I wouldn't expect appointed "leaders" to be able to speak for minorities' opinions as a whole, I wouldn't expect a newspaper columnist or an academic like myself to be able to do so either. We have to ask the question – and compare it to non-minorities' responses as well. I suspect we'd find that a feeling of being misrepresented is widespread these days and not limited to minority groups.

What are your views on the recent UK immigration policy proposals tabled by the current government?.

Dr. Blinder: There are multiple proposals on immigration policy, including some on marginal issues such as raising fees for

visas and the like, but I'm guessing that the immigration "cap" is what's on most people's minds. The idea of a cap sounds appealing to many voters and politicians, but it is going to be difficult to figure out in practice. Even eliminating all labour-related migration from outside Europe will not get us down to the "tens of thousands, rather than hundreds of thousands," so it's a very big task.

But my job is not to take a position on particular policy issues, so I'll suggest that in the rush to talk about the immigration cap, we run the risk of ignoring the challenges of migration beyond the numbers. Even with lower numbers of immigrants, there will still be issues for government to address. The issues that critics point to – the impact on public services and housing, the challenges of integration – we should not pretend these will go away even if the cap works. And public opinion may not be satisfied by the cap either – maybe it will, but there were high levels of opposition to immigration even decades ago when the annual numbers coming in were much smaller. It's not only about the numbers, in both policy and in public opinion.

How would you grade immigrant integration in European countries? What has worked well and what hasn't?

Dr. Blinder: There isn't really a successful blueprint yet, is there? But I think

integration in some ways is working better than people think it is at the level of public opinion or mass attitudes. Opinion data from surveys show that most Muslims living in Europe express loyalty to their current nation, and believe in “Western” values such as tolerance of other religions. Also,

wave survey in Britain and in Germany. Our work so far points to the importance of a social norm against racism and prejudice, particularly in preventing radical right wing parties from having more success than they do. In Britain, we’ve found that a preference for reducing

Only 15% think that immigration or diversity actually poses problems for them in their own neighbourhood

at the local level integration might work better in practice than one might think – only about 15% think that immigration or diversity actually poses problems for them in their own neighbourhood. It’s in thinking about national-level issues that people’s concerns come to the fore.

What still needs more work is economic integration. Even the second generation – the children of migrants – do not fare as well as the children of native-born parents.

You've performed research on the interaction between racial and ethnic prejudices as they influence politics and public opinion about immigration in Europe. What were your findings?

Dr. Blinder: We are still digging through our data, which come from a large, multi-

immigration tends to nudge voters toward the Conservatives or even toward UKIP. Rather, in our study BNP support was predicted only by the combination of anti-immigrant attitudes with a low score on a set of items measuring “motivation to avoid prejudice” – which tries to get at people’s identification with this social norm against prejudice.

What trends do you see in anti-immigration sentiment in Europe? What effects do you believe that can have?

Dr. Blinder: In my view, the major trend over the past 20 years or so has been the increasing salience of immigration as a political and social issue. At least this is true for the general native-born population, it might be a bit different among elites and political leaders. Immigration has never been very popular among European

publics, but it didn't preoccupy people nearly as much before the early 1990's or so. Probably this is partly because there was less of it, and partly because of what types of people were arriving – where they came from, their involvement in the labour market, and the like.

At the elite level, “sentiment” may be increasingly hostile. Immigration in many European nations, including Britain, was really kick-started by labour shortages after World War II, and was encouraged by governments. Now, as it's become a more salient issue for voters, the politicians are looking for ways to reduce it, and are more likely to frame it as a problem.

What are your views on the Arizona Immigration Law? How is it generally viewed in Europe?

Dr. Blinder: I'm not sure there's a general view of it here in Europe – it got some attention here when it was passed, but not a lot of sustained coverage. I'd assume that people who care about and support immigrants' rights are unhappy with it, but probably most Europeans are indifferent or supportive. But this is speculative. As for my own view, it seem to me that there are two troublesome trends in the US that are merged in this single law – not only ratcheted-up anxieties about immigration, but also the willingness to increase the unchecked power of law enforcement officials. The Arizona law would seem to

open the door to violation of civil liberties. Officials there say it will not involve racial or ethnic profiling but it is hard to see how they will avoid it in practice.

Do you see any parallels between European immigrant issues you've studied and issues surrounding immigration in the United States and elsewhere?

Dr. Blinder: Yes, I do see parallels. My specialty is in public opinion, and in my view of the research in that area, opposition to immigration in both Europe and the US comes mainly from the feeling that immigration poses a threat to national identities, rather than from, say, economic factors. In the US as in Europe, there is a lot of talk about economic impact of migrants, or effects on crime rates, or public services, and these things do matter. But in my view the research suggests that at the root of it, native-born population's anxieties over immigration are first and foremost a reaction to a felt threat to national identities. This is why not all migrants are seen as equal – my colleague at Manchester, Robert Ford, has shown that British public opinion sees migrants from Australia, for example, as more acceptable to the native-born British than migrants from Asia or Africa, because Australians are culturally similar to Britons and do not seem to change the character and appearance of the nation in the same way. This is not to say that we shouldn't look at impacts on the economy or public

services, of course, but just to say that the roots of public anxiety about immigration are similarly rooted in identities in the US and in Europe.

You're involved with The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, a website planned for launch in 2011. What will it encompass?

Dr. Blinder: The Migration Observatory website will provide accurate, up-to-date data on trends in UK migration and related issues, along with our evidence-based analysis. We aim to be a first stop for policy-makers, journalists, NGOs, students, and academics looking for data and non-partisan analysis. We will have briefings on about 30 topics, all based on data but also including our guidance to users on how to read them. This includes our assessment of which questions we simply can't answer with the data we have available. (For example, we have multiple, conflicting sources of information on people entering into the UK, but very little information on departures. This limits what we can say about a lot of enforcement and border control issues, among others.)

We will also address policy, but rather than taking sides on particular proposals our "policy primers" will look at the big picture, and try to illuminate what's at stake, what's possible, and what the trade-offs are in a given area. For example,

rather than weighing in for or against the idea of a numerical "cap" on labour migration, we will have primers on the policy trade-offs that we face in making policies that both limit numbers and select some potential migrants over others.

Lastly, we'll have a news and expert commentary section where we track major stories and offer quick-hitting reactions to the stories of the day. Here, we will bring in a wider variety of voices from the Oxford research community and beyond, and see what they can tell us about what's happening now.

Muslim Immigrant Integration in Europe

Interview with **Dr. Justin Gest**
LSE Global Governance
UNITED KINGDOM

International Affairs Forum: Your book, *Apart: Alienated and Engaged Muslims in the West*, revolves around research you performed on Muslim immigrants in London's East End and Madrid's Lavapiés district. What were your findings and your conclusions?

Dr. Justin Gest: The general conclusion from the book is that alienation appears to be the product of political integration, which is very counterintuitive. This finding suggests that people can only become alienated once they're actually integrated enough to understand their political society, to understand their political system. Once you have that acquaintance, that familiarity, you're in a better position to critique it, perhaps dismiss it, or rebel against it. There is often a very fine line separating engagement from alienation.

One of the ways that we're able to actually understand whether or not people are

engaged or alienated from their societies and their political system is by paying attention to their perceptions. That's the other big finding of the book. Rather than focusing on things like income, religion, piety, or discrimination, like previous studies, what this study finds is actually, those things are modified by people's perceptions of their political system. For example, take two pious Muslim men of the same ethnicity, in the same neighborhood, who have the same incomes. One could be very alienated from their society, or as I refer to it, anti-system, and the other could be actually quite engaged--maybe he protests, votes, attends civic meetings, and participates in associations and advocacy groups. The difference in these two persons is not so much the structural differences between them, because they're often very marginal, but actually, the way they perceive and interpret their shared reality and disadvantage.

In terms of the comparison between

Spanish Moroccans and British Bangladeshis, these two groups are remarkably disparate. In the East End Bangladeshis, you'd be hard pressed to find a group of people who are more engaged, more active, more in tune and in touch with one another, and with more cohesion as a society and political community. They are an extraordinarily active group of people, always with meetings to go to. They know each other, know each other's problems, know each other's families, know each other's families' problems. So it's a remarkably cohesive group, and their politics follows. There's a high level of activism and most times that activism is within the democratic political system in the United Kingdom. But similarly, you also see strong strains of active apartism, active anti-system behavior, where people are rebelling against their government. I witnessed activism against the government: encouraging people not to vote, being an activist against the British state, against the British political system, against democracy and democratic channels of activism. That was very common there.

If we look at Moroccans in the southern barrios of Madrid, what's so remarkable is that they're the polar opposite of the British Bangladeshis. They're atomized. They're often very disengaged with their government but also within their own communities. They're very distrustful, not just of Spaniards but of fellow Moroccans as well. They wouldn't know very much about what other people are doing.

They're not very cohesive and not very cooperative with one another. That's reflected in their relationship with the Spanish state as well. What that means from the standpoint of political activism is that they're not necessarily very politically active within the democracy. In terms of their alienation, it's a much more passive alienation, a much more passive anti-system behavior, which is characterized by withdrawal.

To what degree did you find that perceptions were impacted by political actions by the government?

Dr. Gest: Well, it's impossible to say how much, because this is a qualitative study. But I think that government actions are obviously very important, because that's how they define their relationship with their communities, not just Muslims, but any citizen. It's important that we view Muslims as just any other human beings, any other democratic citizens in their political societies. Just like anyone else, they'll judge the government based on its actions. I do think that there is definitely a political basis for a lot of what they do and a lot of their perceptions, as derived from their political institutions and structures of their local societies.

That said, some of it is also going to be cultural. Moroccans do not necessarily have the most active and civically engaged society back in Morocco, and

that is perhaps attributable to the nature of the state, which is pretty autocratic and discourages activism. Meanwhile, Bangladeshis have a sort of village-like atmosphere in the East End, which may be very attributable to the Bari culture, which means village in Bengali, and essentially creates a very small, close knit cooperative community. So it's very likely that there's several factors involved here, and not one we can pinpoint.

How would you rate government actions toward the communities in the aftermath of attacks in both countries? What did they do well? What didn't they do well?

Dr. Gest: The reactions were quite different. In the United Kingdom, they've tried desperately to toe a very difficult line between maintaining a strong supportive relationship with the nearly three million Muslims living in the United Kingdom at the moment, while also securitizing them as a community with a lot of scrutiny and a lot of suspicion. That's a very difficult balance to strike, because the suspicion and scrutiny undermines the support and trust that social cohesion requires. This includes every action that the United Kingdom has made, whether it be funding Muslim organizations, supporting the creation of youth programs for specifically Muslim groups, facilitating exceptional policies for Halal and prayer requirements, Islamic finance, and occasionally even Sharia law – there are Sharia courts. These

are remarkable accommodations that the British government and people have made to welcome and to facilitate Islam in their country. That said, each of those bits of progress from a Muslim standpoint is undermined when they hear of baseless searches, paranoid reactions to everyday activities, spying, and surveillance.

In Spain, it's a bit different, because the Muslim community there does not have as strong a voice politically, partially because of its lack of activism, particularly amongst the Moroccans who make up the vast majority of Spanish Muslims. The Spanish state has been very rigid in the way it's actually rendered citizenship to its Moroccan migrants. There's a double standard, which really characterized the treatment of Moroccans. They are subject to different citizenship laws than other migrants from, say, Latin America.

In terms of immigration integration in Europe, what do you think can be learned from your research?

Dr. Gest: I think from a migration standpoint, it's high time that Europe realized that they are an immigration continent, that each country is becoming a migrant nation, whether they like it or not. As soon as you begin to open your borders to migrants, mostly for very good reasons and often for reasons of national interest and national need - for economic reasons, perhaps humanitarian, and

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Not only should migrants be expected to change, but the countries themselves should be expected to change in small ways as well.

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eventually family reunification reasons - you cease to be able to expect a certain amount of national homogeneity. It's just really an impossible demand to make your migrants in this day, to suggest that they should be fully assimilated.

It's time that Europe realizes migration is not a temporary thing. You're not simply hiring a pair of hands, because those hands, working from nine to five, don't just stop moving after the end of the business day when they clock out of work. They go home, and they have lives with customs, with preferences, with tastes, with needs and habits that may not necessarily resonate well or directly with the host country. One of the first steps that European nations must make is actually very much a cognitive one, to

realize that in diversifying their country, this is something that is semi permanent, and that not only should migrants be expected to change, but the countries themselves should be expected to change in small ways as well.

What are your views on a common immigration policy for the EU?

Dr. Gest: This is actually a bit farther from my expertise. However, what I can say is that it seems a bit incongruent that there are certain countries in the EU that have borders that are more easily perforated, or immigration policies that are more lenient than others, making the decisions for how the rest of the continent receives migrants. As soon as there is an agreement of open borders within the European Union, the actions of single states, and sometimes just single communities in letting migrants in, really affects the rest of the continent. To me, it seems kind of impossible for the European Union to carry on with a diverse set of migration policies when the arrival, residence, and eventual citizenship of these migrants actually affects all nations at once. It's similar to the idea that you don't have a unified currency because all these different currencies affect all countries, and you can't make centralized decisions about financial regulation and fiscal policy. It's the same thing with migration policy because one isolated country's actions hold an impact on others.

Did you uncover findings that could be applied in the United States?

Dr. Gest: Absolutely. This study has major, major implications for the United States. Like so much of the history of Western Civilization, the United States often comes second in terms of trends, following trends of others. We can learn from the mistakes of our European partners or other countries. This is one of those cases, to be sure.

The United States Muslim community is remarkably different from Muslim communities in Europe. It's wealthier, more educated, and in terms of demographics, it's not as concentrated in certain geographical areas. That has significant implications for the relationship that those Muslims have with each other and with the state. But as I said before, Muslims are citizens just like anybody else in a democracy and their reactions here are not going to be that different from Muslims' reactions in Europe if the United States chooses to build their relationship with their migrant population, the Muslim migrant population, in the same way.

One of the benefits that the United States has, a sort of innate benefit: It's naturally a migrant nation. It's very accustomed to incorporating diverse and often very different people into their populace. That's a very big advantage because they've already made the cognitive leap that I'm suggesting Europe needs to consider. The

United States also has the advantage of having a very open American identity that is not necessarily tied to blood and heritage but actually tied to principles, naturalization, and qualification by their migrants. Essentially, if you buy into the American way and the American system of government, then after a few years, you're eventually welcome to take on American nationality. That's not always true in Europe, which often relates citizenship to blood and heritage.

However, we can't simply be lackadaisical about this in the United States and expect that that's going to keep Muslims satisfied and that that's going to be sufficient. In fact, it can overrule our interest in general civil liberties. If the United States begins to take away civil liberties from Muslims or treats them in exceptional ways and creates laws or regulations or policies that affect them disproportionately, then naturally there's going to be a lot of dissatisfaction amongst them. Of course, dissatisfaction does not necessarily lead to violence. I think a lot of people tend to relate dissatisfaction to violence. Muslims know how to participate in a democracy, just like anybody else. However, the fact is that the United States cannot carry on with policies of selective scrutiny and duplicity and expect results that are all that different from the European continent and the sort of distrust that characterizes the European Muslim communities' relationships with their governments.

Going Local: Human Mobility and Local Governance in Africa

Prof. Loren B. Landau

University of Witwatersrand

SOUTH AFRICA

While global debates on migration and development tend to speak in terms of national policy frameworks and aggregate economic and social effects, African cities illustrate the importance of exploring sub-national dynamics. It is at the level of the Province or, more importantly, the municipality, where the positive and negative consequences of migration are most pronounced. In previous decades, much of the international migration within sub-Saharan Africa concentrated in agricultural and mining areas or in camps for the forcibly displaced. Since the early 1990s, both international and domestic migrants are increasingly concentrated in the region's urban centres. Indeed, the movements of migrants in search of profit, protection or passage are now perennial features of Africa's cities.

As a result of decentralisation, local governments are increasingly charged with being a leading force for development. Municipal authorities have nevertheless been wary of addressing migration and other population dynamics. This partially stems from a belief among many policy makers, that immigration is exclusively a matter of national policy concern. Some have yet to recognise the degree to which migration is transforming their cities. Others naively hope that heightened human mobility is simply a temporary phenomenon that will only be encouraged by addressing the needs of migrants. In almost all instances, budgeting and planning exercises have largely excluded extended population projections. The budget allocation system used by the South African Treasury, for example, relies on census data which are not updated and rarely provide accurate demographic profiles or trends. Moreover, institutional incentives tend ensure that planning and budgeting is 'backward looking', aimed to meeting the existing needs of long-term residents at the cost of preparing for future growth. The consequences of

such an approach include the inability to meet the demands for services among urban residents including housing, health, and education. Given the importance of cities in leading national and regional growth, there are far-reaching implications of such shortcomings.

Despite the uncertainty on mobility's effects on human development, what is clear—although often little recognised—is the important positive role local authorities can potentially play in maximising migration's economic and human development potential. At the very least, local authorities are and will remain critical in managing the social and political tensions often associated with the movements of people. As decentralisation continues across Africa—and elsewhere in the world—and cities seek to establish themselves as relatively autonomous global players, the challenges of migration and responsibilities of local authorities will only increase.

Reflecting the position of cities in regional migration systems, a growing number of senior municipal officials now accept that new arrivals are part of their populations. However, this recognition does not come without considerable trepidation. Indeed, most local governments have thus far failed to develop empirically informed and proactive policy responses to international migration. Rather than replacing existing divisions with shared rules of economic and social engagement, discrimination against non-citizens threatens further fragmentation and social marginalization. There is a real possibility that exclusion based on nationality or community of origin effects initiatives to achieve a shared vision, amongst all sectors of the society, for the achievement of our goal of improving the quality of life for all residents. Although there are slow changes in government, many officials continue to react to the presence of foreign migrants by implicitly denying their presence, excluding them from developmental plans, or allowing discrimination throughout the government bureaucracy and police.

“*Despite the uncertainty on mobility's effects on human development, what is clear ... is the important positive role local authorities can potentially play...*”

Across the region, internal and domestic migrants continue to be seen largely as a drain on public resources rather than as potential resources or, more neutrally, as the people government is dedicated to serve. Even those who wish to more proactively absorb new, often poor and vulnerable populations, face considerable challenges in determining how to do so.

Two years of research in cities across East, Southern, and Central Africa has revealed a number of areas that need to be addressed to help cities to address the challenges (and capitalise on the opportunities) associated with human mobility. Perhaps the most fundamental challenge to local governments charged with addressing migration and other development challenges is how little they know about the people living in their cities: who they are, whether they are from, what they hope to achieve, and where they are going. Whereas national governments have the relative luxury of developing generalised policy frameworks, local governments and service providers are responsible for more focused and context specific interventions. In almost no instances are municipalities able to draw on a nuanced and dynamic understanding of their constituencies. This is generally true regarding the urban poor and all the more so with geographically mobile people. In this context, local planners continue to be influenced by stereotypes and misreading or incomplete readings of data.

There are also important budgetary issues worth considering. While both sending and receiving communities are influenced by the significant costs and benefits associated with migration, population dynamics are rarely figured into the distribution of national resources. Moreover, peoples' presence in a particular locality is not necessarily a good predictor of their costs to local or provincial government. Without reliable estimates of growth and an understanding of how trans-local livelihood strategies impact needs, cities are unable to prepare for their population's future needs.

There is also the need to address an acute lack of coordination among government departments, a factor that further exaggerates the partial and often ill-informed responses to human mobility. In discussions with planners, they repeatedly expressed frustration regarding their efforts to foster collaboration within local government departments and, more importantly, between local government and provincial or national bodies. However, due to migration's spatial dynamics, effectively responding to human mobility is not something that any single governmental body can singly address as it requires co-ordination and planning that transcends the boundaries of metropolitan areas and encompasses a wider area connected by commuter flows, economic linkages and shared facilities.

In considering the challenges facing local government and the possibility for positive policy reform, we must note that the current policy climate is not conducive to developing pro-migrant responses. Attitudes of planners across the region remain, with a few exceptions, generally anti-urbanisation. In some instances they presume rural life is a more natural (or less politically dangerous) option for the poor. Elsewhere they simply fear their inability to meet an ever expanding demand and the socio-political consequences of such shortcomings. Even those who wish to develop pro-active approaches, few officials had a clear idea of how they might address migrants' the livelihood and service. Without a proactive perspective on what can be done to address human mobility, the common refrain that, "We can't cope with this influx of people," threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. While migration into and through cities will always bring considerable risks, pro-active, coordinated and decentralised policy interventions can help meet the aspirations of those who move, those left behind, and those there to receive them.

Irregular Migration in Europe: Problems and Solutions

Pavla Burdová Hradecná

Association for Integration and Migration

CZECH REPUBLIC

Immigration policy is a delicate political matter and as such is subject to frequent changes in approach either as a result of changes in political leadership or due to the general social or economic situation.

In efforts to arrange the best possible setup to benefit the state, official attitudes towards migrants have changed accordingly. A common denominator of European immigration policy is the effort to minimize irregular migration as much as possible, because its negative impacts are identified and clear -- in principle. However, so far in the process of trying to find solutions responding to irregular migration as well as to unfavorable conditions in which individual persons have to live in, no mechanisms to effectively deal with irregular migration has been implemented successfully

Irregular migrants as a vulnerable group of people

The exact number of foreign nationals staying in the European Union in violation of applicable alien legislation is not known. What is known, however, is that illegal or – in proper language – undocumented migrants are one of the most severely marginalized groups in European contexts. They are at risk of social exclusion and they are often presented as a threat to social and economic stability of the country and as a force behind the increase of criminality and danger of terrorism.

In many cases, the “illegality” of their residence is actually connected to insufficient clarity and thoroughness of the state immigration policies and excessively complex legislation which makes it difficult for migrants to obtain visa prolong residence permits or change their purpose. Furthermore, unreasonable severity of certain directives,

regulations and statutory provisions and shortcomings of state administration in some European countries only serve to complicate matters. In the case of some migrants, this situation logically and easily leads to their loss of legal status.

One could say that a basic precondition of a successful approach to irregular migration is to realize that there is no such thing as a universal and generally applicable definition of an undocumented migrant. If one applies this as a basic starting point, it then logically follows that it is necessary to work towards adopting various diverse measures. This should be done in a way that takes into account the fact that each individual undocumented migrant is different, responds to different realities, has different presumptions, expectations, motivations and in the end, also different concerns.

In European countries, there are undocumented migrants who freely chose residence-related illegality from the beginning. But there are also those who originally belonged to the group of migrants with legal residence and as a result of circumstances, their residence became unauthorized. A large number of foreign nationals lived and still live in the European Union in a situation of dependence on various middlemen who arrange jobs, employers, accommodation providers and other persons who can easily plunge them into illegality in the event a migrant does not do as they are told. There are migrants who decided to stay in Europe as long as possible, but there are also those who would like to return to their home countries and simply do not know how to.

“*The concept of non-punishable departure from country cannot be relied on to fully eliminate irregular migration in Europe*”

Due to unauthorized residence – among other infractions - this means that a migrant cannot legally leave the country without being confronted with sanctions. Therefore, precisely because of fear of sanctions, many migrants prolong their stay often contrary to their original plans and their interests. In order to address exactly these situations there should be development a concept of a “non-punishable departure from country”.

From non-punishable departure and voluntary return towards regularization

Needless to say, the concept of non-punishable departure from country cannot be relied on to fully eliminate irregular migration in Europe. However, on the other hand it may be seen as an effective tool for a state to use when managing migration. After all, that is one of the reasons why many European countries use it in various modifications and why promotion of voluntary returns is one of the principles upheld by the “Return Directive”, albeit in a much weakened form than was envisaged in the initial draft on this directive.

Europe, however, should go further and should strictly adhere to the principles of voluntary returns (unfortunately, it currently does not respect these). Europe should also specifically move towards the possibility of regularization. Regularization means to pardon migrants their previous irregular residence without punishment and to give them, under certain conditions, the opportunity to legally reside in the territory.

Europe is going beyond what is required in the Return Directive. The Return Directive only states that Member States are allowed to grant migrants who have stayed in their territory, without authorization, a residence permit at any time based on any grounds, and that Member States may, but do not have to, issue an entry ban to foreign nationals. However this adjustment is not sufficient.

Benefits and difficulties of regularization

Some benefits that the adoption of the regularization might bring to states, societies or individuals are obvious at first sight, while some become clear only after closer examination. Provided that the parameters of this concept are properly set up it may lead to a reduction in irregular migration and the informal economy, a decrease in the number of human rights violations in specific cases, decrease of criminality (especially with respect to human trafficking or smuggling), a decrease in corruption, more and better information about undocumented migrants in the country and a decrease in the costs of detention and deportation of foreign nationals. Reducing the informal economy then brings further correlative effects such as a decrease in unfair competition, increased contributions to public funds or preventing the deterioration of labor standards on behalf of all actors involved in the labor market including nationals of the host countries.

Obviously, there are also difficulties -- a lot of them. Their identification is important. However, in this context one has to keep in mind that issues connected to the actual introduction of any specific measures are likely add further complications. In order for such a measure to be effective, a proper setup is necessary with regard to the method of its implementation, its form and legislative framework, it must have clear and realizable criteria and transparent implementation processes including flexible administration free from corruption and arbitrary behavior, and it must have mechanisms to prevent abuse. Further, it is important to balance risks and benefits bearing in mind the view that the new measures should be profitable for both sides. The measures have to be sufficiently attractive and, as much as possible, safe for undocumented migrants. The state then has a legitimate right to expect the number of undocumented migrants to decrease and their identification to increase, though the increase in identification can only be partial.

How to get out of the trap

The concept of regularization is often the dividing line between the opinions of a number of NGOs and human rights advocates on one hand and states on the other. The arguments of those who refuse regularization because of the fear that foreigners displace domestic workers from labor market are not accurate because causes of unemployment tend to be more deeply rooted and will not be resolved by reducing immigration. However, these views are rooted in the general public and among leaders influencing public opinion, including immigration policy makers. Moreover, as long as the general public widely tolerates a population of unauthorized cheap labor, it will continue to distort the labor market and constitute unfair competition not only for national workers but also for migrants.

Repressive measures are certainly legitimate and necessary instruments of migration policies. However, without adequate policies and other related actions, repressive measures do not lead to the intended goals and they do not have the potential to eliminate irregular migration. It is necessary to take the existence of irregular migration as a fact which has to be approached in a comprehensive way.

As a result, equal effort should be devoted to other measures, for example regularization, although this only removes the consequences not causes. We can see daily evidence of the alarming violations of human rights in specific cases which are occurring as a result of the use of repressive measures. Irregular residence is both a factual and a legal trap that is easy to fall into but very difficult to escape. Regularization is one of the few

effective options which can help to resolve the situation.

Also see Article 6 and Article 9 of the DIRECTIVE 2008/115/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals.

For more information see Burdová Hradečná, P., Rozumková, P.: Will we allow Non-Punishable Departure from the Country for Undocumented Migrants? In: *Hostis*, Volume I, No 4-2008, Prague, 2008. The contribution is based on this article.

Unintended Consequences of Diaspora Entrepreneurship During Post-Conflict Reconstruction

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NETHERLANDS

Over the past decade the interest of scholars and practitioners in transnational diaspora politics has significantly increased. The interest surged in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the US (2001) and the UK (2005) performed by individuals of foreign origin, and has been maintained by sporadic home-grown terrorist attempts, a recent backlash against multiculturalism and heated debates over immigration policies in western societies. In addition, an accelerated globalization and new information technologies continue to facilitate simultaneous interactions among migrants across the globe. Through the Internet, Skype, and social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace and Youtube, diasporas residing in one part of the globe become more likely to instantly affect events in another. Hence, scholars and practitioners have concerned themselves to understand diaspora mobilization and its impact on both original home countries and countries of settlement.

Political entrepreneurs from the Armenian, Croatian, Eritrean, Ethiopian, Jewish, Kosovo Albanian, Palestinian, Sikh, and Tamil diasporas have demonstrated that diasporas could exacerbate intra-state conflicts in their original homelands (Shain 2002, 2007, Sheffer 2003, Hockenos 2003, Fair 2005, Adamson 2002, 2006, Smith and Stares 2007, Koinova 2010a). They do so by way of demonstrations, lobbying, and clandestine activities, such as fund-raising for radical groups, purchasing of weapons, and drafting soldiers. Some of these studies have been related to growing scholarly agendas on civil wars and terrorism, providing insights into their transnational dimensions. Much less attention has been paid to diaspora activism during post-conflict reconstruction. Most of this scholarship has explored the vast potential of diaspora remittances for the economic development of societies, oftentimes amounting to 12-18 % of a country' GDP per capita, but rarely on how they affect political processes.

What do we know about diasporas and political development during post-conflict reconstruction?

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Diaspora entrepreneurs investing back in their original homeland could carry with themselves new political influences that change local dynamics in the short or long run.

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can engage in the formation of new constitutions, as did the Kurdish diaspora for the provision of Kurdish autonomy in the future Iraqi state (Natali 2007). They can provide monitoring of external elections, and participate in referendums, as did the Kurds and the Macedonians on different occasions (ibid, Koinova 2010b). They can also provide much needed political leadership for new governments as in the cases of post-conflict Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, Kosovo, and Iraq. Women, although sidelined by male domination during the development of peace initiatives, can also contribute to peace-building, mostly through grass-roots organizations (Al-Ali, 2007).

Diaspora political and business entrepreneurs can return to their original homeland and take top governmental and business positions. Diasporas can reframe traumatic identities of conflict parties in the homeland, and contribute to reform as did the Ethiopian diaspora in the US vis-a-vis the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict (Lyons 2006). According to Bercovitch, diaspora members can be agents of healing of psychological traumas, as did some in the aftermath of the conflict in Sierra Leone. Diaspora entrepreneurs can also participate in problem-solving workshops, as did Jews and Palestinians prior to and in the aftermath of the 1993 Oslo process. They can aspire to strengthen civil society by transmitting norms, values, and institutions characteristic for a democratic polity (2007). They

While these studies provide a helpful map of diaspora practices, a deeper understanding of causes and effects of diaspora mobilization is still due. Here I sketch three examples demonstrating that focusing simply on inquiring into a practice deemed positive for post-conflict reconstruction – such as a democratic procedure, providing remittances

or investing in economic development – can have unintended negative consequences or other mixed results on inter-ethnic post-conflict dynamics.

Three Cases of Diaspora Participation: Referendum, Remittances, and Investment in Post-conflict Reconstruction

Participation in referendums is usually associated with core democratic beliefs and practice. Yet, Macedonian diaspora activism in the aftermath of the brief 2001 civil warfare in Macedonia demonstrates that participating in a referendum can boost local nationalism. The Macedonian diaspora, primarily organized by its most radical brethren in Australia and through the World Macedonian Congress, has been instrumental in the creation of a 2004 referendum in the original homeland. The referendum was aimed at challenging a package of laws that would allow the Albanians – whose guerilla soldiers clashed with the Macedonian military and paramilitaries in 2001 – to enjoy more decentralization of power and self-governmental rights in the western parts of the country. The legal package was a bid for implementation of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, which defined the terms of the peace agreement and post-conflict redesigning of the state. Hence, local and international interests were vested in this agreement. Macedonian diaspora activists and their local counterparts – often extended family or long-term friends – were highly mobilized prior to that referendum through grassroots initiatives and media campaigns. Their activism was considered as threatening the fragile post-conflict peace in a volatile Balkan region. It took the European Union significant resources to launch an anti-referendum campaign, and the United States to recognize Macedonia by its highly debated constitutionally proclaimed name, Republic of Macedonia, to convince ethnic Macedonians to stay away from the referendum polls. While the referendum did not succeed and Macedonia continued on the path of decentralization, it demonstrated how influential a diaspora can be during fragile post-conflict development.

Diaspora remittances are welcome by post-conflict societies, yet scholarship needs to better understand how they change or help to consolidate local inter-group dynamics. Remittances to areas strongly affected by the war may help consolidate the power of the winners and undermine that of new minorities in these areas. For example, a 2007 Riinvest study of diaspora contributions to Kosova's post-conflict economic development demonstrated that Kosova Albanian migrants from Prizren (27.5%) send the most remittances back home. They are followed by their ethnic brethren with origins from Prishtina (24.6%), Mitrovica (12.2%) and Ferizaj (11.4%). If read from an economics point of view, these percentages tell us about the remittance habits and

potential for development of specific settlements. If read from a political science point of view, however, these data are indicative of a different dynamic. Prizren was the area most significantly affected by Milosevic's ethnic cleansing shortly prior to NATO's 1999 military intervention. At present, Serbian presence in this area is confined to the Orthodox Decani Monestary, a UNESCO protected site surrounded by military checkpoints. Also, while prior to the 1999 war the capital Prishtina was inhabited by both Kosovo Albanians and Serbian communities, Serbs living there at present are an exception. Many live in the Gračanica enclave, a Serb settlement in the outskirts of Prishtina, or commute to Prishtina if employed there. This case demonstrates how remittances could help consolidate business networks on an ethnic basis, rather than to develop cross-cutting cleavages, a liberal goal cherished by the international community in post-conflict societies.

Last but not the least, diaspora entrepreneurs investing back in their original homeland could carry with themselves new political influences that change local dynamics in the short or long run. The late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and his diasporic connections to Saudi Arabia are a case in point. The Sunni Muslim Lebanese entrepreneur made his fortune in Saudi Arabia during the oil boom and returned to Lebanon in the late 1980s. In the aftermath of the civil war (1975-1991) Lebanon's post-conflict recovery was largely associated with his name, since he managed to channel his own vast fortune made on construction businesses and Saudi resources into the Lebanese post-conflict economy. Hariri consolidated his economic and political power as a prime minister of five governments between 1992 and 1998 and between 2000 and 2004. He was assassinated in 2005 because of some opposition to the Syrian influence in the domestic politics of Lebanon. His assassination became a focal point for the mobilization of anti-Syrian sentiments and movement which led to the popular 2005 "Cedar Revolution," that helped end Syrian troops' presence in the country for the past 29 years. Nevertheless, five years later his son, Saad Hariri who currently heads a government of a pro-Western anti-Syrian coalition, the March 14 Movement, has been allegedly advised by Saudi royalty to be more accommodating to Syrian influence in Lebanon (Stratfor 2010). While Saudi Arabia was not politically influential in the aftermath of the civil war, twenty years later it became yet another external power to effectively meddle in the fragile Lebanese political environment, alongside Syria, Iran, Palestinian groups, and others. Ironically, Rafik Hariri's diaspora entrepreneurship paved the way for this new Saudi political influence.

These three cases demonstrate that considering the influence of diasporas on post-conflict reconstruction processes needs more scrutiny with regard to causal processes

and mechanisms in the political realm. While diaspora participation in democratic political practices, sending of remittances, and financial investment could restore conflict-ridden polities and economies, they could also create new and unanticipated political dynamics.

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Migration Issues in Eastern Europe

Interview with **Madeline Sumption**

Migration Policy Institute

UNITED STATES

International Affairs Forum: A recent report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published shows that labor migration flows have slowed down over the last year. In the case of eastern European immigration within the European Union, has the economic crisis been the first and major cause for this recent evolution of migration?

Madeline Sumption: Yes. The economic crisis isn't the only reason for the recent decrease in mobility from Eastern European countries, but it's almost certainly the most important. From EU enlargement in 2004 to the beginning of the crisis in 2007, the European Union saw a major European immigration wave from East to West. In 2004, only three countries opened their doors to the new EU members: Great Britain, Ireland, and Sweden. As a result, these countries—but particularly Britain and Ireland—received unexpectedly large flows.

The period immediately following enlargement coincided with a massive economic boom. There was a huge demand for labor, especially within less-skilled occupations. Ireland's property boom, for instance led to a huge increase in demand in the construction sector, and eastern Europeans were instrumental in meeting that demand. However, once the crisis came, employment in previously booming sectors suddenly decreased quite dramatically. It's no surprise that immigration from Eastern Europe declined as a result.

Nevertheless, we shouldn't forget that the economic factor isn't the only cause. Immigration from eastern Europe immediately following enlargement was probably higher than one would otherwise expect as a result of "pent-up" demand for migration when it suddenly became legal and easy to move West. When economic growth returns in earnest, immigration from eastern Europe will probably not

return to 2006 levels. Relatively strong growth in Poland should also reduce the overall numbers heading to Britain and Ireland in the future.

How significant has the decrease in migration from Eastern Europe been? Can we clearly say that it has fallen?

Ms. Sumption: Migration from Eastern Europe has definitely decreased. The UK's Worker Registration Scheme recorded quarterly inflows from Eastern Europe in early 2010 at about one third of their peak level in 2006. Passenger survey data also suggests there's been a decrease. At the same time, the population of eastern Europeans recorded in the UK's Labour Force Survey, which grew rapidly in the first years after enlargement, hasn't grown over the past year. In other words, all three data sources point in the same direction. Ireland has experienced similar declines, and in fact the Eastern European population there has decreased.

To what extent, in your opinion, has the economic crisis led migrants, especially from Eastern European countries, to return home after their migration towards Western Europe?

Ms. Sumption: Not all the immigration coming from Eastern Europe has been permanent. Return migration from the UK and Ireland has always been significant

over the past five years. The crisis appears to have accelerated this process. In the UK, the crisis brought an end to the huge growth in the Eastern European immigrant population, but the size of that population has only fallen very slightly if at all. In Ireland there is evidence of much more return migration. The number of adults from new EU member states living in Ireland was estimated to have decreased by between 15 and 20 percent during the two years from the peak in 2007.

Several western European governments have taken measures to make migrants' returns easier. Have these measures been effective in reducing the crisis' impact?

Ms. Sumption: Programs to encourage migrants to return home have largely been aimed at non-EU immigrants, and their success has varied. One of the major limiting factors is that once migrants have settled in western European countries, it's difficult to encourage them to go home if prospects of economic and social success at home are not good. Even if the recession dramatically reduced prospects for migrants within host societies, that doesn't eliminate the opportunity differential between sending and receiving countries. In terms of wages and standards of living, many migrants will be better off by remaining in hosting countries.

More generally, measures to push migrants back to their home countries

have probably had a minimal impact on the economic recovery. The numbers involved are too small to affect economic growth in any significant way. They may have slightly reduced the number of people receiving unemployment benefits, but the long-term cost-benefit of these programs is far from clear.

How has the crisis affected immigration and integration policies implemented within western European countries?

Ms. Sumption: Policy reactions to the crisis have in fact been relatively moderate. Compared to the isolationism that followed the Great Depression in the 1930s, the financial and economic downturn of 2008 has had only a modest impact on openness. Many countries have slightly changed their eligibility criteria for non-EU immigrants, making it more difficult for allowing migrants to get a visa. But the impact of those changes has not been dramatic – they don't represent a major departure in immigration policy.

they do not have the same capacity to absorb new immigration without reducing work and wages' prospects for residents themselves. The second is that some of the immigrants themselves will find it harder to find work, especially those who enter the country without job offers. The setbacks they suffer in the labor market can last for some time—a phenomenon known as economic “scarring”.

One of the major and most lasting impacts of the economic crisis appears to be cuts in public budgets. European governments have less and less money to play with. These financial restrictions lead to a more severe pressure upon social programs, especially for the most disadvantaged. Immigrant integration programs are likely to take at least their share—and probably more—during the period of fiscal austerity ahead. In many cases, the crisis has hit immigrants disproportionately, and there is certainly a risk that the scaling back of social programs could entrench those losses.

One of the major and most lasting impacts of the economic crisis appears to be cuts in public budgets

During a time of recession, governments face two concerns with new migration waves. The first one is the risk of competition for jobs with the existing labor force: when economies are weak

In the context of the European Union labor market, can we say that Eastern European migrants, especially less-skilled migrants from the newest members' states of the European Union, have been

the great victims of this economic and social downturn?

Ms. Sumption: They haven't been the greatest victims although in some countries they have fared quite badly. The most recent OECD report (published on July 12, 2010) shows that eastern European migrants have experienced unemployment at quite high rates in some western European countries. In Ireland, for example, immigrants from the newest European Union members' states face a rate of unemployment close to 18%. But this is not true of the United Kingdom, where Eastern Europeans have so far fared much better than any other sending region. In other words, there is a lot of variation, depending on the hosting country in which the migrants have settled.

In many cases, other groups have been hit harder, however. Each country has a minority group that has suffered disproportionately. Often these are immigrants that entered illegally or through family or refugee channels. North African migrants in Spain are one example, as are Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in the United Kingdom, and Surinamese immigrants in the Netherlands.

Six years after the significant 2004 enlargement of the European Union, how should we assess Eastern European migration, and its integration successes within Western Europe? Since the

economic and financial downturn of 2008, to what extent have these successes been severely weakened?

Ms. Sumption: In many ways, Eastern European migration to the United Kingdom and Ireland has been a success story. These migrants generally found work easily until the economic crisis, had high employment rates, and were very popular with employers. That said, many were confined to low skilled employment even if they had high levels of education and sometimes professional qualifications.

The impact of the recession upon eastern Europeans has varied by country, and of course they now face much harder times because of the crisis. But many of the basic integration policy issues remain the same. The high concentration of eastern European migrants in less-skilled jobs was already a critical issue before the beginning of the crisis, and it will most likely continue to be one in the coming years. Governments will have to continue to work on the processes that help skilled migrants to have their credentials recognized and enable them to move into more skilled work. Another concern is the exploitation of some migrants coming from Eastern Europe, especially workers with poor English skills living in rural areas.

Do eastern European migrants benefit more nowadays from healthcare and

welfare in their hosting countries than before?

Ms. Sumption: Yes. Both the UK and Ireland data show that more eastern Europeans are receiving benefits of some kind now than before the economic downturn. The need has increased, and so has eligibility. In the United Kingdom for instance, migrants have to be continuously employed for 12 months in order to become eligible for most public assistance. But it is important to point out that even despite this increase, benefit receipt in the UK is still lower among eastern European immigrants than among the UK born or among residents of other immigrant communities.

Given the somewhat disproportionate impact of the economic crisis upon immigrants, have western governments taken effective measures to make their economic integration easier?

Ms. Sumption: Political responses have been varied. Some countries have focused their energies on encouraging migrants to go home or on increasing immigration restrictions. Others have taken measures to prevent them from falling into unauthorized status if they lose their jobs—for example, allowing them time to search for a new job before they must return home. Ireland is one such example. Most of these efforts have been relatively minor, however.

What would be, in your opinion, the most well-adapted immigration policy model for European hosting countries, in the aftermath of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, but also of the global economic downturn?

Ms. Sumption: For movement within the European Union, the dominant policy framework has been freedom of movement, so national government policymakers don't have a huge amount of discretion over this type of migration. Restrictions, if still enforced for newest members, will be gone by 2011 for the 2004 EU entrants, and by 2014 for the 2007 EU entrants. That said, the two recent enlargements have gone relatively smoothly so far. The flow of labor from Eastern Europe has been flexible and economically responsive; and in part because many of the immigrants have been highly educated (despite often taking up low skilled jobs), the prospects for their long-term integration look positive.

For immigration from outside the European Union, governments have a lot more discretion. Here, one of the biggest challenges for many EU countries is maintaining openness towards highly-skilled migrants and attracting them to immigrate and to settle. European countries are moving towards this goal at different speeds, of course. Sweden, for instance, has recent made some major reforms to allow more flexible labor migration

sponsored by employers, while others are opening up to the highly skilled much more cautiously. But in the coming years — and especially in the light of the crisis, which may have dampened enthusiasm for less skilled migration — the highly skilled are likely to remain a central focus of immigration policy in Europe.

Immigrant Integration: Discourses and Policies in Belgium and in the EU

Dr. Marco Martiniello

Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research
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BELGIUM

International Affairs Forum: What do you view as significant issues for integrating immigrants into Belgian society?

Dr. Marco Martiniello: Belgium is a unique country in the European Union, and we are now in the middle of discussion about the mere existence of the Belgian state in the future. We had an election on the 13th of June, and still no government has been formed. The problem is that on the Flemish side, the Nationalist and conservative party (NVA) won the elections whereas, in the south, the Socialist Party (PS), which is progressivist and committed to the existence of the Belgian state, won the election. This political situation means that it's very different for immigrants to arrive in the Walloon side, in the south of the country, compared to the Flemish side in the north of the country, or in Brussels. Integrating in Brussels is not the same thing as integrating in Wallonia or integrating in

Flanders. Therefore, the topic needs to be discussed for each of these areas.

In Flanders, there is a clear vision of immigrants' requirements. Immigrants are expected to learn the Dutch language as quickly as possible and expected to endorse Flemish values defined by the Flemish government. Therefore an integration course has been designed for newcomers and immigrants, which they are obliged to pass. If they fail, they will not get access to certain advantages. For example, if they don't speak Dutch, they will have problems if they apply for public housing. There is a kind of assimilationist vision of integration even though there is a discourse about diversity. But diversity is meant as something superficial like ethnic restaurants. The main thought in Flanders is not to question the fundamentals of their society.

In Wallonia, the system is more like the French model, where everybody

is a citizen, and there is no difference between individuals according to ethnic origin, religion, or other factors, at least in political discourse. Basically, everybody is expected to be an equal member of society. This view is also an assimilationist view of society, but progressively there has been an opening towards more of an intercultural society. Compared to Flanders, there is no real clear vision about what should be done with newcomers. There is an idea that integration is not really a Walloon problem; that previous waves of immigrants were successfully integrated and therefore, the problems of immigration today are not very important in Wallonia. So, no homogenous course on the integration of immigrants exists.

Then there is Brussels. To a certain extent, Brussels is analogous to a city like New York. Brussels is a cosmopolitan city and the percentage of foreign-born in Brussels, or immigrant origin second or third generation, is close to 50% of the population. It is different since there is no assimilationist perspective. There is a view that whatever one does, Brussels will be a multicultural, multi-religious, multiracial society. But there is a level of complexity in Brussels because it represents a crossroads between the Flemish view and the Walloon view, and both regions have a say in what is being done there.

But beyond those differences that deal with public discourse and public policies, the problems are very similar for immigrants

throughout the country. It's about finding a decent job, finding decent housing, finding decent schools for their children, finding decent health care. While the problems are the same, the policy solutions are expressed in a completely different way in the three parts of the country.

How do those areas differ in how they approach integrating children?

Dr. Martiniello: For children and young adults, there are three problems: lack of education, unemployment, and discrimination. Lack of education is the result of education policy, especially in Brussels where a kind of soft apartheid regime has developed in education. There are good schools, mostly for white middle class and upper class students. Then you have bad schools that progressively welcome second-generation children, especially non-Europeans. Therefore, it's not rare to have Belgium born kids who cannot properly speak one of the national languages after attending primary school. This becomes a further problem because it creates an obstacle for accessing education later on, which severely impacts their ability to get an education or diploma required for the labor market. This problem can eventually lead to poor employment or unemployment.

This is reinforced by ethnic and racial discrimination, which has been demonstrated by several studies in

Belgium. So there is a convergence of poor performance in education and discrimination. This is also an obstacle for the integration of those immigrant students into the labor market that actually have diplomas, education, and skills. The situation is very worrisome throughout the country but it's more prevalent in Brussels because that's where the concentration of second generation immigrant children and young adults is greatest.

With the recent world economic downturn, have you noticed any effect on anti-immigration sentiment?

Dr. Martiniello: The anti-immigration sentiments were there before the world crisis. The situation in Belgium is very different from the situation in a country like Spain or Ireland. In each of those countries, there was this idea that immigrants were taking over jobs

of competition with the local workers in the labor market is perhaps less crucial than in countries like Spain, Ireland, or even the UK, where there the global crisis has had a direct effect on the growth of anti-immigration attitudes.

Overall, there is a little less anti-immigration sentiment in Belgium than those countries but it is still quite high and quite stable. One element that may have played a part in that is the focus on Muslim immigrants in Belgium following 9/11.

Multiculturalism has become a heated topic in the EU with some claiming that increased immigrant inflows will saturate cities to such a degree that integration efforts, and multiculturalism, are ineffective. Your response? Can multiculturalism programs be effective in the EU?

The challenge [the EU] is facing is how to find the necessary cohesion and unity, with a respect for diversity

from the local population. This has not really been the case in Belgium where migrants, especially new ones, are highly represented in the semi-legal labor market, doing jobs that nobody wants to do even during the world crisis. Therefore, the idea

Dr. Martiniello: I think that they have to be because in Europe, we are a multicultural society. There is no way we can imagine a homogenous Europe. We have entered what I call a process of diversification of European diversity. This is a group of 27

nations with national minorities, religious minorities, and immigrant minorities. We are very diverse society.

The challenge we are facing is how to find the necessary cohesion and unity, with a respect for diversity. We have to go beyond the multiculturalist agendas of the 90s, but we should not return to an assimilationist agenda at the European level because it won't work. So, we are trying to find a European approach to multicultural societies and it's very difficult because there are different traditions. We are struggling to define our own understanding of how a multicultural society should work while at the same time respecting diversity.

Very few people in Europe would advocate an extreme multiculturalist perspective, leading even to separation between groups. But I think that the challenge is really that, and we are struggling to deal with it in an appropriate manner. There is the idea that immigrants should become like us. It's an easy idea, so it seduces many people, even many policy makers. The problem is, how do we define who 'we' are?' If you ask that in Belgium or in Hungary or in Greece, it's very difficult to get a common understanding of what 'we' is. Because of that, I think we may have more problems than the US regarding this.

What about asylum policies and procedures? What are your thoughts on those right now?

Dr. Martiniello: We have moved towards a common asylum policy in the European Union which is quite restrictive and has developed at the same time as a kind of security approach to human mobility. There is a fear of invasion in European public opinion and a tendency to say, 'maybe we should limit the number of refugees we recognize.' In some countries they even want to have some quotas of refugees, which are contrary to the logic of human rights, but again it is really difficult to combine different objectives.

In many cases, there is also a starting presupposition that asylum seekers are fake or bogus refugees. Sometimes this is true, probably because it's quite difficult for someone to enter legally the European Union for economic reasons. However, some "real" refugees are reluctant to apply for asylum because they anticipate a rejection of their application.

Today, we do not have a very clear immigration policy even though we have the blue card and some programs like it. There are still differences between traditional immigration countries like the US, Canada, Australia and the European Union, which is still in the process of getting out of the zero-immigration idea, this idea that immigration is an anomaly

and that asylum seekers are not something normal. Again, like multiculturalism, we are struggling and tend to be a bit too severe when treating requests for asylum. It should be asked, how committed are Europeans to human rights? We do not have a global, coherent, immigration policy comprising economic migration, asylum policy, and family reunification. What we really need is a global, overarching approach to all different forms of migration because nowadays there still are imbalances between the different branches of immigration policy and that creates problems.

That said, there are also positive developments about asylum policy. For a long time, one of the countries carrying the burden of all asylum seekers was Germany. This was perhaps a way for Germany to make a type of amends for the war, and the refugee law was very open there. The idea that different partners in the European Union should share in this burden has been accepted now. That's a positive development. There is no reason why Germany should take care of the majority of asylum seekers that were trying to get into Europe. We are all partners in the European Union and should share the burden.

You've performed research on political participation with immigrant groups...

Dr. Martiniello: Yes, that's a very interesting

issue. Again, there is a wide diversity as far as political participation and the presentation of immigrants, and immigrant origin population in Europe. Perhaps one of the most important cases is in Brussels where there are top politicians with an immigrant background. Sometimes there is even an overrepresentation of immigrant politicians, compared to non-immigrant politicians in some districts of Brussels.

Political participation in Europe is a difficult and complex subject. There are three general groups of countries to examine. First, there are countries like Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and France, where it is an old issue and there is a kind of awareness that the issue of political participation and representation of immigrants and minorities is related in one way or another to the quality of the democratic system. Then there are countries in which the issue is slowly emerging, like Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Finally, there is a group of countries in which, talking about the political participation of immigrants, doesn't make sense. For example, Bulgarians do not see themselves as a country of immigration.

It's also interesting to note that the election of Barack Obama has been important for political participation in Europe. There are now African-origin politicians who claim to be the Paris Obama or the Brussels Obama or the Berlin Obama. It has created a kind of new energy, especially in African communities throughout Europe. This

again shows how interdependent we are. It could be said it's difficult to compare the experience of President Obama in the US to what's going on in Europe. But still, it is used by African immigrants as a model and they think, 'if it has happened in the US, maybe it will eventually happen in Europe, too.' Increasingly, there is discourse with clear references to Obama. The day he was elected, there were huge parties in immigrant communities throughout the European Union. He's very popular here and throughout the European Union in immigrant communities.

Looking to the future, what would you like to see in Belgium's immigration policy?

Dr. Martiniello: I would like to see a country in which immigrants are given a chance, an opportunity to fit in. I would like to see a country in which discrimination on the basis of religion, race, ethnicity, would decrease. I am not naïve, I know that it's impossible to totally get rid of discrimination, but it still harms too many peoples' lives and opportunities here. I would also like a clear view, but I am not sure it will be possible at the Belgian level. And at the European level that you know, we are a country, a continent of immigration.

I am not advocating an idealistic, romanticized view about immigration. But we were, we are, and we will be a country and a continent of immigration. Therefore

we need a clear policy of immigration. We need clear policies of integration. We need to be more active about the fear of discrimination. But that doesn't mean that we should accept any form of cultural assertion in the public space in Europe. There is a democratic order in Europe that everybody has to respect, immigrants and non-immigrants.

We have to consider all the people who live in Europe as partners, as co-citizens. Therefore, they need to have rights, duties, and obligations. I think we'll get there because we've made much progress. There are many positive signs for migration and race relations in Europe. But I think that we are going to struggle with migration for many more years because it's a difficult world with tensions that are expressed in ethnic terms, in religious terms, opposing immigrants to non-immigrants. We have to move to a multicultural democracy, based on equality of rights and duties for everybody. We should give more choice to people to contribute to development of Europe and certainly includes immigrants.

The Future of Migration in the Asia-Pacific

Dr. Graeme Hugo
University of Adelaide

AUSTRALIA

In any discussion of the future of global migration the Asia-Pacific region is of importance for a number of reasons including:

- It has 57.6 percent of the global population.
- It is the fastest growing, economically, of world regions and there is widening of the demographic and economic differentials between nations which the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM 2005, 6) identifies as the main drivers of international migration.
- The World Bank (UNESCAP 2009) estimates that 23.9 percent of the population of Asia and the Pacific live in poverty (954 million persons) - some 59.8 percent of the global total.
- The World Bank (2008) has shown that the Asia-Pacific provides 26.7 percent of the world's largest immigrant countries but 40 percent of the largest emigrant nations by numbers and 23 percent and 17 percent respectively by proportion. Of the 30 largest 'corridors' of international migration globally, 13 involve at least one Asia-Pacific nation.

However, international migration has until recently been neglected by Asian governments. Writing a decade ago (Castles 2003) argued that there was a need for nations of the Asia-Pacific region to make a 'conceptual leap' and recognize the reality of migration in the region and its importance to their future development. Although there is great diversity in the Asia-Pacific, an 'Asian Model' of international migration applied across the region in the 1990s, the features of which are shown in Box 1. International migration was viewed in negative terms by both sending and receiving countries and so there were strong constraints on migration between countries.

The last decade, however, has seen some limited, but nevertheless significant, shifts in the dominant 'model' of migration in the Asia-Pacific region. These include:

- An unprecedented increase in the scale and diversity of international migration in to, out of and especially within the Asia-Pacific.

Box 1: The 'Asian Model' of Migration in the 1990s

Source: Partly drawn from Castles, 2003

- Immigration needs to be highly restricted. It is not generally perceived as being a positive influence on society and economy.
- Even when there are good reasons for migration, such as the demand for labor or the arrival of asylum seekers fleeing persecution, it is not allowed.
- Emphasis has been on constraint, policing and exclusion rather than migration management. There is little tradition of the development of a managed migration system.
- Where the need for migrant workers, tourists, business people has been recognized as essential to the economy, this has been allowed strictly on a temporary basis and been open only to workers, not families. Their rights were strongly restricted.
- Foreigners should not be allowed to become citizens except in exceptional circumstances.
- Culture and identity should not be modified in response to external influences.
- Governance of migration is weak and rent taking and corruption are widespread.
- Migrants were perceived negatively in both origin and destination by politicians, the media and the community generally.
- Regional organizations (ASEAN, APEC) were not allowed to discuss migration at all

- A gradual recognition that migration is a long term structural feature of economies in the region rather than an annoying contingency to deal with short term labor shortage/surplus issues.

- Increased government engagement, with several nations developing new agencies dedicated to migration issues.
- For the first time discussion of migration issues in regional forums such as APEC and ASEAN.
- A recognition by some countries of the inevitability of some permanent settlement of foreign groups.

While these changes are evident, the progress is fragile. With the parametric increase in the scale and diversity of migration there has been a shift away from the overwhelmingly negative conceptualization of migration in the region. Nevertheless, there is a long way to go to mainstream migration into key national and regional discourses and planning in key areas like economic development planning, climate change adaptation and advancing regional, political, social and economic integration.

For most countries in the Asia-Pacific region, international migration has been of only minor significance until recently. Accordingly, it has been accorded little attention by governments and the structures, institutions and practices which they have in place to manage migration are limited. What are some of the major issues which the region faces in managing the anticipated increase in the scale and significance of international migration in the region over the next two decades?

- One of the major constraints on governments in the Asia-Pacific region in the development of efficient and equitable migration systems which work for the benefit of development in countries of origin and destination as well as the migrants is a lack of capacity – both in institutions and human resources.
- The Asia-Pacific region is anticipated to be affected by climate change more than any global region and its effects are one of the major challenges confronting several countries. However, migration is hardly mentioned in the intense activity relating to climate change in the region, nor in the National Adaptation Plans that have been formulated. Migration needs to be mainstreamed into the discourse on climate change in the region. While in situ adaptations will predominate, migration will also be an important adaptation mechanism and planning for it is an important priority.
- While there has been increasing discussion on the potential for migration to development impacts there remains little in the way of operational policies which

are designed to facilitate the development dividends of migration. Migration is still not mainstreamed in the development plans of countries in the region, even in those countries where remittances make up a significant part of export earnings. Indeed there is a distinct lack of policy coherence between migration and development policies and programmes.

- In the Asia-Pacific region until recently there has been little dialogue on migration between pairs of origin/destination countries or at a regional or subregional level. Regional governance of migration remains weak and in its earliest stages. In fact a decade ago there were virtually no regional fora for discussion of migration issues, let alone development of coherent regional migration policies and institutions within the Asia-Pacific region. In Asia and the Pacific the global trend toward regional organization development and regional cooperation is in evidence in the development of organizations like APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). However, little has been achieved with respect to regional agreement on international migration issues in those fora, although discussions about migration have commenced.
- While there are important differences between countries it is apparent that civil society are playing an increasingly significant role in international migration in the region, especially with respect to protection of the rights of workers. Most NGO activity in this area is nationally based but there are some emerging regional NGOs which cover several nations. It is particularly important to have NGOs which are active in pairs of origin and destination countries.
- The onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 has had a significant impact in Asia and the Pacific. The Chief of the Asian Development Bank has argued that the region has been especially hard hit due to inadequate safety nets with 60 million people being kept below the poverty line of US\$1.25 per day (Asian Migration News, 1-30 September 2009). The impacts of the crisis on mobility in the region are not entirely clear and have varied considerably from one country to another but a few generalizations can be made (Hugo 2009).
 - It seems to have impacted more on the flow of migrants more than the stock with little evidence of return movement of migrants established at destinations.
 - The impact has varied greatly between different types of migrants.

Those involved in construction, manufacturing, financial services and travel related services have suffered because of job losses while some areas have not been affected such as domestic workers, care workers and health workers.

- While previous research has shown that remittance flows tend to be countercyclical and represent a way of adjusting to crisis remittances seem to have been less affected by the crisis in Asia and the Pacific than they have been in Latin America (World Bank 2009). They have not decreased but are not increasing at pre-crisis rates (World Bank 2009).

The last decade has seen an unprecedented increase in the scale and significance of international migration in the Asia-Pacific region. There is increasing recognition across the region that migration is a structural feature of the region's economy and that there is a need to improve its governance and some progress has been made in this direction. Yet that progress is fragile. Anti-migration sentiments still abound, there is widespread exploitation of, and rent taking from, migrants and media and governments still predominantly portray migration in a negative light. Building the capacity of destination and origin countries to manage migration so that the benefits are maximized not only to them but also migrants is a crucial pre-condition to the development of an effective and equitable migration regime in the region.

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Immigration Issues in the United States

Interview with **Mark Krikorian**
Center for Immigration Studies

UNITED STATES

International Affairs Forum: The recent Arizona Immigration law requiring immigrants to carry their alien registration documents at all times has sparked considerable debate in the US and abroad. Your impressions of the law?

Mr. Mark Krikorian: The Arizona law wouldn't have been a big deal had the opponents not made it a big deal. They drew a line in the sand and decided to elevate it to a position that it really doesn't warrant. I don't oppose the law, it's a useful measure, but it's a very modest additional tool in the tool kit for immigration enforcement. Arizona's already done much of what it could do as a state in regard to immigration. They've passed an employer sanctions law to require all employers in the state to use the federal government's online screening system for new hires. They've prohibited public benefits for illegal immigrants. They tasked an anti-smuggling law that is used

to prosecute illegal immigrants, so long as they've not been kidnapped, and only if they voluntarily paid to be smuggled as co-conspirators in a smuggling conspiracy. So they've done a lot of things at the state level and kind of hit upon the measures in the Arizona law as some of the last few things they could do.

If the law had just been passed and implemented without a lot of fuss, nobody would have noticed. It would have made a little bit of difference. Some illegal immigrants would have noticed, but it wouldn't have been that big a deal. The opponents of the measure really needed a rallying point for their own constituencies. The President's and Congress's inaction on amnesty was really very dispiriting for the pro-amnesty, anti-enforcement organizations and some of them are very angry with Obama. The advocacy groups clearly saw the need for some kind of rallying point, some kind of object for a "two minute hate," to

borrow Orwellian terminology, and the place of Emmanuel Goldstein was filled by the Arizona law, as well as in a sort of secondary sense by Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County. That's what made this such a big deal. Now that support for the Arizona law has become a kind of litmus test for commitment to immigration enforcement, it's become this national issue. So pollsters asked the public, do you support the Arizona law or not. Well, neither the supporters nor the opponents have read the law. The Attorney General of the United States probably still hasn't read the law, and said as much. But in a sense, what they're really asking is, do you favor enforcement of America's borders or not? That's really the issue. It's not the Arizona law. It's become a proxy for a larger debate. Now the opponents of the law are getting the worst of it and I think at this point they're probably kind of regretting they ever brought it up.

What are you hearing about other states considering similar legislation?

Mr. Krikorian: I think there are a couple of dozen states where at least somebody in the legislature is talking about legislation similar to Arizona's. I actually would be much more interested in states passing laws like Arizona's employer sanctions law, the one that requires employers to use the E-Verify system, DHS's system to make it harder for illegals to get jobs. And in fact a lot of states are doing that

in some way or another. I think from the standpoint of policy effectiveness, going after the employers would do the most good. But the fact is that this latest Arizona law has become the yardstick for measuring support for enforcement and it's the anti-enforcement people who made it that way. In other words, if there are two dozen states considering passing the Arizona law, you can thank the National Council of La Raza and the Department of Justice for that, because they're the ones that raised it to this mythic, iconic level that it is now.

At first, I suspected states would kind of hold off until they saw the outcome of the litigation over the law. In other words, other states would say, we'll let Arizona bear the cost of litigating this thing and trying to get it past the judges. But once the Attorney General weighed in and the Department of Justice sued Arizona, it really became a matter of the states' own self respect and Washington trying to push them around. I suspect you're going to see next year, once legislatures come into session, because most of them don't start until January, more states than I would have thought otherwise actually moving forward in some way on the legislation. If only to spit in the eye of Washington and, in other words, daring the Justice Department to sue them, too. Now I think all those bills are not going to pass, there are all kinds of state specific politics going on in the various state capitols. But I actually suspect you're going to see one

or two states, maybe more, pass, and the governor sign, some similar legislation, almost as bait for the Justice Department, to get the Justice Department to sue them, too.

What effects do you think this legislation would have on law enforcement?

Mr. Krikorian: Not that much. Even when you talk to sheriffs in Arizona who support the law, they say that it's modestly effective but it's not a game changer. See, a lot of those things that the law requires are already being done in Phoenix and Maricopa County, because the cops have a lot of this authority anyway. What would change is that it would strongly encourage them to do things that cops in other jurisdictions are already doing. At the margins, the law will have some increased effect in immigration enforcement. But its effect on ordinary law enforcement is going to be modest, because it allows officers to use their judgment in the sense that it says they have to check legal status if practicable. That's a pretty broad phrase, and so I think it really wouldn't change much of anything in the day to day responsibilities and work of a state highway patrolman or a county sheriff's deputy.

What policies do you recommend for greater, more effective, US border security?

Mr. Krikorian: The most important thing in border security isn't at the border. It's turning off the magnet of jobs inside the country. Immigration enforcement has to happen across the board, and that means inside the country, at the border, and abroad, because one third of our illegal

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The most important thing in border security isn't at the border.
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alien population came in legally with visas, and they just never left. So the process of screening people for visas is a vital border control function that a lot of people forget.

But at the border itself, we do in fact need more and better fencing. There's just no question about it. To this day have still have parts of the Arizona border with no fencing at all and other places with some barbed wire just to keep cows from wandering off. It's not really fencing. We have a bridge in Texas that has no oversight, nobody's there keeping an eye

on who's crossing. The idea that we've done everything practicable to deal with the border itself is simply false. The Border patrol is still smaller than the NYPD, even after the significant increase we've seen over the past ten years. If every border patrolman were on the Mexican border, you would still have fewer than two agents per mile per shift. The idea that even at the border itself we're all set, that we can move on, is false.

But to get back to your question, the most important thing is making it as difficult as possible for illegals to work here, so that it becomes less appealing to come in the first place.

What would you propose for handling existing illegal immigrants in the United States?

Mr. Krikorian: The way this issue's usually presented is that there are only two choices: either everybody has to be rounded up in some kind of mass roundup and driven out of the country by Tuesday or, since we couldn't do that even if we wanted to, we have to legalize them. In other words, it's presented as a sort of a black and white choice and that there's nothing else you can do. That's false. The middle way, the only thing that actually could work, is consistent enforcement across the board to bring about attrition of the illegal population. In other words, instead of permitting it to rise every year,

we turn around the trend and get it to start shrinking every year, from one year to the next. And in fact, partly because of the economy, but also because of enforcement, we've seen the illegal population decline pretty significantly over the past three years. Our own estimates suggest it's declined by something like two million people from over 12 ½ million in summer of 2007, to between 10 ½ and 11 million today. That decline started before the recession so it's not purely an economic phenomenon. And even in the past, recessions have resulted in only very brief and very small reductions in the illegal population. This is pretty significant.

What that points to is the future direction of enforcement. Keep up worksite enforcement, improve border enforcement, and get tougher at our visas abroad. There's a whole variety of things we need to do. We need to see how much we can shrink the illegal population that way. We're not going to get every illegal alien to deport himself, or round him up and get him deported. But if we can shrink the illegal population by, say, half, and get it down to let's say five million, then it may be time to have a debate about whether we want to legalize some of the long term people who remain, whom we haven't been able to get to leave. I'm not sure I'd be for that or not, but it would be an appropriate subject for debate at that point. Legalization is simply not a legitimate topic even for debate. What we need now is across the board, unapologetic,

comprehensive enforcement, and nothing else. Then, later on, we can possibly have a debate about how we might do legalization and what might be, what price might be exacted for that.

A topic brought up often is concern over the cost of illegal immigration on the US, things like health, education -

Mr. Krikorian: The costs of illegal immigration mainly come from the characteristics of the illegal immigrants, rather than their illegality. In other words, the reason illegal immigration costs so much are the same reason that legal immigration costs so much. It's disproportionately made up of people with low levels of skill and education who can only get jobs that pay relatively low wages, and often don't provide health insurance. So they end up becoming wards of the state. They live off the taxpayers. But even if they have jobs, immigrants overall, illegal immigrants in particular, work at slightly higher rates than Americans. There's not a question of laziness or welfare queens or anything like that. But if you've got a fourth grade education in a modern economy like ours, it doesn't matter if you have three jobs. You cannot support a family on that, and you inevitably end up living off the taxpayer. In fact, the majority of immigrant families with children are on welfare, and that's all immigrant families, legal and illegal put together. Illegal immigration would actually be cheaper

than legal immigration because illegal immigrants themselves can't collect most government benefits for themselves. But because their kids who were born here are US citizens, they collect those benefits on behalf of their US citizenship and they're still getting the welfare. Of course, it's not like the three year old is getting the food stamps, the illegal immigrant adults are the ones using them and benefiting from them, but they're getting them on behalf of their kids.

So in a sense, illegal immigration is actually cheaper than legal immigration. We estimated about ten years ago that the cost to federal taxpayers, in other words, federal taxes paid and federal services used by illegal immigrants, was about \$10 billion a year. If those illegal immigrants were legalized, we estimated the cost to taxpayers would triple to almost \$30 billion. That was ten years ago. Certainly, the number would be even bigger now. But the point is, legalizing illegal aliens makes them eligible for far more government benefits than they are now. Even the ones who could have collected on behalf of their kids but were reluctant to do so because they didn't want to show their faces to the government, would be less reluctant now, and so the cost would balloon. The reason for that is not their illegality. In other words, the reason for the cost is that they're 19th century style, low educated workers coming into a 21st century knowledge based American economy, and there's no way to get

around that.

What's been your impression of the Obama Administration's policy on immigration to date?

Mr. Krikorian: They're torn between two imperatives. On the one hand, this administration is fundamentally opposed to the idea of national sovereignty and immigration control, period. They recoil at the idea of limits on immigration. On the other hand, they understand the political need to appear credible on immigration enforcement if they're going to persuade people, persuade Congress, to give them amnesty at some point. That's been the key stumbling block for supporters of amnesty. No one believes their promises that the law will be enforced in the future. They don't believe those promises for good reason, because they've been made before, and they were lies and are lies now. I mean, honestly, everybody gets that. That's why this administration understands they have to do something to appear credible, appear energetic and believable on enforcement, as much as they don't like it. They're trying to have their cake and eat it, too. They want to have open borders but they know they can't, so that results in things like an increase in audits of employers, where they go and check the personnel files and verify the information and tell them they have to fire any illegal aliens. But at the same time, there's a dramatic drop in the

number of illegal workers who actually get arrested. That sort of policy, of trying to split the difference, is what they're pursuing, and it doesn't work very well. There was a memo prepared from inside the bureaucracy by the General Counsel of US Citizenship and Immigration Service and what they were looking for was ways to bring about defector amnesty for as many people as they could, without having to ask Congress for permission. In other words, they were using their existing narrow authority for exceptional cases and applying it to millions of people if they could. That did give away the game: that's what they would want to do if they could get away with it. But it doesn't look like they're going to be able to get away with it.

The Center for International Relations holds student writing competitions for collegiate students where winners are eligible for publication in The Forum. The following two editorials are winners of the Summer-Fall 2010 Contest. The topic for this award:

Experts have been observing the changing attitudes towards immigration globally - both of legal and illegal immigration - and how the current global economic climate is having a direct impact on immigration policies. This issue has raised huge contradictions in many countries - the need for skilled and low-skilled labour in certain sectors to boost the economy, alongside with the problems of overburdened schools and social service & health care systems. Some have called the changing policies 'necessary and reasonable' under the current economic climate, others have stated that these 'racist' laws indiscriminately discriminates against immigrants.

Select a national, regional or global perspective and, using supporting facts and evidence, discuss what path respective policymakers should take to address this issue.

Student Writing Competition Winner

Targeting Immigration to Win Votes: Sarkozy and the Roma Expulsion

Raluca Besliu

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UNITED STATES

Already controversial in most Western European societies, immigration is likely to become an explosive topic in the following years, as more Western European politicians resort to manipulating it as a political tool to boost their declining popularity. As French President Sarkozy's recent crackdown against Roma immigrants will demonstrate, the political exploitation of immigration can lead to increasing discrimination of immigrant groups, violations of their fundamental rights and more restrictive migration policies, unless proper social and political measures are taken immediately.

With Presidential elections approaching in 2012 and recent polls predicting Sarkozy

will lose to his Socialist Party opponent,¹ the French President tackled the problematic situation of the Roma minority to increase his public support. Thus, on July 28, 2010, Sarkozy ordered the dismantling of Roma camps near Grenoble and the expulsion of over 700 Roma living illegally on French territory, by emphasizing that the camps threaten national security, as sources of trafficking, child exploitation and prostitution.²

This crackdown carries significant consequences not just for the Roma, but for all immigrant groups living in France. The President's decision amplified the stigma and discrimination against the Roma minority, already rights-deprived throughout the EU.³ Simultaneously, by associating illegal immigration with disruptive behavior and depicting it as a threat to the safety of the French citizens, Sarkozy indirectly undermined the situation of the 200,000 to 400,000 undocumented immigrants living in France.⁴

On a different note, the Roma expulsion was conducted in violation of one of the EU fundamental freedoms, the right to free movement of persons within the Union. Thus, it was done based on Directive 2004/38/EC, specifying that the expulsion of EU citizens can take place only if they constitute a threat to public security.⁵ If organized crime and international terrorism constitute serious public security threats and reasons for expulsion, trafficking and prostitution networks, which Sarkozy claimed the Roma camps were operating, are matters to be dealt with by the police, not the immigration officer. The fact that France, one of the EU founding fathers and creators of the Roma Declaration containing the right to free movement of persons, easily violated the principle raises questions about its commitment to the EU standards and the obligation of other Members to respect them.

Lastly, the French President plans to reinforce the Roma expulsion by adopting legal measures restricting immigration. Sarkozy emphasized that France must start selecting its immigrants, based on their skills and capacity to contribute to the society. This

1 Mark Deen, "Sarkozy Would Lose Election to Socialist Aubry, Poll Suggests," Bloomberg BusinessWeek, July 9, 2010, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-09/sarkozy-would-lose-election-to-socialist-aubry-poll-suggests.html> (accessed August 21, 2010).

2 Gerard Bon, "France to Dismantle Roma camps, expel offenders," Reuters, July 28, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDF66R2ES> (accessed August 21, 2010).

3 "Europe's Roma community still facing massive discrimination," Amnesty International, April 8, 2009, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/feature-stories/europes-roma-community-still-facing-massive-discrimination-20090408> (August 21, 2010).

4 "France: The offence of solidarity. Stigmatisation, Repression and intimidation of migrants' rights defenders," World Organisation Against Torture, June 11, 2009, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bac760d2.html>, (accessed August 21, 2010).

5 "Directive 2004/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004," <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:229:0035:0048:EN:pdf>, (accessed August 21, 2010).

proposal is dangerous, because it implies transforming immigration into a privilege of the educated and skilled, regarded as worthy of becoming French citizens, and rejecting those who might initially benefit themselves from coming to France, but, who, on the long-term, could significantly contribute to society.

Although the crackdown might have negative consequences for the Roma and other immigrant groups, it was a political victory for Sarkozy: his popularity rates rose for the first time in months,⁶ as his actions were well-received by French citizens of all political orientations. His success sets a dangerous precedent for other European politicians, by demonstrating that adopting hard immigration policies at country and European levels can boost popular support. Italian Interior Minister, Roberto Maroni, has already announced that Italy will propose automatic expulsions of EU citizens from other Member States in a future EU interior ministers meeting.⁷ If such measures pass, the right EU freedom of movement will soon become a myth.

France's immigration problems demand immediate and effective solutions. Firstly, French citizens must stop perceiving immigrants as a threat to national security. This can be only be done through French civil society awareness raising campaigns aimed at informing citizens about the benefits immigration can bring, denouncing the political exploitation of immigration issues, and persuading the French public to discredit the politicians who target the rights and dignity of other human beings in order to win votes.

Finally, France must re-evaluate the notion of the French identity and the type immigrant integration it offers. France must learn to embrace cultural differences of the immigrants living on its territory, instead of striving to maintain unchanged the Republican national identity.⁸ In order to avoid similar situations to the Roma expulsion, the French integration system should be improved and focus on avoiding ghettoisation and facilitating employment opportunities for immigrants. These measures and others should also be applied in all Western European countries, in order to ensure that immigration is not longer used as a political tool, but instead immigrants are respected and helped to integrate in their receiving societies.

6 Noah Barkin, "Analysis: Sarkozy targets crime to revive political fortunes," Reuters, August 8, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6770V520100808> (accessed August 21, 2010).

7 "Italy to raise EU citizen expulsion policy at September meeting," EUobserver, August 23, 2010, <http://euobserver.com/9/30657> (accessed August 21, 2010).

8 "France unveils national identity plans," BBC News, February 9, 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8505751.stm> (accessed August 21, 2010).

Student Writing Competition Winner

**Aiming at the Wrong People:
A More Comprehensive
Approach to Immigration Policy**

Sam Hansen

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UNITED STATES

Immigration debates have recently fueled media headlines all across the United States. From California to New York discourse on how to implicate effective immigration control policies have arisen. The Department of Homeland security estimated that there were 11.6 million unauthorized immigrants living in America as of January 1, 2008, with unauthorized immigrant population growing 36% between 2000 and 2008.¹ The significant rise in immigration rates has uncoincidentally come during a global economic recession. A current unemployment rate of 9.5%², the highest it has been since 1983³, in the United States has made jobs a scarce commodity. The current shortage in jobs causes an illegal immigrant work force, most likely willing to work for cheaper than a legal citizen, to become increasingly threatening to domestic income.

The current global economic situation exacerbates the issues associated with illegal immigration. A need for a more comprehensive and well thought out immigration policy is imperative for safeguarding domestic jobs while at the same time not throwing human rights to the wayside.

The first way to cut down on the amount of illegal immigrants attempting to enter a given country for jobs is through deterring local businesses from hiring illegal immigrants. Instead of municipal law enforcement worrying about finding and expelling illegal

1 Hoefler, Michael, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker. Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2008. Rep. DHS Office of Immigration Statistics. Feb. 2009. Web. <<http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/>>.

2 "Current Population Survey (CPS)." U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Web. 24 Aug. 2010. <<http://www.bls.gov/cps/>>.

3 Employment Status of the Civilian Noninstitutional Population, 1940 to Date. Rep. United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. Web. <<http://stats.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat1.pdf>>.

immigrants, they should be more conscious of discovering local businesses or individuals who hire these illegal immigrants and sanction them appropriately. Current punishment for knowingly or unknowingly hiring illegal immigrants is not enough of a disincentive for local businesses or individuals. Instead of increasing border patrol and enacting harsher immigration laws, such as Senate Bill 1070 in Arizona, local governments should attack the problem at the source and stop businesses and individuals from providing illegal immigrants occupational opportunities.

The problem with the current “hard” approach of increasing men with guns to secure the borders is that as long as there is an incentive for immigrants to migrate illegally to any country, they will adapt and find new ways to penetrate the border. If these immigrants find that once they have made the grueling journey across the border to a land where businesses are strict on hiring illegal immigrants and have a no tolerance policy for this matter, then illegal immigration will wane. The effectiveness of such policies will start at a municipal level. Empowering states to deal with this issue will prove more effective and less costly without the need for mass amounts of troops funded by the federal government to monitor every half-inch of our borders. Targeting “illegal” businesses, those who freely hire illegal immigrants as opposed to illegal immigrant individuals, will also eliminate the danger and controversy of potentially racist and non-constitutional legislature from arising. The United States, along with other countries globally struggling with issues of illegal immigration, need to seriously restructure immigration policy to become more comprehensive. Border security is absolutely a necessity, but it is not the only component in the equation. Businesses that hire unauthorized immigrants should be considered just as illegal as the immigrants they are knowingly hiring. Policies targeting local businesses emerging from municipal governments is the first step in alleviating the many problems currently associated with illegal immigration.

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By Marek Kupiszewski, Anna Kicingier, Dorota Kupiszewska, and Frederik Hendrik Flinterman, International Organization for Migration, November 2009

Displacement, Human Development, and Security in Afghanistan

By Khalid Koser, Brookings Institution, February 16, 2009

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By Ayman Zohry, Migration Letters, 2007

African Migration to Europe

By Julia Choe, Council on Foreign Relations, July 10, 2007

Temporary Immigration: A Viable Policy for Developed Countries

By Paola Subacchi, January 2005, Chatham House

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